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CHAPTER 1: 
General Introduction 
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This PhD thesis is about how organizations balance the interests of stakeholders in corporate 
governance. This is a highly relevant, but certainly not under-explored research question. In fact, since 
the very rise of modern corporations, it is a question that has always been part of the academic debate 
about the corporate governance of organizations. What changes however, is the answer to this 
question. As society changes, organizations change, and so do our theories. The aim of this PhD thesis 
therefore, is to contribute to broadening the scope of corporate governance research, by integrating it 
more closely with stakeholder theory. 
 
The Need to Rethink Corporate Governance for the 21st Century 
The classical economic analysis of the separation of ownership and control has set the stage for most 
contemporary research in corporate governance (Berle & Means, 1932). According to this analysis, 
the separation of ownership and control, a design feature that characterizes many modern 
organizations but is most pronounced in publicly listed firms, brings about significant efficiency 
advantages which explain its empirical prevalence (Fama, 1980). While decision-making power is 
allocated to a professional management that is able to economize on the transmission and handling of 
information (Arrow, 1974), the risk of ownership is borne by dispersed shareholders who are able to 
diversify their portfolio of shares and choose the extent of risk they wish to be exposed to (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b). This specialization of decision-making on the one hand, and risk-bearing on the other, 
however, does not only explain the survival value of the separation of ownership and control as a 
design feature, it also brings about its main weakness. Exactly because those who make decisions are 
separate from those who bear the consequences of these decisions, information asymmetries exists and 
agency problems arise between decision-making agents and risk-bearing shareholders (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a). How organizations can remedy these agency problems has been the dominant focus of 
existing research.  
In its analysis of stakeholders, agency theory focuses primarily on ‘patrons’, i.e. stakeholders 
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that transact with the firm (Hansmann, 1996), and makes a fundamental distinction between fixed 
claimants and residual claimants (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Fixed claimants transact with the firm 
through market contracting, and their claim on the firm is fixed in the contract. Employees, suppliers 
and customers of publicly listed firms are such examples. On the contrary, residual claimants transact 
with the firm through ownership and hence, they have a claim on the residual earnings of the firm. 
Because it is uncertain how much owners receive in return for their provision of resources, residual 
claimants bear much more risk than fixed claimants (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1983). In addition, due to 
information asymmetries between residual claimants and mangers, residual claimants are also prone to 
opportunistic behaviors by managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). Hence, of all of the firm’s patrons, 
agency theory views owners as the most important and vulnerable. 
The primacy of owner interests is also reflected in empirical research in corporate governance, 
as the focus has primarily been on mechanisms that protect shareholders against opportunistic 
managers (Dalton et al., 2007). The two proposed mechanisms are monitoring of managerial decision-
making, for example through independent boards (Dalton et al., 1999; Deutsch, 2005) and 
blockholding (Dalton et al., 2003), and bonding of managerial interests with shareholder interests, 
through financial incentives such as for example CEO ownership of shares (Tosi et al., 2000). Over 
the last 80 years, a massive amount of empirical research has been conducted on these various 
practices. However, very little consistent evidence as to their effectiveness has been accumulated 
(Dalton et al., 2007). 
Since the last decade there has been an increasing call for alternative approaches to the currently 
dominating agency-theoretic analysis of organizations (Tihanyi, Graffin & George, 2014; Starbuck, 
2014). This is partly due to the lacking empirical support for the theory’s predictions, but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, due to the changing nature of contemporary firms and their environment. 
The kind of firms that existed in the time of Berle and Means’ (1932) publication were stable 
organizations with clearly delineated legal and economic boundaries (Rajan & Zingales, 2000). This 
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has changed in two important ways. First, whereas in large, vertically integrated industrial firms, 
financial capital was the critical resource, in contemporary organization the balance has shifted toward 
human capital (Rajan & Zingales, 2000). As a result of technological changes and improved access to 
funding, economies of scale and scope through the possession of physical assets are no longer the 
primary source of competitive advantage (Davis, 2014). Instead, innovativeness, industry- and product 
knowledge which stem from human capital, are much more important. A key consequence of this 
development is that power, rather than being concentrated in the hands of shareholders, is now 
diffused throughout the firm (Rajan & Zingales, 2000; Davis, 2014). This diffusion of power among 
non-shareholding stakeholders has blurred the legal and economic boundaries of the firm, which were 
initially drawn around the ownership of physical assets (Rajan & Zingales, 2000). These changes 
significantly undermine the primacy of residual claimants advocated by agency theory, and reduce the 
theory’s applicability to modern corporations.  
Another factor that has contributed to the blurring of the traditional boundaries of firms is that, 
as a result of globalization and changing societal demands, the scope of relevant stakeholders to firms 
has broadened beyond patrons. The “vertical dis-integration” that took place across industries in the 
1990s and 2000s often involved outsourcing corporate activities and functions to other countries 
(Davis, 2014). The pressure to create shareholder value, together with the decreased control over 
overseas business units (Davis, 2014), resulted in a number of scandals by high-profile multinationals 
such as Nike and Shell, which severely damaged local communities (Gjølberg, 2009). Moreover, as 
organizations globalize, their ecological footprint expands while the ability of national governments to 
regulate this, actually diminishes (Scherer, Palazzo & Matten, 2009). These developments illustrate 
that stakeholders other than fixed and residual claimants also bear significant risk as a result of the 
firm’s activities. Economists refer to such effects as negative externalities, and although negative 
externalities as such are not new to the discussion of corporate governance, what is new is the 
importance society attributes to them. Globalization has intensified the extent of negative externalities 
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that firms produce, while simultaneously, mass communication technology such as the Internet has 
helped civil society to both accumulate and disseminate more information about corporate activities 
(Freeman, 1984). This has contributed to a much more informed society that imposes stricter 
legitimacy demands on firms than in the era of Berle and Means.  
These two societal developments have rendered the agency theoretic analysis of the corporate 
governance of organizations less powerful. Building on the conceptual distinction between fixed and 
residual claimants, the latter is argued to be the stakeholder group that 1) provides the most critical 
resource, 2) bears most risk due to their claim on residual earnings, and 3) is most vulnerable to 
expropriation (Hansmann, 1996). However, contemporary firms rely increasingly on human capital, 
rather than financial capital for achieving organizational success. This requires employees to make 
firm-specific investments (Rajan & Zingales, 2000), which makes them vulnerable to opportunistic 
behavior by managers as well (Blair & Stout, 1999). In addition, one of the consequences of 
globalization has been that firms increase their potential negative effect on stakeholders that are 
neither fixed nor residual claimants (Clement, 2005). Having no transactional relationship with the 
firm, and thus, no economic power to influence the firm, these third-party stakeholders are perhaps the 
most vulnerable stakeholders of all.  
In present-day corporations, residual claimants (i.e. the owners) are no longer the sole risk-
bearers of the firm. Many more stakeholder groups, including fixed claimants and even non-
transacting stakeholders bear risk. The difference between fixed and residual claimants, hence, is a 
matter of degree rather than kind. To better understand the nature of firms of the 21st century, and to 
be able to contribute to improving their corporate governance, a more inclusive understanding of firms 
and their stakeholders is needed.  
 
Stakeholder Theory: The Main Contender of Agency Theory 
One of the main contenders to the classical economic approach to corporate governance is stakeholder 
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theory. This theory was first introduced by Edward Freeman (1984) and proposes that firms are best 
understood as a set of relationships among groups that have a stake in the activities of the firm. 
Accordingly, the objective of organizations is to create as much value as possible for these 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004). One of the underlying questions of 
stakeholder theory is whether capitalism and ethics are connected (Parmar et al., 2010). Stakeholder 
theorists would argue that it is possible to effectively manage stakeholder relationships and thrive in 
capitalist systems (Freeman, 1994; Wicks, 1996), and that moreover, it is a moral obligation of 
managers to pursue this connection (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Phillips, 2003). Undoubtedly, 
stakeholder theory has a normative core (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Early discussions about 
stakeholder theory also revolved around normative questions including the purpose of organizations 
and their responsibility to society (e.g. Evan & Freeman, 1988; Freeman, 1994; Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1999; Jones & Wicks, 1999). Given the empirical, positivist research tradition in management 
scholarship, however, for stakeholder theory to be endorsed, researchers had to show that stakeholder 
management would not damage the competitive survival and economic sustainability of firms (Jones 
& Wicks, 1999).  
Not surprisingly, the last few decades have seen an exponential increase in research on the 
financial consequences of stakeholder management (cf. Margolish & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt 
& Rynes, 2003). Most research on this topic has been conducted under the banner of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). In the last four decades an impressive amount of research has been accumulated 
on the so-called corporate social and financial performance relationship, reflecting its popularity in 
management research, and strategic management more specifically (Crane & Gond, 2008). In this 
stream of research, stakeholder management is increasingly understood as a strategic asset much like 
technological investments, innovative capacity, or firm reputation. With the help of numerous 
databases such as for example the KLD database, scholars have been able to measure stakeholder 
management by means of a single composite score similar to how variables such as reputation and 
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innovativeness are typically measured. The advantages of this approach are obvious. It allows for 
“clean” empirical, quantitative analysis of stakeholder management, and enables scholars to 
circumvent the more challenging questions such as; how do firms balance conflicting demands of 
stakeholders? Arguably though, such questions lay at the heart of stakeholder theory.  
Stakeholder theory has contributed to corporate governance research by providing a broader 
conceptualization of the relevant stakeholders of firms. Its contribution however, is limited to the 
extent that it does not offer clear theoretical arguments or empirical evidence as to how and when 
firms manage and balance the interests of multiple stakeholders. This lack of theorizing was most 
articulately criticized by Jensen (2002) who claimed that stakeholder theory’s proposal to take into 
account multiple stakeholder interests, makes purposeful decision-making for managers impossible, or 
in other words, that “multiple objectives, is no objective” (p, 238). For stakeholder theory to establish 
a firmer position in corporate governance research, this major gap in our understanding must be 
addressed. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to this end.   
  
Towards a Closer Integration of Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Governance 
The leading question of this PhD thesis is: How do organizations balance the interests of multiple 
stakeholders in corporate governance? This thesis consists of three empirical chapters and each 
chapter tackles this research question from a slightly different angle. Chapter 1 zooms in on the 
dichotomy between shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders. At the core of the agency theory 
vs. stakeholder theory debate lays the question of whether firms should maximize value for 
shareholders or whether they should create value for other stakeholders as well. Rather than 
questioning the validity of the normative assumptions upon which these theories rely, as many other 
scholars have already done (cf. Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004; Freeman, et al., 2004), in 
this Chapter I study whether empirically, a trade-off between shareholders and stakeholders actually 
exists. The main research question of this Chapter is therefore: To what extent does the focus on non-
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shareholding stakeholders conflict with the shareholder value maximization proposition? The results 
of this Chapter illustrate that trade-offs are not always necessary. If firms manage their stakeholders 
strategically, they can create value for both shareholders and other stakeholders.  
Firms do not always create value but in some cases also destroy value. Chapter 2 therefore 
deals with corporate misconduct. If a win-win situation between shareholders and non-shareholding 
stakeholders can in emerge in the context of value creation, may there also be a ‘loose-loose’ situation 
in the context of value-destruction? According to economic theory, markets are efficient institutions 
able to fully reflect all available information. So upon revelation of corporate misconduct, financial 
markets will discount firm value accordingly (Karpoff & Lott, 1993). Chapter 2 empirically tests this 
proposition by studying the following question: What are the consequences for shareholders when the 
interests of non-shareholding stakeholders are harmed? I found that corporate misconduct against 
stakeholders that transact with the firm result in more negative financial performance than misconduct 
against stakeholders that do not transact with the firm. This finding implies that markets do not 
perfectly reflect the cost of misconduct. That is, the extent to which shareholders bear the negative 
consequences of corporate misconduct, depends on which stakeholder group is targed by the 
misconduct. In certain instances some of the costs of corporate misconduct are in fact shifted to non-
shareholding stakeholders.  
  In the third empirical Chapter, I study stakeholder management in Philanthropic 
Organizations (POs). POs are organizations that are legally barred from distributing profits to any of 
the organization’s stakeholders. Because ownership entails the formal right to control an organization, 
and the right to appropriate its profits, POs are in fact organizations without owners (Hansmann, 
1980). This specific feature renders fundamental propositions of agency theory, such as the primacy of 
the principal, inappropriate for the analysis of the governance challenges of these organizations. This 
makes POs a truly fruitful context for theory-building in stakeholder management. The main research 
question of Chapter 3 is therefore: What can we learn about stakeholder management from 
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organizations that do not even have formal owners? Through a comparative case study analysis I 
attempt to identify patterns in stakeholder balancing in POs. Based on the differential degree of 
involvability of key stakeholders, Chapter 3 develops a typology of four types of POs, each subject to 
a different stakeholder balancing challenge. To remedy this challenge, POs in each type may adopt 
different stakeholder management practices. This qualitative study offers fine-grained, empirical 
insights into stakeholder management as a process of managing the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders.  
 The findings of these empirical chapters informs how organizations balance stakeholder 
interests in corporate governance. While Chapter 1 shows that it is possible to pursue a stakeholder 
strategy without compromising shareholder profits, Chapter 2 reveals that it is unlikely that firms that 
pursue shareholder profits are able to do so without compromising stakeholders’ interests. This 
interesting asymmetry is a novel insight to the stakeholder management literature. Chapter 3 is based 
on POs and sheds light into the specific dynamics that predict which stakeholder interests are 
prioritized in corporate governance when there are no owners.  
 
The Structure of This Thesis 
This thesis is structured based on the three empirical studies mentioned above. In the following 
section I will summarize the main findings and contributions of each study. 
 
Chapter 2 
 Assessing the ‘Mechanisms Turn’ in Corporate Social and Financial Performance Studies: A 
Meta-Analysis1 
This study is a meta-analysis on the relationship between Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and 
Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). CSP represents a common way in which firms attempt to 
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create and distribute value to its various stakeholders. Even though a tremendous amount of research 
has been conducted on this relationship, our existing knowledge of it remains fragmented given the 
variety of theoretical lenses that inspire the field (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012), and the diverse empirical 
approaches that have been used. Through a meta-analysis, hence, I sought to synthesize the 
accumulated evidence. The question that drove my analysis was first, to what extent is it possible for 
firms to simultaneously create value for non-shareholding stakeholders as well as for shareholders, 
and second, under which conditions are firms best able to do so? The meta-analysis was based on 280 
primary studies that have been published in the last four decades. This is the most comprehensive 
dataset of CSP-CFP studies meta-analyzed to date. I derived partial and bivariate correlations on the 
focal relationship from these studies, and used state of the art meta-analytical techniques to analyze 
the data (i.e. HOMA by Hedges & Olkin, 1985; MARA by Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; and MASEM by 
Carney et al., 2011).  
Taken together, this study finds a modest but significant positive relationship between social and 
financial performance of firms. Simultaneously creating value for multiple stakeholders, therefore, 
appears to be possible. In addition, the data shows that there are four causal mechanisms that enable 
firms to implement CSP in a joint-value enhancing way. First, CSP investments positively affect firm 
reputation, which in turn enhances CFP. The theoretical mechanism that underlies this effect is a 
signaling mechanism (Certo, 2003; Fombrun, 1996). By means of a favorable reputation firms signal 
the quality of their products and internal processes to a broad range of stakeholders who lack in-depth 
knowledge about the firm. Second, CSP activities lead to stakeholder endorsement, which helps to 
improve CFP. This is a cooptation mechanism (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman, 
Withers & Collins, 2009). In this approach firms offer stakeholders direct CSP contributions or 
influence over CSP policy, which allows firms to gain their support for strategic initiatives. Third, 
investing in CSP was found to lower firm risk, while firm risk is negatively related to CFP. Through 
this risk mitigation mechanism (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001), 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Chapter 2 is co-authored by Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens, Hans (J.) van Oosterhout, and Marc van Essen. 
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firms use their CSP activities to prevent future loss of CFP by reducing their firm-specific risks. 
Finally, CSP investments increase firms’ innovative capacity, which has a subsequent positive effect 
on CFP. This is an opportunity identification mechanism (King & Lenox, 2002; Thompson & Heron, 
2006). Through internal experimentation with CSP, or by using CSP as a vehicle to structure 
interactions with external stakeholders, firms are able to identify opportunities for innovation. All four 
causal mechanisms were backed by robust empirical support from the meta-analysis.  
These findings support the notion that joint-value creation is possible; the act of creating value 
for one stakeholder group does not necessarily imply that it destroys value creation for another. If 
firms are able to use their CSP activities strategically, that is to 1) improve their reputation, 2) enhance 
stakeholder endorsement, 3) mitigate risk, or 4) increase innovative capacity, they can simultaneously 
create value for both shareholders as well as other stakeholders. Hence, stakeholders’ demands are not 
always conflicting, and therefore do not always require managers to make trade-offs. So based on four 
decades of empirical research on CSP and CFP, this meta-analysis concludes in favor of stakeholder 
theory and supports the claim that ethics and capitalism can go together.   
 
Chapter 3 
Is ‘Irresponsible’ ‘Unsustainable’? A Meta-Analysis of the Corporate Social Irresponsibility – 
Performance Relationship2 
In Chapter 3 I study corporate misconduct, which, for the sake of comparison, I refer to as ‘Corporate 
Social Irresponsibility’ (CSI) (cf. Lange & Washburn, 2012). Economists would argue that markets 
are self-cleansing institutions. The negative financial consequences that wrongdoers bear when 
misconduct is brought to light is argued to be sufficient to deter future CSI from happening (Becker, 
1968). In this study I question this assumption. I take stock of the existing research on the financial 
effects of CSI and perform another meta-analysis to draw conclusions regarding the self-cleansing 
                                                          
2 Chapter 3 is co-authored by Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens, Hans (J.) van Oosterhout, and Marc van Essen. 
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capacity of markets. While the typical goal of meta-analysis is to synthesize empirical findings and 
test theoretical predictions, more innovative applications of meta-analysis also allow for theory 
extension (MASEM: Carney et al., 2011). Using such applications, I furthermore examine whether 
corporate governance practices, which are typically designed to avoid value destruction for 
shareholders, also play a role in avoiding value destruction for other stakeholders.  
 This meta-analysis includes 244 primary studies on the relationship between CSI and CFP. 
Based on the partial correlations collected from these primary studies, the overall meta-analytic mean 
between CSI and CFP was found to be -0,12. This effect is significant in statistical terms, but only 
modest in practice. It suggests that markets do perform a policing role with respect to CSI, but it also 
shows that they cannot entirely be regarded as self-cleansing institutions. The results also reveal that 
the relationship between CSI and CFP tends to be more negative when corporate misconduct affects a 
related party stakeholder, i.e. a stakeholder with whom the firm transacts, rather than a third party 
stakeholder, i.e. a stakeholder with whom the firm does not transact, such as the natural environment 
or local communities. An obvious explanation for this differential effect is that related party 
stakeholders, on whom the firm depends for key resources, are able to jeopardize the firm’s future 
stream of income. Third party stakeholders on the other hand, lack such reciprocal relationship and 
therefore are only limitedly able to financially penalize the firm (Karpoff & Lott, 1993; Murphy, 
Shrieves & Tibbs, 2009).  
To investigate the role of corporate governance in preventing CSI, I studied the relationship 
between CSI and six specific corporate governance practices: blockholding, board size, institutional 
ownership, CEO duality, board independence and inside ownership. According to the findings, both 
the presence of blockholding owners and large boards reduce the occurrence of CSI. These specific 
corporate governance practices enhance the ability of owners and boards to monitor managerial 
behavior (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Dalton et al., 1999). Even though these practices are implemented 
to reduce agency problems, the results show that they also reduce corporate misconduct more broadly. 
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Conversely, inside ownership, which entails stock ownership by executives, was found to increase the 
prevalence of CSI. Inside ownership is a corporate governance practice aimed at tying executive 
compensation more closely to firm performance as expressed by share price. A downside of such 
bonding practices is that it may incentivize excessive risk-taking by managers because it imposes 
expectations on performance but limited constraints on behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). Increased CSI, 
hence, might be a behavioral consequence of bonding corporate governance practices. The other 
corporate governance practices; institutional ownership, CEO duality and board independence, were 
not found to have significant relationship with CSI.  
Although there is comfort in the thought that better governed firms are also less prone to CSI, 
most corporate governance practices are designed to remedy the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and not necessarily to remedy conflicts of interests 
between the firm and its non-shareholding stakeholders (Kraakman, 2004). This meta-analysis showed 
that monitoring practices reduce the prevalence of CSI, while bonding practices such as inside 
ownership in fact, increases CSI. Hence, practices that protect one stakeholder group from value 
destruction might in fact enhance value destruction for another stakeholder. In addition, as the 
findings demonstrate, markets cannot entirely be relied upon to weed out corporate transgressors. CSI 
has a modest negative effect on firm performance suggesting that at least some of the costs of 
corporate misconduct are borne by non-shareholding stakeholders. Since the interests of third party 
stakeholders in particular, are weakly protected by markets, they are the most vulnerable to CSI.  
 
Chapter 4 
Governance without Ownership: A Qualitative study of the Corporate Governance of 
Philanthropic Organizations3 
In the  and final chapter of this thesis I performed an empirical study on stakeholder management in 
                                                          
3 Chapter 4 is co-authored by Hans (J.) van Oosterhout. Lucas C.P.M. Meijs provided invaluable access to data.  
12B_BW_Vishwanathan_standV3.job
 
 14 
POs. POs are formal organizations without owners that produce goods or services for one stakeholder 
group (i.e. the beneficiaries), that are predominantly paid for by another stakeholder group (i.e. the 
donors). While POs may not be the most obvious research object for most management scholars, they 
are in fact an ideal type organization to study stakeholder management. As nonprofit organizations, 
POs have a so-called non-distribution constraint, which prohibits them from distributing their earnings 
to organizational stakeholders (Hansmann, 1980). As a result, POs have no formal owners and thus 
have no dominant stakeholder group, such as shareholders, whose interests are leading in corporate 
governance. In addition, POs have two main stakeholder groups; beneficiaries and donors, who differ 
significantly with respect to their economic bargaining power over the PO. This asymmetry offers a 
unique setting to study how organizations balance the interests of different stakeholders.  
 Despite these unique organizational features of POs, the agency theoretic analysis of the 
separation of ownership and control in publicly listed firms has also been the dominant framework for 
analyzing the corporate governance challenges of POs, and nonprofit organizations more broadly 
(Ostrower & Stone, 2006; Miller, 2002). Drawing parallels between owners of public firms and 
donors of nonprofit organizations, the literature has primarily focused on the question of how POs can 
be held accountable to their donors (Steinberg, 2010; Ostrower & Stone, 2006). This resulted in so 
much board research, that scholars have come to implicitly equate nonprofit governance with board 
functioning (Cornforth, 2012). Other governance functions such as decision-making have been 
overshadowed by accountability practices (Cornforth, 2012; Coule, 2013), and also other stakeholders 
such as beneficiaries and volunteers have been largely ignored (Jegers, 2009; Wellens & Jegers, 
2011). To break away from this path-dependency on agency theory, this research adopts an inductive, 
qualitative research approach to develop a theory about the specific corporate governance challenges 
of POs.  
This study is based on a qualitative comparative case study analysis of 34 Dutch POs, which 
were selected through a most different systems sampling design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). I used 
13A_BW_Vishwanathan_standV3.job
 
 15 
interview data, archival data and focus groups and found that stakeholder management in corporate 
governance is essentially about managing the involvement of stakeholders, and specifically, the 
involvement of donors and beneficiaries. An important predictor of stakeholder management in POs 
that emerged from the data is “stakeholder involvability”, defined as the extent to which it is possible 
to involve a stakeholder group in the organization. Stakeholder involvability is high when 
stakeholders are individually identifiable and physically approachable to the PO, and able to 
meaningfully and effectively communicate with the PO. Under such circumstances, it is more likely 
that stakeholders are involved in corporate governance. The core prediction of the emerging theory is 
that due to the differential degree in which donors and beneficiaries are involvable, different POs will 
have a different dispositional tendency to incorporate donor interests over beneficiary interests in 
organizational governance, and vice versa. After developing a typology showing how different types 
of POs face subtly different governance challenges, the findings illustrate how involvement enhancing 
or restricting governance practices may functionally contribute to meeting this challenge.  
  This research offers novel, fine-grained insights into stakeholder management as a corporate 
governance practice. It proposes that stakeholder management is essentially about managing 
involvement, and that the extent of involvement is strongly influenced by stakeholder involvability. In 
addition, by looking at two specific stakeholders, this study also illustrates when priority is given to 
one stakeholder group over the other, and how stakeholder involvement practices can influence this 
balancing act. Even though these conclusions were drawn from the context of nonprofit organizations, 
also for profit organizations stand to benefit from these findings. The beneficiaries of POs resemble 
third party stakeholders of for profit organizations in that they also have no a transactional relationship 
to the PO. While for profit firms are increasingly pressured to minimize their negative externalities on 
third parties (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), the core business of POs is in fact to maximize positive 
externalities. By looking at how POs structure their corporate governance to achieve this, for profit 
firms may gain insights into how to manage their own third party stakeholders, and perhaps, more 
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successfully live up to sustainability demands.  
Concluding Remarks 
At the center of the intersection between corporate governance and stakeholder management lies the 
question of how organizations balance stakeholder interests. The three studies of this PhD thesis 
address this question. Chapter 1 showed that CSR practices, which typically enhance value creation 
for non-shareholding stakeholders, may create value for shareholders as well. This implies that 
balancing stakeholder interests does not always require making trade-offs. Chapter 2, on the other 
hand, showed that corporate governance practices, which are designed to avoid value destruction for 
shareholders, in some instances actually enhance value destruction for non-shareholding stakeholders. 
With respect to preventing corporate misconduct, hence, trade-offs between stakeholders have to be 
made.  Finally, Chapter 3 showed that stakeholder balancing is to an important degree determined by 
stakeholder involvability. In order to optimally balance stakeholder interests in corporate governance, 
organizations must adopt practices that enhance or restrict the involvement of stakeholders in 
corporate governance.  
 With these findings, this PhD thesis contributes to more closely integrate stakeholder theory in 
corporate governance research. By providing empirical evidence on when and how joint value creation 
for stakeholders is possible, I hope my research enables managers to engage in more purposeful 
decision-making, and inspires scholars to further study the complex process of balancing conflicting 
stakeholder interests.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
Assessing the ‘Mechanisms Turn’ in Corporate Social and Financial 
Performance Studies: A Meta-Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Prior research has found a positive relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and 
corporate financial performance (CFP). Amongst CSP researchers, however, there neither is 
consensus about the appropriate specification of the relationship, nor about the mechanisms through 
which both variables are connected. Because recent research has mostly focused on the mechanisms 
that mediate the CSP – CFP relationship, we meta-analyze 280 primary studies to develop and test a 
theoretical framework specifying four paths involving mediating mechanisms. We find that firms 
benefit financially when using CSP to improve their reputations, co-opt critical stakeholders, mitigate 
firm risk, and jump-start innovation. We also find that these results are robust over three alternative 
specifications of the CSP – CFP relationship: endogeneity, omitted joint causation variables, and 
virtuous circle theory.  
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Introduction 
Firms’ investments in corporate social performance (CSP), commonly defined as their voluntary and 
extralegal participation in social and environmental issues (Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), have long puzzled management scholars. Even in competitive industries 
corporations routinely use their discretion to reduce pollution (King & Lenox, 2002) and “voluntarily 
over-comply with environmental regulations” (Konar & Cohen, 2001: 289). Furthermore, managers 
frequently create separately endowed corporate charitable foundations supporting philanthropic 
activities that serve no direct business interest (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990). Additionally, employers go to great lengths to stimulate workplace diversity and work-life 
balance programs, even when not coerced to do so by law or labor unions (Aguilera et al., 2007; 
Turban & Greening, 1997). In short, a firm that engages in CSP “allocates more resources to satisfy 
the needs and demands of its legitimate stakeholders than would be necessary to simply retain their 
willful participation in the firm’s productive activities” (Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010: 58). 
To solve this ‘puzzle’ of corporations’ discretionary participation in social and environmental 
issues, researchers have devoted much attention to the relationship between CSP and corporate 
financial performance (CFP) ever since the late 1970s (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Chen & 
Metcalf, 1980; Kedia & Kuntz, 1981). Most of the authors involved with these earlier studies focused 
on justifying managers’ decisions to engage in CSP (van Oosterhout & Heugens, 2008) by arguing 
that CSP activities generate CFP (cf. Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009). By showing the possible 
existence of a positive and significant association between CSP and CFP, these scholars tried to build 
the ‘business case’ for CSP (Barnett, 2007). Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) synthesized this 
stream of research in an influential meta-analysis, which corroborated the existence of a positive and 
significant association between CSP and CFP. The upshot of their analysis was that there is a business 
case for CSP, as CSP investments frequently strengthen the financial results of the focal firm.  
Orlitzky and his associates did not intend their meta-analysis to be conclusive, but rather used 
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it to “identify areas in which there have been relatively few studies conducted” (2003: 425) and they 
found “that interesting questions remain” (2003: 426). Numerous scholars have concurred that we still 
know too little about the precise mechanisms through which CSP translates into CFP. For example, 
Margolis and Walsh concluded that the relationship between CSP and CFP is likely to be more 
complex than direct causality, and that there is thus “a need for a causal theory” (2003: 278) linking 
the two together. Observing the frequently positive association between CSP and CFP, Konar and 
Cohen similarly concluded that “[w]hat we have yet to understand, however, is whether this 
relationship is truly causal” (2001: 289). In response to these calls to arms, scholars have increasingly 
begun to conduct studies aimed at explaining the CSP – CFP link by stipulating concrete causal 
mechanisms (van Oosterhout & Heugens, 2008). Indeed, the number of studies proposing and testing 
a variety of causal mechanisms has skyrocketed in the past decade (e.g., Barnett, 2007; Godfrey, 
Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Husted, 2005; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Luo et al., 2013; Uotila et al., 
2009).  
While we see this ‘mechanisms turn’ in CSP – CFP studies as an important step forward, our 
understanding of how CSP is causally related to CFP is currently limited in two ways. First, there is 
presently no consensus concerning the appropriate specification of the CSP – CFP relationship. While 
most contemporary researchers opt for a mediating variables specification, in which CSP affects CFP 
only indirectly through its influence on an intervening factor, others opt for specifications involving 
endogeneity (Ghoul et al., 2011; Goss & Roberts, 2011), omitted joint causation variables (Bansal, 
2005; Barnett, 2007), or ‘virtuous circles’ (Surroca et al., 2010; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Second, 
our existing knowledge of the CSP – CFP relationship remains fragmented. Due to the 
multidisciplinary and multitheoretical nature of the CSP concept (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012), the 
mechanisms turn in CSP – CFP studies has generated a wide variety of theoretical mechanisms 
linking both constructs together, as well as a substantial but diverse body of empirical evidence. 
Further advancement in the CSP field thus hinges on a critical assessment of the alternative 
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specifications of the CSP – CFP relationship, and on a theoretical and empirical integration of prior 
studies.  
In the present study, we seek this advancement by making three contributions. First, we 
construct a comprehensive theoretical framework detailing the mechanisms through which firms’ CSP 
activities affect their CFP. This framework identifies four mediating mechanisms that are activated by 
CSP: signaling the firm’s attractiveness through its reputation (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Surroca et 
al., 2010), co-opting external stakeholders (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Sharma & Henriques, 2005), 
mitigating firm risk (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Godfrey, 2005), and stimulating innovation (Hull & 
Rothenberg, 2008; King & Lenox, 2002). As these four mechanisms are found to fully mediate the 
CSP – CFP relationship, our theoretical framework synthesizes and structures the extant body of 
evidence. Second, we clarify the debate concerning the most appropriate specification of the CSP – 
CFP relationship by concurrently testing the mediating mechanisms, endogeneity, omitted joint 
causation variables, and virtuous circle specifications. While we find that several of these theoretical 
specifications have some empirical merit, the mediating mechanisms specification surfaces as the one 
offering the most robust explanation of how CSP is causally linked to CFP. Third, to address the need 
for a more consistent empirical approach in CSP – CFP research (Peloza, 2009), we critically evaluate 
the currently prevailing measurement strategies, research designs, and model specifications in CSP 
research, and develop a set of best-practice recommendations to guide future research studies.  
Our meta-analysis is based on the most complete database of the CSP – CFP relationship to 
date, spanning 280 primary studies and covering more than 40 years of research. We use correlation-
based and partial correlation-based Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 
1985) to establish the associational strength of the focal relationship. Furthermore, we use meta-
analytic structural equations modeling (MASEM), to test our mediating mechanisms hypotheses 
(Aguinis, Bergh, & Joo, 2011; Carney et al., 2011) and to compare the explanatory power of 
mediation models against specifications involving omitted joint causation variables or virtuous circles. 
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Finally, we employ meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) to diagnose 
whether CSP is endogenous upon CFP and to establish the robustness of our results. We also use 
MARA to map the influence of different methodological and theoretical moderator variables on the 
CSP-CFP relationship and to arrive at recommendations for future research.  
Theory & Hypotheses 
The Problem of Specification  
The field of management has accumulated over four decades of research and evidence on the 
questions of whether and how CSP is related to CFP (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Margolis & Walsh, 
2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003). In spite of these efforts, however, what is the most appropriate 
specification of the relationship between both constructs remains disputed to this day. Whereas many 
earlier studies explored the correlation between CSP and CFP (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Chen & 
Metcalf, 1980; Cochran & Wood, 1984; Kedia & Kuntz, 1981), the idea that there is a direct causal 
link between ‘doing good’ and ‘doing well’ has fallen out of favor with the CSP community. Instead, 
CSP researchers currently hold at least four alternative views concerning the most appropriate 
specification of the CSP – CFP relationship. 
The first of these views is that CSP is wholly or partially endogenous upon CFP, such that CSP 
is not an antecedent to CFP but rather a consequence of it (Garcia-Castro, Ariño, & Canela, 2010; 
Ghoul et al., 2011). When stronger prior financial performance provides companies with the necessary 
means to engage in CSP, the relationship between CSP and CFP could be one of bidirectional or 
reverse causality. A failure to correct for endogeneity can then lead to inflated estimates of the focal 
relationship (Goss & Roberts, 2011). The second view is that the relationship between CSP and CFP 
is spurious due to omitted joint causation variables (cf. Bansal, 2005; Barnett, 2007). In this 
interpretation, the direct relationship between CSP and CFP is either weak or nonexistent, as both 
phenomena are in fact related to a third variable, which tends to be omitted from the equation. 
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Candidate variables that could be related to both CSP and CFP include environmental munificence 
(Goll & Rasheed, 2004) and organizational slack (Bansal, 2005). Accounting for these variables in a 
joint causation model is thus likely to either make the focal relationship weaker or disappear 
altogether. The third view is that the relationship between CSP and CFP is only part of a wider system 
of interlocking equations (Surroca et al., 2010; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Concretely, “social 
performance seems to be both a predictor and a consequence of financial results, forming […] a 
virtuous circle” (Surroca et al., 2010: 463). According to this virtuous circle theory, the relationship 
between CSP and CFP is more complex than simple bi-directionality or reverse causality, and 
involves iterative processes that link the two variables together in a time-ordered recursive sequence. 
The fourth and final view, which has by far gained the strongest traction amongst CSP researchers, is 
that CSP and CFP stand in a mediated relationship to one another (Godfrey, 2005; Husted, 2005; Luo 
& Bhattacharya, 2006; Luo et al., 2013; Uotila et al., 2009). The mediation view entails that CSP is 
not a direct driver of firm performance, but rather a firm attribute that can influence other 
organizational variables, which are directly linked to CFP.  
 
Towards an Integrative Mediation-Based Framework 
In the present study, we follow the current trend in the mechanisms-based CSP literature by focusing 
on meta-analyzing mediation models, although we will also account for other specifications of the 
CSP – CFP relationship in a series of additional analyses4. A focus on mediating mechanisms is also 
warranted for three substantive reasons. First, the possibility to distinguish between several concurrent 
mediation paths is congruent with the theoretical idea that CSP is a complex construct that involves 
firm actions in different domains targeted towards different stakeholder groups (Aguinis & Glavas, 
2012; Brammer & Millington, 2008; Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, & Eilert, 2013). Second, the 
theoretical structure of mediation models is widely accepted, such that mediation hypotheses can be 
                                                          
4 We thank SMJ editor Will Mitchell and both of our anonymous reviewers for encouraging us to consider alternative 
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stated with great clarity and conceptual precision (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Third, formal statistical 
tests like the Sobel, Aroian, and Goodman tests have been developed for assessing mediation models 
(MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993). This makes mediation hypotheses more refutable than hypotheses 
based on alternative specifications, for which such tests are frequently still forthcoming.  
Concretely, we construe an integrative theoretical framework stipulating four mediating 
mechanisms. The first is a signaling mechanism (Certo, 2003; Fombrun, 1995), which is activated 
when firms use their reputation to convey the quality of their products or internal processes to 
stakeholders who find it difficult to assess the true quality of the firm due to information or knowledge 
asymmetries. The second is a cooptation mechanism (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman, 
Withers, & Collins, 2009). Firms can gain stakeholders’ endorsement of future strategic initiatives 
either by offering them direct CSP-related contributions or indirect influence over CSP policy. The 
third mechanism is rooted in risk mitigation (Godfrey et al., 2009; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001). CSP 
expenditures may function as a quasi-insurance against future losses in CFP by avoiding firm-specific 
risks or by cushioning their impact. The fourth and final mechanism is CSP-related opportunity 
identification (King & Lenox, 2002; Thompson & Heron, 2006). A firm’s discretionary participation 
in social and environmental issues exposes it to previously unencountered internal implementation 
challenges and external stakeholder relationships, both of which provide new innovation 
opportunities. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of our integrative theoretical framework. We 
proceed to argue in greater depth how these four paths link CSP to better CFP, formulating a specific 
hypothesis for each path. 
 
Hypotheses Development 
Firm reputation: A firm’s reputation is “a perceptual representation of a company’s past 
actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
specifications of the CSR – CSP relationship, in addition to the mediating mechanisms specification. 
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compared to other leading rivals” (Fombrun, 1996: 72). Reputations act as an information signal, from 
which the firm’s audiences can infer its standing vis-à-vis its competitors in product, labor, and  
 
FIGURE 1 
Mediation models 
financial markets (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). An important question in 
the CSP literature is: do firms that have better CSP have better reputations than those with poorer CSP 
(Konar & Cohen, 2001)? Two complementary mechanisms have been argued to produce a positive 
link. First, CSP can be seen as a direct and pro-active contribution to the welfare of key constituents, 
which sends an information signal to outsiders that the firm aspires to achieve a “mutualistic 
relationship with potentially powerful groups in their environments” (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990: 
239). For example, Turban and Greening (1997) found that when firms invest in social programs, their 
reputation as an employer improves. Second, CSP can function as a restitution device: after it has 
committed illegal acts, a firm can use strategic philanthropy and other forms of CSP to restore its 
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reputation in the eyes of societal stakeholders. In the words of Williams and Barrett (2000: 348): 
“charitable giving appears to be a means by which firms may partially restore their good name 
following the commission of illegal acts”. In short, several theoretical mechanisms suggest a positive 
association between CSP and firm reputation, and earlier studies have shown that these mechanisms 
indeed operate in practice (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Konar & Cohen, 
2001; Rowley & Berman, 2000).  
A second important question is: do firms with better reputations have stronger financial 
performance? Prior research has found that “firms that have better (…) reputations have higher 
intangible assets” (Konar & Cohen, 2001: 289) and report stronger scores on accounting measures of 
profitability (Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Several mechanisms have been argued to effectuate a 
stronger link between firm reputation and CFP. First, good reputations allow firms to charge premium 
prices for their products, both because consumers prefer to associate themselves with prestigious 
companies and because they take reputation as an indicator of the companies’ superior product quality 
(Klein & Leffler, 1981; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). Second, firms with good reputations are also 
better positioned in labor markets, allowing them to attract talented and exceptionally productive 
employees (Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2008; Stigler, 1962). Third, more reputable firms also 
have better access to external financing, which lowers their cost of capital and allows them to finance 
attractive business opportunities (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Engelen & Van Essen, 2011). In other words: 
“corporate reputation is an important strategic asset that contributes to firm-level persistent 
profitability” (Roberts & Dowling, 2002: 1091). See Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: The CSP – CFP relationship is mediated by firm reputation: CSP is positively 
related to firm reputation, whereas firm reputation is positively related to CFP. 
 
Stakeholder endorsement: Whereas some firms may be intrinsically committed to stakeholder 
welfare, most firms seek involvement with stakeholders on instrumental grounds in a deliberate 
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attempt to secure endorsement of their policies and strategies (Berman et al., 1999; Wood & Jones, 
1995). CSP is then often the primary vehicle through which firms seek to co-opt stakeholder groups. 
In the words of Berman and his associates: “stakeholder relationships and resource allocation 
decisions [towards CSP] are inseparable, because how managers distribute resources inevitably has 
implications for the strength of stakeholder relationships” (1999: 503). Such focused resource 
allocation decisions have been shown to affect the firm’s endorsement by various stakeholder groups 
(Harrison et al., 2010; Sharma & Henriques, 2005). First, institutional investors like pension funds and 
mutual funds – which currently own 73% of the outstanding stock of the largest 1000 U.S. firms 
(Conference Board, 2010) – frequently use social and environmental ‘screens’ when selecting 
investment targets. Firms that have adequate CSP ‘qualify’ for institutional investments, whereas 
firms with lackluster CSP generally do not (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999). 
Second, consumers may respond positively to a firm’s efforts to engage in CSP, identify more 
strongly with firms acting in responsible ways, and derive more satisfaction from products or services 
stemming from high CSP firms (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006). Third, regulators who have the direct 
power to enact laws and enforce CSP may be positively inclined towards firms’ voluntary 
participation in social problems, and allow these firms to pursue self-regulation (Sharma & Henriques, 
2005). CSP can thus enact a mode of voluntary cooperation between firms and government and 
prevent antagonism in this essential stakeholder relationship (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). Fourth, 
companies that engage in employee-oriented CSP tend to enact greater job satisfaction and lower 
turnover amongst their workers (Turban & Greening, 1997). In short, CSP can secure the endorsement 
of vital stakeholder groups. 
Prior research has shown that crafting mutually productive relationships with stakeholders can 
have a direct positive effect on firms’ financial performance (Berman et al., 1999; Wood & Jones, 
1995). This happens either because the endorsing stakeholders are willing to make resources available 
to the firm on more favorable terms or because they impose fewer costs and demands upon it. When a 
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firm is eligible for institutional investments because its CSP meets the criteria of socially engaged 
investors, it increases the potential influx of financial capital and subsequently lowers its financing 
costs (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999). This effect is increased further when 
firms engage in voluntary social and environmental disclosures, which reduces information 
asymmetries between firms and their financiers and lowers the cost of capital (cf. Richardson & 
Welker, 2001). Furthermore, firms with more satisfied customers tend to enjoy greater customer 
loyalty, are able to charge consumers premium prices, and therefore achieve higher levels of cash 
flows and market valuation (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006). Also, firms that manage to convince 
regulators to let them regulate themselves can avoid expensive compliance costs and penalties, and 
can seek CSP strategies that are most closely aligned with their market strategies (Sharma & 
Henriques, 2005). Finally, firms that inspire greater loyalty and emotional involvement amongst their 
workers are frequently able to get ahead of competitors in industries in which the quality of human 
capital is a decisive factor (Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Turban & Greening, 1997). In short, gaining the 
support of primary stakeholder groups has positive financial consequences for firms. See Hypothesis 
2:  
Hypothesis 2: The CSP – CFP relationship is mediated by stakeholder endorsement: CSP is 
positively related to stakeholder endorsement, whereas stakeholder endorsement is positively 
related to CFP. 
 
Firm risk: All firms occasionally commit acts that hurt the interests of their stakeholders, 
ranging from oil spills through plant closures to workplace safety incidents. In response, stakeholders 
may impose sanctions upon transgressing firms, which can take a variety of forms, including 
environmental protection agency penalties (Konar & Cohen, 2001), superfund liability (Barth & 
McNichols, 1994), boycotts or lawsuits initiated by customers (Godfrey et al., 2009), and heightened 
scrutiny by legislative bodies (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). When shareholders observe such sanctions, 
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and adjust their expectations concerning future profitability accordingly, transgressing firms incur so-
called unsystematic risk, or “variability in a firm’s stock price associated with events that primarily 
affect only that firm” (Bansal & Clelland, 2004: 93). By improving their CSP, firms can lower their 
risk in two ways. First, by making focused investments in health, safety, and environmental programs, 
firms can avoid the type of transgressions that could lead to stock price variability. Specifically, by 
anticipating foreseeable risks and by redesigning their operations to prevent these risks from 
materializing, “companies will be more proactive and effective in mitigating the wide array of social 
problems” (Porter & Kramer, 2006: 10) associated with their core business. Second, by making 
credible CSP commitments a priori, firms can ‘insure’ themselves against a posteriori societal 
blowback in case transgressions do happen. Concretely, CSP creates a ‘reservoir of goodwill’ 
(Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004) or a stock of ‘positive moral capital’ (Godfrey, 2005) protecting the firm 
from incurring sanctions after accidents or occasional misdeeds (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006; 
Godfrey, 2005; Peloza, 2006). Thus, “being trusted by stakeholders and pursuing socially responsible 
policies, reduces risks arising from safety issues, potential boycotts and loss of corporate reputation” 
(Knox & Maklan, 2004: 26). In short, CSP investments reduce firm risk by preventing certain 
corporate transgressions from materializing and by cushioning the impact of others (Bansal & 
Clelland, 2004; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001; Peloza, 2006). 
Subsequently, a reduction in firm risk is likely to be positively associated with CFP, not 
because lower risk generates CFP, but because it helps to preserve it (Godfrey et al., 2009). Preventing 
transgressions through CSP protects shareholder value, because it helps firms avoid nonproductive 
costs like fines and legal expenses, turnover of key personnel, refinancing costs, and the diversion of 
managerial attention (Smith & Stulz, 1985; Stultz, 2002). Good CSP also makes it less likely that 
stakeholders will call for retribution in case a transgression inadvertently does happen (Fombrun, 
Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000; Godfrey, 2005). When firms have a well-stocked reservoir of goodwill or 
positive moral capital, stakeholders are much more likely to “attribute the negative event to 
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managerial maladroitness rather than malevolence, and temper their reactions accordingly” (Godfrey 
et al., 2009: 428). Managers can thus prevent stakeholder sanctions and subsequent losses of 
shareholder value by taking out an ‘insurance premium’ paid for in CSP, which reduces the firm’s 
exposure to risks that would otherwise materialize in the form of irrecoverable costs (Godfrey et al., 
2009). Both the avoidance and the cushioning of transgressions that lead to firm risk are thus 
positively associated with CFP. See Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3: The CSP – CFP relationship is mediated by firm risk: CSP is negatively related 
to firm risk, whereas firm risk is negatively related to CFP. 
 
Innovative capacity: One widely held insight amongst CSP scholars is that investments in CSP 
can deliberately or serendipitously lead to innovation (Barnett, 2007; King & Lenox, 2007). Prior 
studies have distinguished between two innovation paths: an internal path that leads to the 
development of new capabilities through experimentation with new CSP initiatives (Christmann, 
2000; Klassen & Whybark, 1999) and an external path through which such new capabilities 
accumulate from interactions with outside stakeholders (Hart, 1995; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). 
Internally, a firm’s adoption of CSP initiatives frequently generates process innovations, as 
organizational systems need to be adapted to accommodate the new CSP activities (Christmann, 
2000). For example, pollution abatement requires the redesign of a firm’s production processes to 
increase material savings and reduce energy consumption (King & Lenox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 
1999), thereby increasing the efficiency of the production cycle and reducing production costs 
(Christmann, 2000). Externally, a firm’s implementation of CSP activities can be a vehicle for the 
development of closer relationships with outside stakeholders, which can in turn lead to externally 
driven innovation. A proactive social and environmental strategy thus enhances a firm’s relational 
capital (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), allowing it to involve stakeholders in innovative activities 
leading to new products, processes, and technologies (Thomson & Heron, 2006). In sum, CSP 
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investments can increase focal firms’ innovative capacity through internal and external capability 
development.  
 Prior studies have shown that innovation in general is positively related to organizational 
performance (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Capon et al., 1992; Zahra & Covin, 1995). Yet there is also 
evidence suggesting that innovation induced by CSP in particular is conducive to firms’ financial 
advantages. A number of scholars have argued that CSP innovations are profitable simply because 
they help to improve the efficiency of business processes. By learning how to improve their social 
performance, firms can capture ‘low-hanging fruit’ like preventing fines and eliminating waste 
(Darnall, Henriques, & Sadorsky, 2008; Hart & Ahuja, 1996; Judge & Douglas, 1998). Others, 
however, see innovation that stems from CSP as a systemic form of competitive advantage that has 
the power to transform the way firms organize their business activities (Hart, 1995; Vogel, 2006). 
Especially resource-based scholars have argued that innovation activities conducted under the banner 
of CSP can be conducive to creating firm-specific capabilities that have the potential to generate new 
technologies, products, and process improvements that are difficult and costly to imitate by 
competitors (Christmann, 2000; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Such 
innovations allow firms to differentiate themselves meaningfully and durably from competitors by 
crafting new products and services that have unique and attractive qualities in the eyes of clients 
(Hart, 1995; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000, 2001). CSP-driven innovation thus allows firms to improve 
financial performance by enhancing productive efficiency and by enabling competitive differentiation 
(Hart & Ahuja, 1996). See Hypothesis 4:  
Hypothesis 4: The CSP – CFP relationship is mediated by innovative capacity: CSP is 
positively related to innovative capacity, whereas innovative capacity is positively related to 
CFP. 
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Methods 
Sample and Coding 
To identify the population of studies on CSP, we used five complementary search strategies. First, we 
read review articles (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; McWilliams et al., 2006) and prior meta-analytical 
studies (Margolis et al., 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Second, we examined six electronic databases: 
(1) ABI/INFORM Global, (2) Business Source Premier, (3) JSTOR, (4) Google Scholar, (5) 
ECONLIT, and (6) SSRN, using the following search terms: ‘corporate citizenship’, ‘corporate social 
responsibility’, ‘corporate social performance’, ‘environmental performance’, ‘ethical investment’, 
‘FTSE4GOOD’, ‘green investment fund’, ‘ISO14001’, ‘KLD data’, ‘philanthropic giving’, 
‘philanthropy’, ‘social issues’, ‘social responsible investing’, and ‘stakeholder’. Third, we manually 
searched 15 journals in the fields of management and finance, including: Academy of Management 
Journal, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Strategic Management Journal. Fourth, we corresponded 
via email with 121 researchers who had written empirical papers on CSP with missing effect-size 
information, asking them for a correlation table and any studies we could not retrieve by other means. 
This strategy yielded an additional 13 studies. Finally, using a two-way ‘snowballing’ technique, we 
backward-traced all references reported in the identified articles and forward-traced all articles that 
cited the original articles via Google Scholar. These five search strategies yielded a final sample of 
280 primary studies (see Appendix A). Of these, 235 were published journal articles and 45 were 
working papers at the time of our analysis.  
After reading the articles, we developed a coding protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) for 
extracting data on relevant variables. For testing the hypotheses, we collected effect size and sample 
size information for all the variables predicted to influence CSP and CFP and the interrelationships 
among all dependent, independent, and control variables used in our analyses. Table 1 provides a 
description of the key variables harvested from these studies that are included in our meta-analysis. One 
author coded all effect sizes. To assess inter-rater agreement, a second rater coded a subsample of 200  
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TABLE 1 
Description of Variables 
Variables Definition Common Operationalizations  
CSP A firm’s voluntary and 
extralegal participation in 
social and environmental 
issues. 
(1) Third-party evaluations of the firm’s CSP, including 
assessments by parties like KLD, Fortune Magazine, and stock 
markets like Nikkei and FTSE (Bird et al., 2007; Brammer, 
Brooks, & Pavelin, 2009); (2) archival measures of actual CSP, 
such as toxic release reports and philanthropic donations (Zhang, 
Rezaee, & Zhu, 2010); (3) self-reported assessments of CSP in 
surveys (Chen & Wang, 2011). 
CFP A general measure of a 
firm’s overall financial 
health over a given 
period of time. 
(1) Accounting-based measures of profitability like ROE, ROA, 
and ROI (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006); (2) Market-based 
measures of stock returns like Tobin’s Q or market-to-book ratio 
(Makni, Francoeur, & Bellavance, 2009). 
Prior CFP CFP realized in a 
previous time period. 
(1) Accounting-based measures like ROE in t-1, ROA in t-1, or 
ROI in t-1 (Galaskiewicz, 1997); (2) market-based measures like 
Tobin’s Q in t-1 or market-to-book ratio in t-1 (Brammer, Brooks, 
& Pavelin, 2009). 
Firm reputation A perceptual represen- 
tation of a company’s 
past actions and future 
prospects that describe 
the firm’s overall appeal 
to all its key constituents 
when compared to other 
leading rivals. 
(1) External assessments of firm reputation like the propensity of 
favorable press articles, expert ratings of firm reputation, and 
rankings like that of Fortune Magazine (Brammer & Pavelin, 
2008); (2) expenditures on reputation-building efforts like 
advertising expenditures/sales, number of public affairs staff, and 
number of corporate PR communications of CSR activities 
(Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011). 
Stakeholder 
endorsement 
A measure of active 
support by any of the 
firm’s primary stake-
holder groups for its 
chosen course of strategic 
action. 
(1) Employees: employee commitment or attractiveness of the firm 
as an employer (Turban & Greening, 1997); (2) government: 
government ownership or regulatory supportiveness (Said, 
Zainuddin & Haron, 2009); (3) management: inside ownership 
(Said, Zainuddin & Haron, 2009); (4) customers: customer 
satisfaction or customer loyalty (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), (5) 
long-term oriented shareholders: institutional ownership (Mahoney 
& Roberts, 2007). 
Firm risk Variability in the firm’s 
stock price associated 
with events that primarily 
affect only that firm.  
(1) Jensen’s beta, standard deviation of stock returns, standard 
deviation of ROE over the past years (Jo & Na, 2012). 
Innovative 
capacity 
The ability of the firm to 
produce better solutions 
to novel or existing 
market problems.  
(1) General measures of innovative capacity like R&D 
expenses/sales, age of assets, and innovativeness relative to 
competitors (Christmann, 2000); (2) CSP-specific measures of 
innovative capacity like environmental innovativeness, and 
implementation of novel health & safety systems (Gallego-Álvarez, 
Prado-Lorenzo, & García-Sánchez, 2011). 
Firm size A measure of the 
absolute size of the firm.  
(1) Absolute measures like total assets, total sales, total employees, 
or market capitalization (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, Hughes, 2004). 
Firm leverage The capital structure of 
the firm expressed as the 
balance of debt and 
equity. 
(1) Ratios like debt/assets, debt/equity, and short term debt/long 
term debt (Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000). 
Capital intensity The balance between 
capital and labor amongst 
the firm’s total means of 
production  
(1) Ratios like capital expenditure/sales, total assets/sales, number 
of employees/assets, and sales/assets (King & Lenox, 2002). 
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randomly selected effect sizes, after which we computed a chance agreement-corrected measure of 
inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa coefficient; Cohen, 1960). With a value of 0.90, kappa signified 
high inter-rater agreement. 
 
 
HOMA Procedure 
We used Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to compute the meta-
analytic mean association between CSP and CFP. We also performed a variety of sub-group analyses 
to assess whether the associational strength of the focal relationship was sensitive to: (a) the source of 
the CSP data (survey measure, archival measures, or third-party evaluations); (b) the stakeholder 
group targeted with the CSP activities (employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders, community, 
natural environment, or mixed stakeholders); (c) the CFP measures used (accounting or market-
based); and (d) the industry context in which measurement took place (manufacturing, financial 
services, non-financial services, or mixed industries). As effect size information, we used both 
Pearson product-moment correlations (r) and partial correlations (rxy.z) to compute the meta-analytic 
mean effect size and the corresponding confidence interval. A partial correlation is a standardized 
measure of the degree of association between two variables (x and y), controlling for the influence of a 
vector of other factors (z). We decided to replicate our r-based HOMAs on partial correlations because 
the direction of causality between CSP and CFP remains contested (Shipley, 2002). rxy.z-based 
HOMAs generate useful additional information because they measure the direct impact of CSP on 
CFP, holding other factors constant (Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). By using rxy.z, we can also 
assess the effect of using endogeneity corrections like instrumental variables on the strength of the 
meta-analytic mean effect size. We obtained these partial correlations by converting reported t-
statistics using the relevant formulas5. 
                                                          
5 The partial correlation coefficients were calculated by using the t-statistic reported in the primary studies. If the t-statistic 
was not reported, we approximated it using the regression coefficient and the standard errors. The formula used to 
24A_BW_Vishwanathan_standV3.job
 
 37 
HOMA procedures assume that effect sizes are normally distributed. However, when the 
underlying (or true) population value of r differs substantially from zero, the effect size distribution 
tends to become skewed (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), which complicates the process of comparing and 
combining the results. To remedy this problem, we apply the Fisher’s Zr transformation to the data, 
bringing the correlations closer to the normal distribution (Hedges & Olkin, 1985)6. In HOMA there 
are two methods for combining study estimates. The first method utilizes a fixed effects model, which 
assumes the absence of heterogeneity between study results. In fixed effects HOMA, the collected 
effect sizes are solely corrected for sampling error, under the assumption that differences in sample 
size are the sole driver of variability between effect sizes. The second method employs random effects 
models, and is currently favored by the meta-analytic community (Kisamore & Brannick, 2008; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Random effects HOMA is more conservative than fixed effects HOMA 
when effect size distributions are heterogeneous, but both methods yield materially similar results 
when the distribution is homogeneous (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). For these reasons, we use random 
effects HOMA. 
To arrive at an appropriate estimate of the meta-analytic mean effect size, we had to account 
for differences in precision across effect sizes plus variability in the population of effect sizes (Lipsey 
& Wilson, 2001). These differences derive from the unequal sample sizes of the underlying primary 
studies on which the effect sizes are based, plus a constant that represents the variability across the 
population of effects. Hedges and Olkin (1985) demonstrate that the optimal measure of precision for 
a given effect size is the inverse variance weight w: the inverse of the squared standard error value of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
calculate partial correlation is: , where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees of freedom. Note that this will 
always produce a positive number, so it is necessary to convert it to a negative number if the regression coefficient is 
negative (Greene, 2008: Chapter 3). 
6 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows: , where r is the untransformed 
correlation coefficient. 
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the effect size7. With these weights, we can subsequently calculate the meta-analytic mean effect size, 
its standard error and the corresponding confidence interval8. When multiple measurements of a focal 
effect are reported, we include all of them in our analyses, as Monte Carlo simulations show that 
procedures using the complete set of measurements outperform those representing each study by a 
single value in areas like parameter significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy (Bijmolt & 
Pieters, 2001).  
MASEM Procedure 
We used meta-analytical structural equation modeling (MASEM; Aguinis et al., 2011; Carney et al., 
2011) to test our hypotheses. The MASEM procedure combines the techniques of structural equation 
modeling with those of meta-analysis (Cheung & Chan, 2005). The technique is ideally suited to test 
our hypotheses, because it allows us to analyze: (a) the direct effect of CSP on CFP; (b) the effect of 
CSP on firm reputation, stakeholder endorsement, firm risk, and innovative capacity, and (c) the 
consequences of these mediating variables on CFP (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). MASEM has three 
advantages over more conventional meta-analytic techniques. First, not all relationships specified by 
the theory under investigation or development need to be included in each primary study, as each cell 
in the data matrix used to estimate the system of equations represents an independent accumulation of 
primary studies’ research (Carney et al., 2011). Second, MASEM allows for the testing of research 
hypotheses that have never been tested in prior research, especially those connecting previously 
unlinked streams of literature (Aguinis et al., 2011). Third, MASEM avoids biased estimates when 
                                                          
7 w is calculated as follows: , where se is the standard error of the effect size and is the random effects 
variance component. The standard error is calculated as: , and the formula of the random effect variance 
is:  
8 The meta-analytic mean is calculated as follows: , with its standard error: , and with its 
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there are possible simultaneity effects at play and when there is the risk of collinearity among 
independent variables (Geyskens et al., 2006). 
We conducted our MASEM modeling with the help of a two-stage procedure (Carney et al., 
2011). In the first stage, a series of separate r-based HOMA analyses is conducted to construe a meta-
analytic correlation table specifying the mean correlations between all independent, mediator, 
dependent, and control variables. This table is always based on r, as partial correlations usually cannot 
be computed between the various independent and control variables included in a primary research 
study. This is the case because other regression equations than the ones pertaining to the focal 
dependent variable tend not to be reported. To deal with sample size differences across the correlation 
coefficients included in our matrix, we based our analysis on the harmonic mean sample size. The 
harmonic mean is less sensitive to outliers than the arithmetic mean, making it more appropriate for 
estimating correct and conservative t-values for the model parameters (Geyskens et al., 2006). 
In the second stage of the MASEM modeling, the meta-analytic correlation matrix is treated as 
the observed correlation matrix, and subjected to regular maximum likelihood structural equation 
modeling routines to test the hypothesized relationships (Cheung & Chan, 2005). The data were 
analyzed using the full information maximum likelihood method with the LISREL 8.80 software 
package. Specifically, to investigate whether a direct and significant association between CSP and 
CFP exists, or whether this relationship is fully mediated by our hypothesized mediation variables 
(Hypotheses 1 through 4), we estimated two nested models, allowing us to trace changes in the 
coefficient for the direct relationship. We commenced with a simple model examining the direct 
relationship between CSP and CFP while controlling for prior firm performance, firm size, firm 
leverage, and capital intensity. We estimated the following systems of equations (N = 1,912):  
(1) CSP = β1 prior CFP + β2 firm size + ε 
(2) CFP = β3 CSP + β4 prior CFP + β5 firm size + β6 firm leverage + β7 capital intensity + ε 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
95% confidence interval computed as: )(96.1
ES
seESLower  , and )(96.1
ES
seESUpper  . 
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To test our hypotheses we subsequently ran a more elaborate model including (1) firm reputation, (2) 
stakeholder endorsement, (3) firm risk, and (4) innovative capacity as mediating variables (N = 2,798): 
(1) CSP = β1 prior CFP + β2 firm size + ε 
(2) Firm reputation = β3 CSP + β4 prior CFP + β5 firm size + β6 firm leverage + β7 capital 
intensity + ε 
(3) Stakeholder endorsement = β8 CSP + β9 prior CFP + β10 firm size + β11 l firm leverage + 
β12 capital intensity + ε 
(4) Firm risk = β13 CSP + β14 prior CFP + β15 firm size + β16 firm leverage + β17 capital 
intensity + ε 
(5) Innovative capacity = β18 CSP + β19 prior CFP + β20 firm size + β21 firm leverage + β22 
capital intensity + ε 
(6) CFP = β23 CSP + β24 prior CFP + β25 firm size + β26 firm leverage + β27 capital intensity + 
β28 firm reputation + β29 stakeholder endorsement + β30 firm risk+ β27 innovative capacity + 
ε 
 
MARA Procedure  
We use meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) to test the robustness of our 
findings against a number of moderator variables, using both r and rxy.z as our effect sizes of choice. 
Similar to multiple regression approaches, MARA estimates a linear regression model in which the 
dependent variable (which in our case is the bivariate or partial correlation between CSP and CFP in a 
given primary sample) is regressed on a set of predictors (which are the potential moderators of the 
focal relationship) (Carney et al., 2011). We weighted the effect sizes by their inverse variance weight 
in order to account for differences in the precision of the information contained in them (Aguinis, 
Gottfredson, & Wright, 2011).  
The moderator variables we used in the r-based MARA analyses correspond one-on-one to 
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those used in the HOMA analyses. In terms of data sources, we included dummy variables to indicate 
whether the focal relationship estimates derived from ‘survey measure’, ‘third-party evaluations’, or 
‘archival measures’ (reference category). In terms of stakeholders, we included dummy variables 
indicating whether the targeted stakeholders were ‘employees’, ‘customers’, ‘shareholders’, 
‘community’, ‘natural environment’, or ‘mixed stakeholders’ (reference category) 9 . We also 
distinguished between two groups of CFP measures: ‘accounting performance’ and ‘market 
performance’ (reference category). To disentangle industry effects, we included dummy variables for 
‘manufacturing’, ‘non-financial services’, and ‘mixed industries’ (reference category)10. Finally, we 
also tested for the presence of methodological moderating effects by including the ‘median year of the 
sampling window’ as well as dummy variables indicating whether a study was ‘published’ or a 
‘working paper’ (reference category) and whether it was based on ‘panel data’ or on ‘cross-sectional 
data’ (reference category). 
In the rxy.z-based MARA analyses, we made full use of the possibility offered by partial 
correlation methods to code for the control variables used in the original analysis (Doucouliagos & 
Ulubasoğlu, 2008). In addition to all aforementioned variables, we therefore also included a dummy 
variable coding whether the primary study used an ‘endogeneity control’ or not (reference category). 
Furthermore, we also inserted dummy variables to code for the most commonly used control variables 
in the underlying primary studies: ‘prior CFP’, ‘firm size’, ‘firm leverage’, ‘capital intensity’, ‘firm 
reputation’, ‘stakeholder endorsement’, ‘firm risk’, and ‘innovation capacity’ (see Table 1 for variable 
definitions). Following current standards in the meta-analytic literature (Geyskens et al., 2009), we 
used random effects estimation methods in our MARA analyses, which are more conservative than 
conventional fixed effects methods.  
                                                          
9 We had to exclude ‘suppliers’ from the MARA analyses because the number of available effect sizes pertaining to this 
stakeholder category was insufficient. 
10 We had to exclude ‘financial services’ from the MARA analyses because the number of available effect sizes pertaining 
to this industry category was insufficient. 
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Results 
HOMA results 
Table 2 presents the results for our r-based (left-hand panel) and rxy.z-based (right-hand panel) HOMA 
analyses pertaining to the CSP – CFP relationship. In addition to the meta-analytic mean effect size 
(mean), we report the number of samples (k), the cumulative sample size (N), the standard error of the 
mean effect size (se), the 95% confidence interval around the meta-analytic mean, as well as the chi-
square (Q test: Hedges & Olkin, 1985) 11  and I-square (I2: Higgins et al., 2003) 12  tests for 
heterogeneity of the effect size distribution. The r-based mean effect size for the focal relationship is 
.07 (k = 1,290) and the rxy.z-based mean is .05 (k = 1,427). As the confidence intervals around both 
effects are small and do not include zero, they are highly significant. These means are somewhat 
smaller but comparable in terms of magnitude as those reported in prior meta-analyses (Margolis et 
al., 2007: .13; Orlitzky et al., 2003: .18). The significant Q values testify to the heterogeneity of both 
effect size distributions, while the I2 tests reveal the presence of moderate to high levels of ‘true’ or 
not sampling error-related heterogeneity between studies (Higgins & Thompson, 2002). These values 
underscore the need for further subgroup (HOMA) and multivariate (MARA) moderator analyses.   
 Sub-group HOMA analyses reveal that the heterogeneity in study findings is at least partially 
driven by methodological artifacts: whereas the mean effect sizes based on archival data and third-
party rater data are close to the overall mean effect size, those based on self-reported survey data are 
substantially higher (r-based mean = .16; rxy.z-based mean = .10). Because relatively few effect sizes 
are based on survey data, however (11.6 percent of the r-based effect size distribution and 7.9 percent  
                                                          
11 The Q test is computed by summing the squared deviations of each study’s effect estimate from the overall effect 
estimate (Cochran, 1954), in doing so each study is weighted by its w. The Q test assumes homogeneity, following a Chi-
square distribution with k – 1 degrees of freedom (k = the number of studies). When Q is significant, the assumption of 
homogeneity is rejected. 
12 I2 is a scale-free index of heterogeneity across study findings computed by the ratio of Q in relations to its degrees of 
freedom: . As opposed to Q, I2 is easier to interpret because it defines heterogeneity along a scale-free range 
as a percentage from 0.00 to 1.00, it facilitates comparisons across meta-analyses, and its values do not depend on the 
number of studies (Higgins et al., 2003). 
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of the rxy.z-based distribution), removing these effects from the analysis does not meaningfully affect 
the overall mean effect size estimate13. Furthermore, while there are some minor differences to report 
when the main sample is broken down by the various stakeholder groups towards which the CSP 
activities are targeted, perhaps the most surprising result is that the range of mean effects is very small 
(r-based: from .04 for the natural environment to .09 to the local community; rxy.z-based: from .03 for 
the local community to .05 for customers). Like Orlitzky and associates (2003), we found CSP to be 
(somewhat) more strongly linked to accounting-based measures of performance than to market-based 
measures (r-based mean = .08 vs. .05; rxy.z-based mean = .05 vs. .04). Finally, we found limited 
evidence for moderation by industry context, with the exception of the financial service industry (.13).  
 
MASEM Results and Hypothesis Tests 
In Table 3 we depict the meta-analytic correlation matrix. Each of the 45 cells below the diagonal 
represents a separate HOMA analysis. We report both the meta-analytic mean correlation (mean) and 
the standard error (se) for each relationship. The cells above the diagonal show the total number of 
observations (N) as well as the total number of samples (k) on which the meta-analytic mean is based. 
Since no primary sample included all correlations of interest, the total number of samples far exceeds 
the number of samples in any single cell.  
 Table 4 shows the results of a basic MASEM analysis, in which the direct effect of CSP on 
CFP is estimated, controlling for prior CFP and firm size (on CSP and CFP) and firm leverage and 
capital intensity (on CFP only). The model fits the data well (χ2 = 2.63; RMSR = 0.008; GFI = 1.00). 
While several control variables had significant effects – larger firms engage more in CSP and enjoy 
better CFP, and firm leverage is negatively related to CFP – the standardized parameter estimate for 
the CSP – CFP relationship matches the overall meta-analytic effect size closely (β = 0.06, p < 0.05). 
                                                          
13 As a separate robustness check, we also ran our MASEM and MARA analyses again without the survey data-based 
effect sizes. All our findings are robust against this exclusion. 
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TABLE 4 
MASEM Simple Model Resultsa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
a Significant relationships (p < .05) are printed in bold; t-values are given in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 5 contains the results pertaining to our Hypotheses 1 through 4. It presents a more 
comprehensive MASEM model, which not only includes the same control variables as those depicted 
in Table 4, but also the four mediating variables which feature in our hypotheses. The model again fits 
the data well (χ2 = 112.45; RMSR = 0.026; GFI = 0.99). Hypothesis 1 is supported. CSP is positively 
related to firm reputation (β = 0.18, p < 0.01), and firm reputation is positively related to CFP (β = 
0.07, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2 likewise receives empirical support. CSP is positively related to 
stakeholder endorsement (β = 0.14, p < 0.01), and stakeholder endorsement is positively related to 
CFP (β = 0.13, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 3 is similarly supported. CSP is negatively related to firm risk (β 
= -0.08, p < 0.01), and firm risk is negatively related to CFP (β = -0.07, p < 0.01). Finally, we also 
found support for Hypothesis 4. CSP is positively related to innovative capacity (β = 0.16, p < 0.01), 
and innovative capacity is positively related to CFP (β = 0.10, p < 0.01). Jointly, these four variables 
fully mediate the relationship between CSP and CFP, as the focal effect becomes insignificant (β = 
0.01, p > 0.10) upon their inclusion (also see Surroca et al., 2013). Formal tests for statistical 
mediation confirm that the relationship between CSP and CFP is fully mediated by firm reputation, 
stakeholder endorsement, firm risk, and innovative capacity (Sobel: z = 7.92, p < .001; Aroian: z = 
7.88, p < .001; Goodman: z = 7.97, p < .001; cf. MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dyer, 1995). 
Predictors CSP CFP 
CSP  0.06 
(2.58) 
Prior CFP 0.04 
(1.93) 
0.03 
(1.44) 
Firm size 0.16 
(7.00) 
0.05 
(2.27) 
Firm leverage  -0.10 
(-4.29) 
Capital intensity  0.04 
(1.59) 
R2 0.028 0.018 
Harmonic Mean N 1,912  
X2 2.63  
GFI 1.00  
RMSR 0.008  
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TABLE 5 
MASEM Hypotheses Resultsa 
 
a Significant relationships (p < .05) are printed in bold; t-values are given in parentheses. 
(Sobel: z = 7.92, p < .001; Aroian: z = 7.88, p < .001; Goodman: z = 7.97, p < .001) 
 
MARA Results 
Table 6 reports the results of the MARA moderator analysis, intended to model the extant 
heterogeneity in the r-based (left-hand panel) and rxy.z-based (right-hand panel) effect size 
distributions (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001)14. The main benefit of MARA is its multivariate, weighted 
regression-based character. This format allows the researcher to separate the effects of different 
moderators. Because MARA also pools effect sizes in a single analysis, in sharp contrast to HOMA 
subgroup analyses, it has more statistical power to detect moderating effects (Geyskens et al., 2009).  
Our MARA analyses confirm the positive moderating effect of survey designs (r-based β = 0.12, p < 
0.001; rxy.z-based β = 0.05, p < 0.001). It appears that either common method bias or self-report biases 
make survey methods less desirable for CSP research (cf. Orlitzky et al., 2003). In terms of CFP 
                                                          
14 We are grateful to one of our anonymous reviewers, who suggested that we include further analyses to explore whether 
Predictors CSP Firm 
Reputation 
Stakeholder 
endorsement 
Firm 
risk 
Innovation 
capacity 
CFP 
CSP  0.18 
(9.96) 
0.14 
(7.74) 
-0.08 
(4.42) 
0.16 
(8.86) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
Prior CFP 0.04 
(2.34) 
0.09 
(4.62) 
0.15 
(8.12) 
-0.08 
(-4.22) 
0.13 
(7.20) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Firm size 0.16 
(8.47) 
0.13 
(7.10) 
0.04 
(2.33) 
0.04 
(1.97) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
0.03 
(1.78) 
Firm leverage  -0.04 
(-2.23) 
-0.03 
(-1.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
-0.11 
(-6.06) 
-0.08 
(-4.31) 
Capital intensity  0.02 
(0.90) 
0.03 
(1.55 
0.11 
(5.78) 
-0.07 
(-3.82) 
0.03 
(1.67) 
Firm reputation      0.07 
(3.64) 
Stakeholder endorsement      0.13 
(6.71) 
Firm risk       -0.07 
(3.46) 
Innovative capacity      0.10 
(5.12) 
R2  0.028 0.069 0.052 0.026 0.064 0.051 
Harmonic Mean N 2,798      
X2 112.45      
GFI 0.99      
RMSR 0.026      
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operationalizations, the slightly positive moderating effect of accounting performance  measures we 
TABLE 6 
Results of Mixed-Effects WLS Regressiona 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented for study moderators and substantive moderators with standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<.05 ** p < .01, *** p<.001 
 
 
detected in the bivariate HOMA analyses disappears in the multivariate MARA analyses. 
Furthermore, like with the HOMA subgroup analyses, we again find surprisingly few significant 
moderating effects across targeted stakeholder groups (the only exceptions being the natural 
environment: r-based β = -0.07, p < 0.01; and the community: rxy.z-based β = -0.02, p < 0.05). In other 
words, the benefits that accrue to firms due to their CSP activities are largely invariant across a range 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
the findings across the primary studies in our sample varied under the influence of moderating conditions. 
 Bivariate 
correlation 
Partial 
correlation 
CSP operationalization   
Source of CSP   
Survey measure 0.12 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 
Third party evaluations 0.02 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Stakeholder groups   
Employees -0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) 
Customers -0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.01) 
Shareholders -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Community -0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)* 
Natural environment -0.07 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.01) 
CFP operationalization   
Accounting performance 0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
   
Industry   
Manufacturing 0.06 (0.02)*** -0.02 (0.01) 
Non-financial services 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) 
   
Study characteristics   
Median year of sample 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Published study 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Panel data -0.03 (0.01)** -0.04 (0.01)*** 
Endogeneity check  -0.03 (0.01)*** 
   
Control variables   
Prior CFP  0.00 (0.01) 
Firm size  -0.04 (0.01)*** 
Firm leverage  0.01 (0.01) 
Capital capacity  -0.01 (0.01) 
Firm reputation  -0.01 (0.01) 
Stakeholder endorsement  0.00 (0.01) 
Firm risk  -0.03 (0.01)** 
Innovative capacity  0.02 (0.01)*** 
R2 0.09 0.10 
K 1,290 1,427 
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of beneficiaries. In terms of industry effects, for which we use mixed industry samples as our control 
group, we only find a positive moderating effect for manufacturing industries in the r-based effect size 
distribution (β = 0.06, p < 0.001). The benefits of CSP thus do not appear to be limited to any single 
industry context. Amongst the study characteristics, we found a negative significant moderating effect 
for panel designs (r-based β = -0.03, p < 0.01; rxy.z-based β = -0.04, p < 0.001). A plausible 
explanation for this finding is that panel studies seek to detect the sensitivity of CFP to changes in 
CSP, which isolates the effect of CSP, whereas cross-sectional studies assess how firms’ absolute 
scores on both variables are related, which tends to confound CSP with other historical and 
contemporaneous effects. The rxy.z-based panel also indicates that omitted variable biases frequently 
hamper CSP – CFP studies (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). In particular, a failure to control for firm 
size, innovative capacity, and firm risk can lead to significantly distorted estimates of the focal 
relationship, and these variables should therefore always be included in the vector of control variables 
to prevent omitted variable biases. 
 
Alternative Specifications of the CSP – CFP Relationship 
We also tested for three alternative specifications of the CSP – CFP relationship: endogeneity, omitted 
joint causation variables, and virtuous circle theory. First, the relevant information for the endogeneity 
specification is reported in Tables 2 and 6 (in both cases in the right-hand rxy.z-based panel). The 
results show that a nuanced interpretation is warranted. On the one hand, we found a significant 
negative moderating effect for studies using endogeneity corrections in our MARA analysis (rxy.z- 
based β = -0.03, p < 0.001). On the other hand, our HOMA analyses showed that while the meta-
analytic mean for studies using endogeneity corrections was significantly lower than that for studies 
not using such corrections (0.01 vs. 0.05), it remained positive and significant. Thus, while we do find 
evidence that CSP is partially endogenous on CFP, we cannot conclude that CSP is wholly 
endogenous upon CFP. Second, to test the idea that the CSP – CFP relationship is spurious and driven 
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by omitted joint causation variables like financial slack and environmental munificence, we conducted 
a separate MASEM analysis reported in Table 7. We found some evidence for the joint causation role  
 
TABLE 7 
MASEM Robustness Results: Joint Causationa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Significant relationships (p < .05) are printed in bold; t-values are given in parentheses. 
 
 
TABLE 8 
MASEM Robustness Results: Virtuous Circlea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Significant relationships (p < .05) are printed in bold; t-values are given in parentheses. 
Predictors CSP CFP 
CSP  0.05 
(3.86) 
Firm size 0.16 
(12.81) 
0.06 
(4.38) 
Leverage  -0.08 
(-6.33) 
Capital intensity  0.03 
(2.17) 
Financial slack 0.09 
(6.75) 
0.12 
(9.43) 
Munificence 0.01 
(0.92) 
0.04 
(3.48) 
R2 0.03  
Harmonic Mean N 5,982  
X2 5.22  
GFI 1.00  
RMSR 0.016  
Predictors CSP CFP 
CSP  0.05 
(2.01) 
Prior CFP 0.04 
(1.45) 
0.02 
(0.84) 
Firm size 0.16 
(6.71) 
0.06 
(2.29) 
Leverage  -0.08 
(-3.35) 
Capital intensity  0.03 
(1.13) 
Financial slack 0.08 
(3.41) 
0.12 
(4.89) 
Munificence 0.01 
(0.45) 
0.04 
(1.82) 
R2 0.03 0.04 
Harmonic Mean N 1,682  
X2 1.39  
GFI 1.00  
RMSR .0047  
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of financial slack, which is both a driver of CSP (β = 0.09, p < 0.001) and CFP (β = 0.12, p < 0.001). 
We did not obtain similar evidence for the role of munificence, which is related to CFP (β = 0.04, p < 
0.01) but not to CSP. However, accounting for financial slack and munificence leaves the focal 
relationship largely unaltered (β = 0.05, p < 0.01), which offers no support for the idea that the CSP – 
CFP relationship is spurious. Third, we tested a somewhat simplified version of virtuous circle theory 
through a final MASEM analysis reported in Table 8. Specifically, we assessed the argument that 
prior CFP predicts CSP, which in turn predicts subsequent CFP, controlling for all relevant factors. 
However, in this test prior CFP turned out not to be connected to CSP, so we had to refute the virtuous 
circle specification. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Specifying the CSP – CFP Relationship 
All social scientific research programs need both creativity and discipline to further their 
advancement: the former to continuously open up new lines of inquiry, the latter to close down the 
ones that have proven to be less fruitful. Meta-analyses are especially helpful towards the latter end. 
Several of the ideas that have been suggested in recent years concerning the most appropriate 
specification of the CSP – CFP relationship have therefore been subjected to a series of advanced 
meta-analytic tests in the present paper. These tests help to identify the most plausible specification of 
the focal relationship, and to reallocate researchers’ attention towards those research designs that 
harbor the greatest future promise. 
 We began by testing the idea that CSP is endogenous upon CFP (Ghoul et al., 2011; Goss & 
Roberts, 2011). A variety of researchers have recently begun to use statistical corrections for 
endogeneity, such as instrumental variables (Bascle, 2008), to account for the possibility that firms 
experiencing better CFP are more inclined to engage in CSP. We indeed found supporting evidence 
for the idea that CSP is partially endogenous upon CFP: while correcting for reverse causality does 
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not reduce the focal relationship to zero, it significantly diminishes it. We proceeded to assess whether 
the observed CSP – CFP relationship was spurious, and driven by omitted joint causation variables 
(Bansal, 2005; Barnett, 2007). Support for this position was weak, however. While there is some 
evidence that financial slack is a significant predictor of both CSP and CFP, controlling for its 
influence does not substantially weaken the focal relationship. Furthermore, our study did not find 
support for virtuous circle theory (Surroca et al., 2010; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Because the 
predicted positive relationship between prior CFP and CSP did not materialize, the hypothesized 
‘circle’ was broken. Finally, we tested a mediating mechanisms specification (Luo et al., 2013; Uotila 
et al., 2009), which turned out to be the most promising specification of the CSP – CFP relationship. 
Not only were all four hypothesized paths strongly significant, but collectively they also fully 
mediated the focal relationship. Based on our empirical assessment of four alternative specifications, 
we therefore conclude that studies using a mediating mechanisms design provide the most fruitful 
future research opportunities.  
 
Identifying Mediating Mechanisms 
In line with our finding that mediating mechanisms designs represent the empirically most tenable 
way of specifying the CSP – CFP relationship, the field of CSP research has in recent years spawned 
numerous studies involving theorized mediation effects (Barnett, 2007; Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 
2009; Husted, 2005; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Luo et al., 2013; Uotila et al., 2009). Since most 
studies only test individual mediation mechanisms in isolation, and since the evidence for many 
known mediating mechanisms is mixed, it has thus far been impossible to assess the balance of 
evidence for this important branch of the explanatory CSP literature. In the present paper, we 
therefore set out to fill this gap.  
We found broad support for our theoretical framework, and for each of its four paths (see 
Table 5). First, we found that CSP investments positively affect firms’ reputations, which 
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subsequently exert a positive influence on their CFP. The theoretical mechanism at play here is a 
signaling mechanism (Certo, 2003; Fombrun, 1995), through which firms can convey the quality of 
their products and internal processes to a broad range of stakeholders lacking in-depth knowledge of 
their offerings and operations. Second, we discovered that CSP activities lead to stakeholder 
endorsements, which in turn help improve CFP. The theoretical mechanism at work here is cooptation 
(Hillman et al., 2000, 2009), through which firms offer stakeholders direct CSP contributions or 
influence over CSP policy to gain their support for strategic initiatives. Third, our results show that 
investing in CSP lowers firm risk, while firm risk itself is negatively related to CFP. Through this risk 
mitigation mechanism (Godfrey et al., 2009; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001), firms prevent the loss of 
CFP by avoiding firm-specific risks or by cushioning their financial impact. Third, we discovered that 
CSP investments increase firms’ innovative capacity, which has a subsequent positive relationship 
with CFP. Firms utilize this CSP-related opportunity identification mechanism (King & Lenox, 2002; 
Thompson & Heron, 2006) either through internal experimentation with CSP activities or by using 
CSP as a conduit for structuring interactions with outsiders. In short, all four hypothesized paths 
generate robust and generalizable empirical support. 
 
CSP and Strategic Management: Theoretical Implications  
Since its inception, CSP research has been inspired by multiple disciplines including economics, 
sociology, psychology, philosophy, and political science (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). These diverse 
origins explain why to this day the CSP field is “not characterized by the domination of a particular 
theoretical approach, assumptions and method” (Lockett, Moon, & Visser, 2006: 133). While these 
multidisciplinary and multitheoretical underpinnings of the field have favored it with a wide array of 
ideas concerning the mechanisms linking CSP to CFP (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012), they have also 
hampered it by inadvertently obstructing the structuring and integration of extant research. By 
proposing and corroborating an integrative theoretical framework, we aspire to help the field break out 
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from its “continuing state of emergence” (Lockett et al., 2006: 133). 
The strong focus of CSP scholars on CFP illustrates the elaborate influence of the strategic 
management field on the research practices of the CSP community (Lockett et al., 2006). Similarly, 
the steady accumulation of CSP research in top strategy journals like Strategic Management Journal 
also demonstrates the acknowledgement of CSP as a relevant performance driver by strategic 
management scholars (Parmar et al., 2010). The confluence of these two fields is best illustrated by 
the integration of mainstream strategy theories within CSP research (Parmar et al., 2010), a process to 
which our theoretical framework contributes. The theoretical logics of the four mechanisms identified 
in this framework echo both those of the resource-based (Barney, 1991) and relational (Dyer & Singh, 
1998) views of the firm. Specifically, our signaling and risk mitigation mechanisms hinge on the value 
of intangible assets to the firm (Barney, 1991). Firms’ reputations and their ‘reservoirs of goodwill’ 
meet the standing criteria for resource-based advantages in that they have the potential to protect and 
enhance CFP. Furthermore, the cooptation and opportunity identification mechanisms emphasize the 
competitive value of relational capital (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Gaining the endorsement of critical 
stakeholders and engaging in external learning are thus two important ways of developing relational 
advantages conducive to stronger CFP. The theoretical framework proposed in this paper thus helps to 
further the process of connecting and integrating CSP research with mainstream ideas in the strategic 
management field.   
 
New Lines of Inquiry 
Around the advent of the mechanisms turn in the CSP literature, Russo and Fouts (1997: 554) stated 
that “we have not identified every link in a complex causal chain” connecting CSP to CFP. In the 
intervening years, CSP scholars have taken calls to arms like these to heart, and we now have 
numerous studies at our disposal that uncover important pieces of the causal puzzle. In this paper, our 
primary objective has been to conduct a comprehensive test of these studies, finding that the 
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complexity of the chain discussed by Russo and Fouts primarily resides in the multiplicity of the 
salient paths through which doing good can translate into doing well. Based on our synthesis of the 
mechanisms-based CSP literature, we see several opportunities for new lines of inquiry, which we 
will formulate as open research questions.  
First, how do CSP reputations form and how do they become a source of competitive 
advantage? Firms’ participation in CSP activities does not automatically translate into strong CSP 
reputations, as many CSP contributions remain below the radar of firms’ key audiences. Moreover, 
even strong CSP reputations do not always translate into CFP, especially when investors and other 
critical stakeholders question the necessity of CSP-based strategic initiatives. More research is 
therefore needed to uncover the social processes by which information intermediaries disclose, 
disseminate, and frame information on firms’ CSP activities, and how these processes affect audience 
evaluations (Luo et al., 2013).  
Second, are focused stakeholder endorsement strategies better than diffused ones? According 
to the relational view of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998), the value of relational capital increases as 
firms make more relationship-specific investments. This raises the issue whether firms are best off 
spreading such investments across multiple stakeholder groups or focusing them on a select few 
constituents. Our findings show that there is no single stakeholder group that is salient above all 
others. Because the motives driving different stakeholder groups can fundamentally be at odds with 
one another (Aguilera et al., 2007), it appears that firms are best off targeting their CSP efforts 
towards a narrow set of stakeholders with similar motives to avoid accusations of hypocrisy and 
double standards. We would welcome future research into the issue of CSP scope.  
Third, are firms better off avoiding risk or cushioning it? Our study offers strong support for 
the risk mitigating effect of CSP. What we do not know yet, however, is whether the financial 
consequences of using CSP to avoid firm transgressions (Porter & Kramer, 2006) are more or less 
positive than those of using CSP as an insurance against stakeholder attributions of ill will ex post 
33B_BW_Vishwanathan_standV3.job
 
 56 
facto (Godfrey et al., 2009). Because the managerial implications of this question are substantial – 
avoidance requires investments in health, safety, and environmental programs, whereas cushioning 
requires outwardly visible deeds like philanthropic giving – we call upon CSP scholars to further 
investigate the issue.  
Fourth, does CSP-driven innovation increase or inhibit positive social change? Our findings 
show that the CSP-driven innovation mechanism improves CFP. But while the relational view logic 
underpinning this mechanism stresses the joint generation of economic rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998), 
the resource-based view logic highlights the private appropriation of such economic rents (Barney, 
1991). More research is therefore needed to explore whether pitching private firms against one 
another in a ‘market for virtue’ will results in a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race for the top’ (Vogel, 
2006). Future research must determine whether CSP increases positive social change by raising social 
and environmental standards for all market participants, or inhibits it as competitive isolating 
mechanisms prevent the diffusion of socially beneficial innovations. 
 
Future Research: Best Practice Recommendations 
Our meta-analytic findings jointly also suggest a set of evidence-based research best practices, which 
we offer as recommendations to CSP researchers planning future studies. First, both our HOMA 
(Table 2) and MARA (Table 6) analyses indicate that there is strong evidence that CSP is partially 
endogenous upon CFP (Ghoul et al., 2011; Goss & Roberts, 2011). We therefore recommend 
researchers to correct for endogeneity using instrumental variables (Bascle, 2008). Variables that have 
been used successfully as instruments in the past include firm age (Jo & Harjoto, 2011), industry 
average CSP (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013), self-imposed limitations on executive 
compensation (Brammer & Millington, 2006), and transparency in terms of social and environmental 
reporting (Luo et al., 2013). Across several samples, these variables have shown to be correlated with 
the endogenous explanatory variable CSP, but not with CFP or with the error terms resulting from the 
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regression equation, such that they can be used productively to address the issue of reverse causality 
in the CSP – CFP relationship.  
Second, our MARA analyses have revealed that primary studies are at risk of model 
misspecification due to omitted variable bias (see Table 6). The issue appears to concentrate on three 
variables in particular: firm size (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), innovative capacity (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001), and firm risk (Godfrey, 2005). When these variables are included in the regression 
equation, the coefficient for the CSP – CFP relationship becomes significantly larger (innovative 
capacity) or smaller (firm size and firm risk) than when they are omitted15. We therefore recommend 
that each CSP – CFP regression equation at least include these three variables as controls. Interested 
researchers can find the most commonly used empirical proxies for these variables in Table 1.  
Third, and finally, both our HOMA (Table 2) and MARA (Table 6) analyses reveal that the 
results of studies using survey data are upwardly biased. For example, the HOMA results suggest that 
the estimate for the CSP – CFP relationship is approximately 2.0 (rxy.z-based distribution) to 2.3 (r-
based distribution) times larger for studies based on survey data than for those based on archival or 
third party rater data. We suspect that this is the case because the topic of CSP is inherently vulnerable 
to both social desirability and confirmation biases (in addition to common method bias) exerting an 
upward influence on the focal relationship. We therefore strongly advise against using survey data in 
CSP – CFP studies. 
 
Conclusion 
With our study, we have made three distinct contributions to the CSP literature. First, based on a 
concurrent test of four alternative specifications of the CSP – CFP relationship, we find that the 
mediating mechanisms specification trumps the alternative endogeneity, omitted joint causation 
variables, and virtuous circle specifications. CSP researchers are therefore advised to turn their 
                                                          
15 See Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu (2008) for guidelines on how to interpret the coefficients for omitted variables in 
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attention towards mediating mechanisms research. Second, we developed and corroborated a 
comprehensive theoretical framework synthesizing the explanatory CSP literature. The framework 
encompasses four paths which reference the most commonly theorized mediating mechanisms in the 
CSP literature: signaling through firm reputation, cooptation through stakeholder endorsement, 
preserving firm value through risk mitigation, and creating firm value by fostering its innovative 
capacity. This framework provides structure to previous studies and points out fruitful lines of inquiry 
to inspire future ones. Third, by assessing the merits of currently prevailing measurement strategies, 
research designs, and model specifications in CSP research, we provide a set of evidence-based 
research best practices. We trust that these guidelines will prove useful to researchers planning 
mechanisms-based CSP studies, and add greater consistency to future investigations into the CSP – 
CFP relationship.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
MARA regression. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Is ‘Irresponsible’ ‘Unsustainable’? A Meta-Analysis of the Corporate 
Social Irresponsibility – Performance Relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 244 primary studies, we not only challenge the widespread 
belief that markets are self-cleansing institutions in which corporate socially irresponsible behavior (CSI) 
is ultimately unsustainable, but also provide a more fine-grained account of the antecedents and 
performance consequences of CSI than is currently available in the literature. Specifically, we find that 
CSI is less prevalent in better monitored firms and more prevalent in firms with high inside ownership; 
that the negative performance consequences of CSI are higher when CSI is directed against related-party 
stakeholders rather than economically uninvolved third parties; and that the negative performance 
consequences of CSI are both aggravated and ameliorated by country-level institutional factors.  
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Introduction 
An often made assumption in economics and management is that markets are ultimately self-cleansing 
institutions (e.g. Jones, 1995; Shapiro, 1983). In economic exchange we inevitably come across 
organizations that “lie, cheat, steal, mislead, disguise, obfuscate, feign, distort and confuse” (Williamson, 
1984: 198) at the expense of their business partners, uninvolved third parties, or even society at large. Yet 
there is comfort in the thought that when such corporate socially irresponsible (CSI) behaviors are 
brought to light, their perpetrators are confronted with various economic sanctions (Brennan and Pettit, 
1993), such as reputational penalties (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Lott, 1988), consumer boycotts (Posnikoff, 
1997), lowered credit ratings (Baucus and Baucus, 1997), management turnover (Desai et al., 2004), and 
stock price depreciation (Karpoff and Lott, 1993). In contrast, parties untarnished by CSI are thought to 
incur economic benefits like pricing premiums (Shapiro, 1983), lowered agency and transaction costs 
(Jones, 1995), greater access to valued resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), improved credit ratings 
(Mishra and Salavei, 2009), and survival-enhancing legitimacy (Elsbach, 1994). Under such conditions, 
CSI will ultimately be economically unsustainable.  
 We define CSI as all corporate acts that deviate from prevailing legal or social norms that apply to 
corporate behavior, either through deliberate deviance or unwarranted negligence, without proper regard 
for the safety or interests of the parties affected by these behaviors. Disturbingly, a narrative review of the 
literature on CSI reveals that markets do not consistently meet out justice for corporate transgressions. 
Whereas certain studies have found that pollution and other environmental violations lead to stock value 
discounts in financial markets (Hamilton, 1995), other studies report no self-cleansing effects of CSI 
(Schneider, 2010). Similarly, whereas some studies find that stock markets punish civil right violations 
(Bradford, 2005), others reveal that investors are at best indifferent towards such misbehavior (Abraham 
and Voos, 2000). These contradictory findings question the self-cleansing qualities of market exchange 
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and suggest that CSI may ultimately be economically sustainable after all.  
 From a research perspective, these mixed findings point out four presently unresolved research 
questions. First, is CSI unsustainable? If we take into account all available evidence, will we then find 
that CSI generally generates economic sanctions that are sufficient to deter future CSI behaviors (e.g. 
Becker, 1968)? Or can we identify significant differences in how markets sanction different types of CSI, 
such that some irresponsible behaviors are more sustainable than others? Second, do different kinds of 
affected parties—often referred to as stakeholders (Freeman, 1984)—matter differentially? More 
specifically, given that firms are differentially dependent on the future cooperation of different kinds of 
stakeholders (Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997), will the impact of CSI on firm performance vary 
systematically across stakeholder groups (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff et al., 2008)? Third, does 
corporate governance matter in relation to CSI? Although it is an attractive thought that better governed 
firms are less prone to CSI than firms with deficiencies in their governance setup (Black et al., 2000; 
Romano, 2005), most corporate governance practices were designed to remedy conflicts of interest 
between managers and owners (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and in some cases between owners 
themselves (Heugens et al., 2009; Peng and Jiang, 2010), but hardly to counter conflicts of interests 
between corporations and parties external to them (Kraakman, 2004). So will prevailing governance 
practices also deter CSI behaviors that harm stakeholders other than owners? Fourth, do institutions 
matter? The matrix of formal and informal institutions that could sanction CSI differs greatly across 
jurisdictions (Peng and Khoury, 2008; Peng et al., 2009). But which institutions can we rely on when it 
comes to making CSI unsustainable? 
 We address these four interrelated research questions through a meta-analysis involving the most 
comprehensive database on CSI to date, consisting of 244 primary studies on the CSI–corporate financial 
performance (CFP) association. Whereas our first research question primarily concerns the classic meta-
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analytic goal of synthesizing prior literature (Hedges and Olkin, 1985), research questions two, three, and 
four aim at theory extension and involve more innovative applications of meta-analysis (Combs et al., 
2010). To establish the overall associational strength of the CSI–CFP relationship, and to detect any 
moderating effects related to CSI operationalization, we employ partial correlation-based Hedges and 
Olkin-type meta-analyses (HOMA; Hedges and Olkin, 1985). To test for the moderating effects of 
stakeholder type and institutional development, we use meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey 
and Wilson, 2001); a special type of weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis designed 
specifically to assess the relationship between effect size and moderator variables in a multivariate format 
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). To test for the effect of various corporate governance antecedents on the 
prevalence of CSI, and to assess CSI’s subsequent effect on CFP while accounting for the influence of 
firm level control variables, we use meta-analytical structural equation modeling (MASEM; Cheung and 
Chan, 2005), which combines elements of meta-analysis and structural equation modeling (Cheung and 
Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran and Ones, 1995).  
Our contributions are threefold. First, we assess the balance of evidence on the impact of CSI on 
CFP, thereby synthesizing a large and rapidly expanding literature in management and economics 
(Daboub et al., 1995; Schnatterly, 2003; Zahra et al., 2005). Second, we develop previously 
underexplored theoretical connections between CSI and three other management literatures: stakeholder 
theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997), corporate governance theory (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), and the emerging institution-based view of management (Peng and Khoury, 2008; Peng et 
al., 2009). We thereby supply the CSI literature, which to date has been predominantly focused on the 
empirical issue of identifying the immediate economic effects of CSI, with novel theoretical 
underpinnings that may inspire future empirical work. Third, our study has important implications for 
practice, as it identifies the levers through which managers, policy makers, non-executive directors, and 
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other parties with an interest in combating CSI can influence both its prevalence and impact. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Performance Consequences of CSI  
CSI is a convenient label for denoting various irresponsible corporate behaviors, but it is necessarily a 
broad denominator bringing together a variety of corporate actions. While certain types of CSI, such as 
breach of contract (Bhagat et al., 1998), political corruption (Strachan et al., 2005), or antitrust violations 
(Skantz et al., 1990) are mostly intentionally committed, other types, such as environmental damage (Hill 
and Schneeweis, 1983), airplane crashes (Bosch et al., 1998), or the need to initiate product recalls (Rupp, 
2004), are largely unintentional, even though their origins may well be rooted in (criminal) negligence. 
Although the question as to what motivates corporations to engage in CSI is beyond the scope of this 
paper, certain forms of CSI clearly benefit corporations and their senior executives financially, such as 
insider trading (Schnatterly, 2003), tax sheltering (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009), and white collar crime 
(Karpoff and Lott, 1993). Furthermore, while CSI may affect the interests of a wide variety of stakeholder 
groups, violations against employees involving discrimination and occupational safety issues are amongst 
the most frequently researched and reported forms of CSI (Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 2006). In spite 
of the large variety of CSI behaviors studied, the question whether corporate misconduct is or is not 
economically unsustainable remains unanswered  to date.  
 We expect CSI to have a negative impact on CFP because it is associated with a variety of legal 
and economic consequences (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Klein and Leffler, 1981). When corporate 
misconduct results in court convictions, liable firms will have to bear litigation costs, administrative fines, 
civil damage awards, and criminal sanctions (Bradford, 2005; Khanna, 1996). Additionally, these firms 
may face court-imposed remediation costs because of oil spills and toxic releases (Karpoff et al., 2005) or 
recall- and replacement costs following product recall announcements (Govindaraj et al., 2004). 
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Frequently, however, a sizeable share of the value or performance loss a transgressing firm has to incur is 
attributable to less tangible factors, such reputational losses (Karpoff and Lott, 1993). Firms incur such 
reputational penalties, for example, through stock price depreciations (e.g. Karpoff and Lott, 1993; 
Murphy et al., 2009) or through declining sales due to consumer boycotts (Posnikoff, 1997). Additionally, 
firms involved in CSI may face adverse business conditions on account of either increases in their cost of 
capital (Mishra and Salavei, 2009), changes in the terms of trade with suppliers (Jones, 1995), or a 
deterioration of network ties (Sullivan et al., 2007) and legitimacy within the business community 
(Elsbach, 1994), which will all adversely affect firm value and performance. See Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: CSI is negatively related to CFP. 
 
CSI and Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory is about the management of relations between a firm and both its internal corporate 
constituencies, such as shareholders, managers and employees, and parties external to the firm such as 
clients, creditors, environmental interests and the community. From its inception onwards, stakeholder 
theory has developed both normative and instrumental variants that are premised on rather different 
theoretical logics (Jones and Wicks, 1999). Some authors have argued that, at its core, stakeholder theory 
is an inherently normative theory that pertains to the question of how corporations ought to behave 
towards their stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In this view, the stakeholder concept is 
inclusively defined, involving not only parties that can affect the firm, but also those parties affected by a 
firm’s acts and omissions (Heugens and Van Oosterhout, 2002). Other authors have promoted a more 
instrumental variant of stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999), in which the core 
question is how corporations and their managers best engage with stakeholders in order to maximize firm 
performance (Heugens et al., 2008; Jones, 1995). Compared to normative stakeholder theory, the logic of 
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instrumental stakeholder theory is reversely premised on the ability of stakeholders to affect the wellbeing 
of the firm. As a result, the conceptualization and operationalization of the stakeholder concept includes 
only those parties that can exert economic leverage over the firm (Berman et al., 1999). 
In line with these differential conceptualizations of normative and instrumental stakeholder 
theory, we distinguish between two different stakeholder groups. First, related party stakeholders, like 
shareholders, employees, and customers, are parties with whom the firm transacts on a regular basis and 
upon whom the firm depends for the generation of future revenues (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Murphy et 
al., 2009). Second, third party stakeholders like competitors, governments, the natural environment, and 
communities, typically do not have a reciprocal economic relationship with the focal firm, but often end 
up having a relationship with a firm involuntarily because a firm’s actions affect them negatively.  
Because third party stakeholders have no reciprocal relationship with the firm, they cannot exert 
economic leverage over it and are unable to affect its future cash flows (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Murphy 
et al., 2009). Related party stakeholders, in contrast, are important to a firm’s performance either because 
they control critical resources (Frooman, 1999), are able to exert highly legitimate and urgent claims on 
the firm (Mitchell et al., 1997), or take up central positions in the network upon which a firm is dependent 
for its business (Rowley, 1997; Sullivan et al., 2007). From an instrumental stakeholder perspective, 
therefore, the danger of CSI is that it has relationship-rupturing features, such that mutually advantageous 
exchange relationships can inadvertently be damaged or even terminated (Van Oosterhout et al., 2006). 
Even if CSI does not lead to the severance of all ties, it can still cause a loss of trust and cooperation, 
making exchange partners “regress” to the use of costlier control-based forms of exchange (Heugens et 
al., 2008). We expect the negative performance consequences of CSI to be greater when it affects related 
rather than third party stakeholder relationships, as CSI towards related parties jeopardizes the firm’s 
future stream of income (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Murphy et al., 2009). See Hypothesis 2: 
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Hypothesis 2: The focal relationship will be more strongly negative when CSI affects related 
party stakeholders rather than third party stakeholders.  
 
Corporate Governance and CSI 
Although CSI is pervasive in many sectors of the economy, it remains a low base-rate phenomenon, 
involving certain firms but not others. So why do some firms engage in CSI while others do not? Because 
CSI is often the result of (self-serving) managerial decision-making, one answer to this question stems 
from corporate governance theory. In its classic conceptualization, the problem of corporate governance 
results from the separation of ownership and control in publicly listed firms (Berle and Means, 1932), and 
the agency problems between managers and shareholders that result from it (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Most research in corporate governance has therefore focused on assessing 
the effectiveness of various corporate governance practices, both inside and outside the firm (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990), in remedying these agency problems (Dalton et al., 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Interestingly, however, hardly any researchers have investigated whether corporate governance practices 
implemented to remedy manager-owner agency problems also function to combat CSI (but see: Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2009). To address this empirical question, we focus on the roles of Board of Directors 
(BoD) and the ownership of the firm in this regard. 
In situations in which the need to monitor management is high, either because a jurisdiction 
provides limited legal protection of investor interests or due to complex and opaque managerial 
assignments, corporate ownership tends to become more concentrated (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; 
Heugens et al., 2009). Concentrated ownership increases both shareholders’ motives and means to 
monitor managers in order to prevent CSI behaviors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), because as residual 
claimants shareholders will ultimately have to bear the costs of legal or reputational penalties for CSI 
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). When ownership is dispersed, the task of policing managers shifts to 
the BoD. Prior research shows that the monitoring capacity of the BoD increases with board size (Dalton 
et al., 1999), as larger boards are better able to absorb and process voluminous information concerning 
managerial behavior. We therefore expect CSI to occur less in firms with better monitoring of managerial 
decision-making, either in the form of concentrated (institutional) ownership or larger boards. See 
Hypothesis 3a: 
Hypothesis 3a: CSI is less prevalent in corporations with a corporate governance setup with 
greater capacity for monitoring managerial behavior. 
 
Yet monitoring in corporate governance is not always effective (Daily and Dalton, 1994). This may be 
because a firm lacks a sufficiently capable and incentivized large owner, but a particularly problematic 
case arises when the BoD, which in large publicly listed firms performs a monitoring rather than 
decision-making role (Bainbridge, 2003), is insufficiently distanced from management. Research shows 
that cooptation of the BoD by management occurs frequently through various corporate governance 
deficiencies (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Romano, 2005). In many firms, for example, the roles of CEO and 
Chair of the BoD are united in the hands of a single person (CEO duality), which is widely believed to 
stand in the way of effective monitoring of managers (Dalton et al., 1998). BoDs can also be dominated 
by insiders, such that the primary monitoring body of the corporation is staffed by individuals who are 
economically and socially tied to the firm (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Finally, executives may be 
sizeable corporate owners themselves (Holderness, 2003), which gives them additional means to 
influence the BoD’s composition, turnover, and monitoring behavior. When the monitoring capacity of 
the BoD is compromised, we expect CSI to become more prevalent. See Hypothesis 3b: 
Hypothesis 3b: CSI is more prevalent in corporations with a corporate governance setup in which 
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the board of directors is insufficiently distanced from management. 
CSI and Institutions 
A new development in management studies involves the emergence of an institution-based view of 
management (Carney et al., 2010; Engelen and van Essen, 2010; Peng et al., 2009), which seeks to 
explain the institutional underpinnings of managerial decision-making. Both formal and informal 
institutions enable and constrain managers by sanctioning alternative courses of action (North, 1990). 
While both types of institutions may sanction CSI, their relative importance differs across nations (Peng 
and Khoury, 2008).  
A first set of formal institutions that may condition the CSI-CFP relationship involves a well-
developed legal system, which not only provides relevant norms for business conduct but also an 
adequate policing capability to enforce them (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). While legal systems can be 
characterized along different dimensions, regulatory stringency, defined as the complexity and 
sophistication of regulatory environments (Fennell and Alexander, 1987), is often used in management 
studies to assess regulatory effects on firm performance (e.g. Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; King and Lenox, 
2002). We expect that in contexts with well-developed legal institutions, CSI is more likely to result in 
legal sanctions, such that the CSI-CFP relationship will be more strongly negative in such jurisdictions. 
See Hypothesis 4a: 
Hypothesis 4a: The CSI – CFP relationship is negatively moderated by the degree of regulatory 
stringency. 
 
Whereas legal institutions are paramount for connecting CSI to legal sanctions, effective reputational 
mechanisms also require development in a different part of the institutional matrix. For CSI to be 
reflected in reputational penalties, other more informal institutions must also play a role in reducing the 
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information asymmetry between corporations and their monitors in regard to CSI (Deephouse and 
Heugens, 2009). This ‘infomediary’ role is most effectively played by free and independent news media 
(Dyck et al., 2008). The news media represent a forum through which information about CSI can be 
disseminated and evaluated, which will subsequently increase its social and economic impact (Davis, 
2005; Tetlock, 2007). We expect reputation mechanisms to work best in contexts with a high degree of 
media freedom, implying that the CSI-CFP relationship will be more strongly negative in such 
jurisdictions. See Hypothesis 4b: 
 Hypothesis 4b: The CSI – CFP relationship is negatively moderated by the degree of press 
freedom. 
 
While regulatory stringency and the freedom of the media determine the impact of legal and reputational 
penalties on the corporate bottom line, other institutions determine the relative importance of reputational 
as opposed to legal penalties in a country. An important set of institutions in this respect are those that 
jointly determine a country’s competitiveness, such as the higher education system, financial market 
sophistication, technological readiness, and overall business sophistication (Mowery and Oxley, 1995; 
Porter et al., 2007). In highly competitive contexts, stakeholders who have an economic interest in the 
firm can be certain that new information about CSI will swiftly and accurately be reflected in a firm’s 
stock price. In competitive jurisdictions, relatively less importance will be attached to informal and 
opaque information cues like rumors and opinions, while greater prominence will be given to more 
precise and factual knowledge about the consequences of CSI for firm performance. As the effect of 
reputational penalties on a firm’s stock price can be up to 7.5 times higher than what can be accounted for 
based on the imposed legal penalties (Bradford, 2005; Karpoff et al., 2008), we expect the CSI-CFP 
relationship to be less strongly negative in more competitive market contexts. See Hypothesis 4c:  
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Hypothesis 4c: The CSI – CFP relationship is positively moderated by the degree of national 
competitiveness. 
 
Finally, whereas the institutions that jointly determine a country’s competitiveness focus stakeholders’ 
attention on formal, objective information cues, other institutions express and articulate societal values 
and norms concerning proper business conduct. This is especially true for the development of 
humanitarian, post-industrial cultural institutions, such as those promoting gender equality, human rights, 
democracy, and economic equality (Nussbaum, 1997; Rogoff, 2003), and which normatively pressure for 
compliance with prevailing norms and standards for business conduct. In the words of Downs (1972: p. 
45), in humanitarianly well-developed societies, “rising dissatisfaction with “[corporate behavior]” (…) 
does not result primarily from poorer performance by [corporations]. Rather, it stems mainly from a rapid 
escalation of our aspirations as to what [corporations’] performance ought to be.” Given the relatively 
large impact of reputational penalties on the bottom line (Bradford, 2005; Karpoff et al., 2008), we expect 
the CSI-CFP relationship to be more negative in contexts in which humanitarian institutions are well-
developed, as an appreciation of humanitarian values and norms makes CSI a greater risk to the firm’s 
going concern value. See Hypothesis 4d: 
 Hypothesis 4d: The CSI – CFP relationship is negatively moderated by the overall level of 
humanitarian development. 
Methods 
Sample and Coding 
To identify the population of relevant studies, we used four complementary search strategies. First, we 
searched four electronic databases: (1) Business Source Premier, (2) Google Scholar, (3) JSTOR, and (4) 
SSRN, using 34 keywords like ‘corporate lawsuits’, ‘discrimination’, ‘fraud’, ‘hazardous waste’, and 
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‘misconduct.’ Second, we conducted a manual search of leading management journals. Third, we applied 
a two-way ‘snow-balling’ technique on all retrieved studies, backward-tracing all references reported in 
them and forward-tracing all articles citing the originals. Fourth, we corresponded with 291 researchers 
represented in our dataset, asking them for related studies. We finished our search in June 2010. These 
four strategies yielded a final sample of 244 primary studies, consisting of 156 published journal articles 
and 88 working papers. In Appendix B an overview of all included studies can be found. From these 
studies we retrieved 2,896 partial correlation-based effect sizes for our CSI-CFP relationship, 
representing a cumulative sample of 3,499,595 firm-year observations. 
 
HOMA Procedure 
We tested Hypothesis 1 using Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA). HOMA estimates the 
associational strength of the focal relationship (mean ρ) and the variability of this relationship across 
studies (Q; Cochran, 1954). We used the partial correlation coefficient, rxy.z, as our primary source of 
effect size information. rxy.z captures the association between CSI (X) and firm performance (Y), given a set 
of n control variables (Z). The z-vector in CSI studies typically contains variables like firm size, firm risk, 
and firm leverage (e.g. Sullivan et al., 2007). We rely on rxy.z, first, because it has favorable measurement 
properties, as it is a standardized measure of the degree of association between two variables. Second, 
because rxy.z can be computed directly from regression output, it is the most widely available effect size 
statistic in the CSI field. Third, because rxy.z controls for the influence of a vector of other factors, it offers 
a more precise estimate of the focal effect than the Pearson product-moment correlation r. 
In the CSI field, the dominant methodology used in primary studies is the event study method (see 
also McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), which examines the stock price effect (or abnormal return) of the 
release of unanticipated information. Abnormal returns around the event date are estimated by subtracting 
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the expected return, obtained from a regression analysis estimating the rate of return on a market portfolio 
of stocks over a period preceding the event, from the actual return. Significant differences are assumed to 
derive from the unanticipated event. We were able to include event studies in our meta-analysis by 
converting the reported t-statistics into rxy.z16.The statistical output of other frequently used research 
designs, such as regression analysis, were similarly converted into rxy.z. Additionally, we coded the 
average abnormal return on the event day to obtain a measure for the decrease in market value resulting 
from CSI. 
A further issue is how to deal with studies containing multiple measurements of the focal effect. A 
Monte Carlo simulation by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) shows that procedures including all available effect 
size information outperform those representing each study by a single value in areas like effect size 
estimation precision and parameter estimate consistency. We therefore included all available 
measurements in our study. All retrieved effect sizes were subjected to a Fisher’s (1928) Zr 
transformation, to correct for skew in the effect size distribution17. In line with current conventions 
(Geyskens et al., 2009), we opted for random effects HOMA, in which effect sizes are corrected for 
sampling error plus a randomly distributed value representing other sources of variability (Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001). Finally, we account for differences in accuracy across effect sizes by weighting them by 
their inverse variance weight w (Hedges and Olkin, 1985)18. We use w-weighted rxy.z to calculate the 
                                                          
16 The partial correlation coefficients were calculated by using the t-statistic reported in the primary studies. The formula used 
to calculate partial correlation is:  dft t2
2
, where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees of freedom. 
17 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows:
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18 w is calculated as follows: 
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2  , where SE is the standard error of the effect size and Tvˆ  is the random effects 
variance component, which is turn calculated as: 
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mean ρ, its standard error, and the corresponding confidence interval19. 
 
MARA Procedure 
We tested Hypotheses 2 and 4a–4d using meta-analytical regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001). Similar to multiple regression analysis, MARA features individual effect size estimates as 
the dependent variable and methodological and substantive moderators as the independent variables 
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). These moderators are modeled simultaneously to examine extant 
heterogeneity in the effect size distribution (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). MARA is a type of WLS 
regression analysis, which weighs effect sizes by w. Following current standards in the meta-analytic 
community (Geyskens et al., 2009), we used random effects estimation methods in our MARA analyses, 
which are more conservative than conventional fixed effects methods.  
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimated the effect of stakeholder type on the CSI-CFP relationship, 
categorizing stakeholders into ‘related party’ and ‘third party stakeholders’ (reference category: ‘mixed 
stakeholders’). As a robustness check, we unpacked these categories into more specific stakeholder 
groups: ‘shareholders’, ‘employees’, ‘customers’, ‘environment’, ‘government’, ‘community residents’, 
‘competitors’, and ‘mixed stakeholders’. To test Hypotheses 4a−4d, we included several jurisdiction-level 
variables capturing the institutional context from which an effect size was drawn. In recognition of the 
predominance of US-based observations in our dataset, we first included a dummy variable indicating 
whether a given effect size was derived from the ‘US’ context. We subsequently disaggregated this 
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dichotomous classification into four specific variables. To test Hypothesis 4a, we used the ‘regulatory 
stringency’ variable from the Economic Freedom of the World Report (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008). It 
captures the extent to which regulatory constraints influence exchanges in credit, labor, and product 
markets. To test Hypothesis 4b, we included Freedom House’s ‘press freedom’ variable. To make greater 
values represent larger levels of freedom, we employed reversed scores in our analysis. Hypothesis 4c 
was tested using the ‘global competitiveness index’ (Porter et al., 2007), which captures the micro and 
macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness. Finally, we tested Hypothesis 4d using the 
United Nations’ ‘human development index’, a composite index measuring the level of humanitarian 
development of a country.  
We also included a number of control variables in our MARAs to assess whether heterogeneity in 
the effect size distribution could be attributed to differences in measurement or study design. Five dummy 
variables accounted for the specific characteristics of each type of CSI, notably: whether the CSI behavior 
was formally illegal, whether it was committed intentionally, whether the perpetrator was the corporation 
itself, whether the likely beneficiary of the misconduct involved management or the organization itself, 
and whether the misconduct was committed in the same country as where the perpetrating firm is listed 
on the stock exchange. Seven additional dummy variables controlled for the phase in which new 
information about the CSI behavior became public. The effects of different measurements for CFP were 
controlled for by including a dummy variable assessing whether a ‘market measure’ of CFP was used or 
not. In recognition of the different research designs used in CSI studies we constructed a categorical 
variable identifying whether the primary study performed an ‘event study’, a ‘cross-sectional study’, or a 
‘longitudinal study’. Since the event study methodology was most commonly used we additionally 
controlled for differences in the length of the event window. Finally, to control for industry effects we 
differentiated between ‘production’ and ‘service industries’, using ‘mixed industries’ as a reference 
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category. Table 1 lists all moderator and control variables used in our MARA, including their 
operationalizations and reference categories.   
 
TABLE 1 
Variable descriptiona 
Variable Description 
Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility 
All corporate actions deviating from the prevailing legal or social 
norms applying to corporate behavior, either through deliberate 
deviance or unwarranted negligence, without proper regard for the 
safety or interests of the parties affected by these behaviors. 
Related party 
stakeholders 
Parties with whom the firm transacts on a regular basis, i.e. 
shareholders, employees, and customers. 
Third party  
stakeholders 
Parties that are economically uninvolved with the firm, i.e. the 
natural environment, governments, community residents, and 
competitors. 
US A dummy variable coded as (1) if a specific study collected its data in 
the US and (0) if otherwise. 
Freedom of press A rating score assessing the varied ways in which pressure can be 
placed upon the flow of information and the ability of print, 
broadcast, and internet-based media to operate freely and without fear 
of repercussions. Source: Freedom House (2010). 
Regulatory stringency An index reflecting the extent of credit market regulations (e.g. 
ownership of banks, foreign bank competition, interest rate controls), 
labor market regulations (e.g. minimum wage, hiring and firing 
regulations, centralized collective bargaining), and business 
regulations (e.g. price controls, administrative requirements, 
bureaucracy costs). Source: Gwartney & Lawson (2008). 
National 
competitiveness 
Global Competitiveness Index: represents a weighted average 
addressing a country’s legal institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher 
education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market 
efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological readiness, 
market size, business sophistication, and innovativeness. Source: 
World Economic Forum (2009-2010). 
Human Development 
Index  
An index measuring the average achievements in a country in three 
basic dimensions of human development in 2007: a long and healthy 
life, as measured by life expectancy at birth, knowledge, as measured 
by adult literacy rate and gross enrolment ratio, and a decent standard 
of living, as measured by GDP per capita. Source: United Nations’ 
Human Development Report (2009). 
Illegal A dummy variable coded as (1) if the specific form of CSI is 
formally illegal and (0) if otherwise. 
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Intentional A dummy variable coded as (1) if the specific form of CSI was 
committed intentionally and (0) if otherwise. 
Committed by focal firm A dummy variable coded as (1) if the CSI in question was committed 
by the focal firm and (0) if otherwise. 
Management/ 
organization benefits 
A dummy variable coded as (1) if the beneficiaries of CSI involve the 
firm's management and/or the organization and (0) if otherwise. 
CSI vicinity A dummy variable coded as (1) if the country of misconduct 
corresponds to the country where the focal firm is publicly listed and 
(0) if otherwise. 
Impact phase of 
misconduct 
A categorical variable measuring whether CSI was studied during the 
phase of (1) an allegation/rumor, (2) a public announcement, (3) an 
initial press release, (4) a formal investigation, (5) a lawsuit filling, 
(6) a settlement/conviction, or (0) mixed. 
Study design A categorical variable measuring whether the primary study 
performed (1) an event study, (2) a cross-sectional study, or (0) a 
longitudinal study. 
Event window A categorical variable measuring whether those primary studies that 
performed event studies used an event window of (1) less than 11 
days, (2) between 11 and 60 days, (3) between 61 days and 1 year, 
(4) more than 1 year, or (0) performed no event study.  
Market measure of CFP A dummy variable coded as (1) if the CFP was measured using a 
market measure, and (0) if otherwise. 
Industry A categorical variable measuring whether the primary study's sample 
included firms from only (1) production industries, (2) service 
industries, or (0) multiple industries. 
a Those variables coded as (0) are used as reference categories in the MARAs. 
 
 
MASEM Procedure 
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b we relied on meta-analytical structural equation modeling (MASEM: 
Cheung and Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran and Ones, 1995). MASEM involves a two-step procedure. In the 
first step, a meta-analytic correlation matrix is constructed from the separate HOMA analyses on all 
interrelationships between the independent, mediating, and control variables applied. Since primary 
studies rarely incorporate all variables of interest, we estimated each cell of the meta-analytic correlation 
matrix based on a different number of studies using pair-wise deletion (Viswesvaran and Ones, 1995). In 
the rare event that we could not retrieve sufficient effect sizes to meta-analyze a relationship of interest, 
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we retrieved additional effect sizes from related fields in order to obtain a minimum of three effect sizes 
per cell of the meta-analytic correlation matrix. In the second step, the meta-analytic correlation table is 
used as input for a SEM path analysis. We use the full information maximum likelihood method in 
LISREL 8.80 and the harmonic mean number of observations of all included effect sizes as our sample 
size (N = 4,128), to compute correct, but conservative t-values for the parameter estimates (Carney et al., 
2010). 
To evaluate the effect of governance variables on the prevalence of CSI we estimate a model 
including blockholders, institutional ownership, board size, CEO duality, board independence, and inside 
ownership as antecedents. We simultaneously test the strength of the direct relationship between CSI and 
CFP, incorporating leverage ratio and firm size as control variables. We hence estimate the following 
equations:  
(3) CSI = β1 blockholders + β2 board size + β3 CEO duality + β4 board independence + β5 inside 
ownership + β6 institutional ownership + ε 
(4) CFP = β7 leverage + β8 size + β9 CSI + ε 
Results 
HOMA Results 
Table 2 reports the partial correlation-based HOMA results for Hypothesis 1, including: the meta-
analytical mean (mean ρ), the number of samples (k), the cumulative sample size (N), the standard 
deviation of the mean effect size in the population (s.d.ρ), the 95 percent confidence interval around the 
mean ρ, the Q test for homogeneity (Hedges and Olkin, 1985), and, when available, the average abnormal 
return as a percentage of the firm’s stock price. The evidence supports Hypothesis 1, as the mean ρ is -
0.12 and significant (k = 2,896).  
The results in Table 2 warrant three further observations. First, the Q-test for homogeneity in the effect 
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size distribution is rejected, implying that the mean ρ must be interpreted as an average rather than a 
common true correlation value (Hedges and Olkin, 1985: p. 235), suggesting that further moderator 
analyses are warranted. Second, the focal relationship is moderated by CSI type, suggesting that certain 
types of CSI are more sustainable than others. Misleading advertising (mean ρ = -0.36), white collar 
crime (mean ρ = -0.23), and breach of confidential data (mean ρ = -0.25) are the forms of CSI that are 
most severely punished by financial markets and therefore economically the least sustainable. 
Conversely, no significant negative performance consequences were detected for political corruption 
(mean ρ = -0.09; n.s.), tax sheltering (mean ρ = -0.02; n.s.), and earnings management (mean ρ = 0.02; 
n.s.), suggesting that these forms of CSI may be economically sustainable. Third, in terms of the largest 
percentage-wise stock price impact, we find that announcements of unexpected financial losses (-7.20 
percent), the presence of class action lawsuits (-4.70 percent), and violations related to discrimination and 
occupational safety (-4.04 percent) destroy most value.  
 
MARA Results 
The MARA results for Hypotheses 2 and 4a–4d are reported in Table 3. Model 1 reports a multivariate 
test of Hypothesis 2, whereas Model 2 disentangles the capstone variables ‘related party’ and ‘third party’ 
stakeholders into the specific categories represented in our dataset. Model 3 reports the results for 
Hypotheses 4a–4d by replacing the US dummy variable used in Models 1 and 2 with four more specific 
institutional variables. The sample attrition from Models 1 and 2 to Model 3 (from k = 2,896 to k = 2,557) 
occurrs as we eliminate effect sizes drawn from multi-country samples. Overall, our findings are robust 
across all models, and the models fit the data reasonably well. 
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Hypothesis 2 is accepted. The related party variable negatively moderates the focal relationship, 
implying that CSI is more severely punished when it is directed towards related parties (p < 0.01). The 
third party variable positively moderates the focal relationship (p < 0.01), suggesting that third party 
offenses have a less negative impact on CFP. The more fine-grained results in Model 2 and 3 corroborate 
these conclusions. CSI has a more negative effect on the focal relationship when it is directed towards 
related party stakeholders like shareholders, employees, and customers than when it is directed towards 
third party stakeholders like governments, communities, the natural environment, and firm competitors 
(Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Murphy et al., 2009).  
The results reported in Model 3 confirm Hypothesis 4a. Regulatory stringency negatively 
moderates the focal relationship (p < 0.01), suggesting that corporations operating in highly regulated 
environments suffer higher financial penalties from CSI than firms in a less stringent regulatory  
 
TABLE 3 
Results of Mixed Effects WLS Regressiona 
Variable Model Model Model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Stakeholder type    
Related party -0.04 (0.01)***   
Third party 0.05 (0.01)***   
  Shareholder  -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.06 (0.01)*** 
  Employee  -0.04 (0.02)*** -0.05 (0.02)*** 
  Customer  -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 
  Environment  0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)* 
  Government  0.09 (0.02)*** 0.07 (0.02)*** 
  Community  -0.02 (0.06) -0.02 (0.06) 
  Competitor  0.06 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.02)*** 
    
Characteristics country of misconduct    
US dummy 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.01)***  
  Freedom of press   -0.00 (0.00)*** 
  Regulatory stringency   -0.08 (0.02)*** 
  National competitiveness index   0.33 (0.08)*** 
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  Human development index   -0.44 (0.40) 
    
Controls    
Characteristics of misconduct:    
  Illegal -0.06 (0.01)*** -0.06 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** 
  Intentional 0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
  Committed by focal firm -0.09 (0.01)*** -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.08 (0.01)*** 
  Management/organization benefits -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)** 
  CSI vicinity 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Impact phase of misconduct:    
  Allegation/rumor -0.02 (0.01)* -0.03 (0.01)** -0.04 (0.01)*** 
  Public announcement  -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.01) 
  Initial press release -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02)* -0.04 (0.02)** 
  Formal investigation -0.12 (0.02)*** -0.12 (0.02)*** -0.16 (0.02)*** 
  Lawsuit filling 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
  Settlement/conviction 0.12 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.01)*** 
Measurement dependent variable    
  Market measure of CFP 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Study design:    
  Event study 0.05 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.03)** 0.05 (0.03)* 
  Cross sectional study -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.04 (0.01)*** 
Event window:     
  < 11 days -0.18 (0.03)*** -0.19 (0.03)*** -0.17 (0.03)*** 
  11 - 60 days -0.21 (0.03)*** -0.22 (0.03)*** -0.21 (0.03)*** 
  61 - 365 days -0.18 (0.04)*** -0.19 (0.04)*** -0.15 (0.04)*** 
  > 365 days -0.07 (0.03)** -0.08 (0.03)** -0.06 (0.03)** 
Industry:     
  Production industry 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 
  Service industry 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.06 (0.01)*** 
    
R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 
K 2,896 2,896 2,557 
Qmodel (p) 1,409.11 (0.00) 1,404.75 (0.00) 1,155.95 (0.00) 
Qresidual (p) 8,228.89 (0.00) 8,241.63 (0.00) 7,095.32 (0.00) 
v 0.0045 0.0045 0.0040 
a Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented for study moderators and substantive 
moderators with standard errors in parentheses. k is the total number of effect sizes; Q is the 
homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v is the 
          *      p < .1    
          **    p < .05    
          ***  p < .01    
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environments (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Hypothesis 4b is also accepted. The level of media freedom 
in a given country negatively moderates the focal relationship (p < 0.01) such that corporations face 
higher reputational penalties from CSI  in countries where the media function independently (Dyck et al., 
2008). Model 3 results also support Hypothesis 4c. National competitiveness positively moderates the 
focal relationship (p < 0.01). Apparently, shareholders of firms in countries with sophisticated economic 
institutions are better able to assess the actual costs of CSI and discount a firm’s share price correctly. 
Hypothesis 4d is rejected. The human development index does not significantly moderate the focal 
relationship, suggesting that the prevalence of humanitarian values does not increase the reputational 
penalties that firms bear. 
Table 3 reports additional control variable results. Almost all included methodological control 
variables significantly moderate the focal relationship. We make three observations. First, whether CFP is 
measured using accounting or market measures does not significantly influence the strength of the CSI-
CFP relationship. This finding is salient, because a large majority of the effect sizes in our dataset involve 
market-based measures of CFP (see Table 2). Second, our results indicate that host country CSI is more 
severely penalized than home country CSI, suggesting that there are increased uncertainties and risk 
exposure associated with operations overseas. Finally, the control variables relating to the impact phase of 
CSI indicate that CSI is more severely punished in the initial discovery phases than in subsequent phases 
of the enforcement process. 
 
Antecedents of CSI 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results pertaining to Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Table IV depicts the meta-analytic 
correlation matrix. To test Hypothesis 3a, we use blockholders, board size, and institutional owners as 
indicators of managerial monitoring capacity. To test Hypothesis 3b, we included CEO duality, board  
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TABLE V 
MASEM Resultsa 
Predictor CSI CFP 
CSI  -0.07*** 
  (-4.83) 
Leverage  0.00 
  (0.16) 
Firm size  0.08*** 
  (4.95) 
Blockholders -0.05***  
 (-3.33)  
Board size -0.04**  
 (-2.60)  
Institutional ownership 0.02  
 (1.17)  
CEO duality -0.00  
 (-0.29)  
Board independence 0.01  
 (0.34)  
Inside ownership 0.04**  
 (2.62)  
   
Harmonic Mean N 4,128 
X2 18.74 
GFI 1.00 
RMSR 0.0084 
a Significant relationship are printed in bold; t-values are given in 
parentheses. * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
dependence, and inside ownership as indicators of the BoD’s inability to operate at arm’s length. The 
model reported in Table V fits the data very well (χ2 = 18.74; RMSR = 0.01; GFI = 1.00). Consistent with 
the results for Hypothesis 1, the direct relationship between CSI and CFP remains negative (β = -0.07, p < 
0.01). The model supports Hypothesis 3a. Both the presence of blockholding owners and larger boards 
reduce the occurrence of CSI (β = -0.05, p < 0.01 and β = -0.04, p < 0.05, respectively). Institutional 
ownership does not significantly reduce the incidence of CSI, however, consistent with the poor 
monitoring performance of institutional investors more generally (Faccio and Lasfer 2000). The support 
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for Hypothesis 3b is weaker. Inside ownership increases the prevalence of CSI (β = 0.04, p < 0.05), but 
CEO duality and board dependence yield no significant effects, suggesting that arm’s-length relationships 
between management and the BoD do not prevent CSI.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our overarching research question in this paper was: Is irresponsible corporate behavior also 
unsustainable? Taking stock of the currently available empirical evidence, we find a modest negative 
effect of CSI behaviors on firm performance (mean ρ = -0.12), suggesting that even though markets 
perform some policing role with respect to CSI, they cannot entirely be regarded as self-cleansing 
institutions. More interesting are the fine-grained answers that our study provides in respect to the 
conditions under which markets discipline CSI behaviors. We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of these more fine-grained results for managers, policy makers, and scholarly research. 
 
Managerial Implications: Good Advice for Bad Managers? 
Taking a cynical perspective, our findings can be used in a Machiavellian way to counsel ill-intending 
managers. First, managers who ruthlessly seek to realize economic benefits should avoid types of CSI 
that are known to result in substantial economic sanctions. We show that certain forms of CSI, such as 
misleading advertising, white collar crime, and breach of confidential data, can lead to severe economic 
penalties in addition to adverse legal consequences. At the same time, other forms of CSI, such as 
political corruption, tax-sheltering and earnings management practices, are associated with negligible 
economic sanctions, although they may have severe legal consequences. 
Second, managers are advised to avoid victimizing related party stakeholders on whom the firm is 
dependent for the realization of future earnings. Our findings indicate that while transgressions against 
parties economically related to the firm can have severe negative effects on performance, the performance 
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implications of CSI against unrelated, third parties tend to be considerably smaller (cf. Karpoff and Lott, 
1993; Murphy et al., 2009).  
Third, we find that corporate governance matters in respect to the prevalence of CSI, as it is more 
prevalent in firms in which managers are less constrained by the monitoring activities of boards and large 
shareholders, and where they hold larger ownership stakes. This finding can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, governance structures that allow for more managerial discretion and in which managers have a 
stronger interest in firm outcomes will also feature more CSI. This interpretation has interesting policy 
implications, which we will discuss below. Another interpretation, however, is that managers are more 
likely to get caught in better governed firms. In that case, ill-intending managers should be more careful 
in firms where they are monitored more, even though they may stand to gain more from CSI through their 
larger ownership in such firms.  
Finally, ill-intending managers should be aware of where to engage in CSI. Our findings suggest 
that managers should avoid both countries with stringent regulatory regimes and countries that feature 
more freedom for the press. Yet our findings do not thereby ban ill-intending managers to the less 
developed parts of the world, as CSI is punished less severely in more economically more competitive 
countries like Switzerland, Singapore, Germany, and Japan (Porter et al., 2007).  
 
Policy Implications  
Our intention is of course not to encourage managers to engage in CSI, but to alert policy makers to the 
conditions under which managers may engage in forms of CSI that are economically sustainable. So what 
can policy makers learn from our findings?  
First, policy makers must come to understand the specific conditions under which markets 
succeed or fail to correct irresponsible corporate behaviors. Our study finds that CSI against related party 
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stakeholders invokes stronger economic penalties than CSI against third party stakeholders. Hence, the 
self-cleansing capacities of markets function only selectively. Policy makers should therefore focus their 
enforcement efforts on those forms of CSI that spontaneously functioning market mechanisms fail to 
correct sufficiently. Put differently, given that active enforcement is costly, it will generally be more 
efficient to spend a dollar on enforcement where that dollar matters most in correcting CSI. Our findings 
suggest that enforcement dollars are better spent on preventing and correcting externalities and forms of 
CSI targeted at third parties than on CSI that directly involves economic interests of the firm, as the latter 
are remedied effectively by market mechanisms. Note that this conclusion goes against current trends in 
business regulation, which has mushroomed more in the financial sector than in any other field of society 
(Coffee, 1999; Karpoff et al., 2005).  
Second, policy makers must address the conditions under which CSI arises in the first place. Our 
study has shown that CSI flourishes in the presence of weak firm-level corporate governance and weak 
country-level institutions. We address the role of corporate governance in combating CSI below, but in 
the area of institutional development, policy makers should focus on developing and maintaining a high 
degree of regulatory stringency as well as vigorously protect the freedom of the press. Our results indicate 
that this is especially necessary in countries that are economically more competitive (Porter et al., 2007), 
but in which legal institutions and the media are less than fully developed, such as China, Hong Kong, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore (Freedom House, 2010). 
 
Scholarly Implications 
This paper has drawn extensively on three scholarly literatures: stakeholder theory, corporate governance, 
and institutional theory. While Hypotheses 1 and 2 aimed at testing existing theories of CSI and 
stakeholder management, Hypotheses 3 and 4 served to extend theory. By testing novel hypotheses, our 
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study makes important contributions to both corporate governance and institutional theory.  
To date, corporate governance research has focused mostly on the effectiveness of governance 
practices in remedying the agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control in 
publicly listed firms (Dalton et al., 2007). We find that two of the most important corporate governance 
mechanisms internal to firms are also effective in combating CSI, which is often directed at parties other 
than shareholders. More specifically, both larger boards and large shareholders prove to be effective 
monitors of managers in regard to CSI. At the same time, our results also indicate that certain corporate 
governance reforms promoted in the quest to secure shareholder value (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009) may conflict fundamentally with the ambition to combat CSI. This is true for recommendations to 
tie executive compensation more closely to firm performance through executive ownership, efforts to 
reduce board size in order to be able to monitor management more effectively, and reforms that seek to 
curb the adverse effects of concentrated ownership of firms (Morck et al., 2005). As certain corporate 
governance practices appear to be significant antecedents of CSI, future research should attempt to further 
unveil the corporate governance antecedents of those forms of CSI that target stakeholders other than 
shareholders. 
Our findings also have implications for the emerging institution-based view of management (Peng 
et al., 2009). An important theme in this literature involves the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions (cf. Peng and Khoury, 2008), which both affect corporate practices. Yet with the exception of 
national culture, most of the available measures for country level institutions tend to focus on formal 
institutions. Consequently, most empirical contributions to the institution-based view limit themselves to 
an analysis of formal institutional effects. Our study explicitly assesses the effects of both formal and 
informal institutions on the functioning of reputation mechanisms and demonstrates that institutions like 
free media and those promoting national competitiveness have a profound effect on the size of 
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reputational sanctions firms incur for CSI behaviors. This suggests the presence of complementarities 
between formal and informal institutions (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). We therefore recommend 
institutional researchers to more explicitly assess the interactions between formal and informal 
institutions in future studies. 
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Appendix B 
Studies Included in the Meta-Analysisa 
Author Year Publication  
Abraham & Voos 2000 WP 
Agrawal & Chadha 2005 JLE 
Agrawal & Cooper  2009 WP 
Agrawal & Cooper  2009 WP 
Agrawal, Jaffe, & Karpoff 1999 JLE 
Ahmed, Gardella, & Nanda 2002 FM 
Alexander  1999 JLE 
Alla, Detre, & Connor 2005 WP 
Alyousef & Alumutairi 2010 IRBRP 
Amir, Kallunki, & Nilsson 2009 WP 
Anderson & Yohn 2002 WP 
Arena & Julio 2009 WP 
Atanasov, Ivanov, & Litvak 2008 WP 
Badertscher & Burks 2010 WP 
Badrinath & Bolster  1996 JRE 
Barber & Darrough 1996 JPE 
Barber , Kang, & Liang 2006 WP 
Barnett & King 2008 AMJ 
Barth & McNichols  1994 JAR 
Baucus & Baucus 1997 AMJ 
Baucus & Near 1991 AMJ 
Becker & Olsen 1986 ILRR 
Beneish 1999 AR 
Bernile & Jarrell 2009 JAE 
Bhagat, Bizjak, & Coles 1998 FM 
Bhagat, Brickley, & Coles 1994 JFE 
Bittlingmayer & Hazlett 2000 JFE 
Bizjak & Coles 1995 AER 
Blacconiere & Northcut 1997 JAAF 
Blackwell, Marr, & Spivey 1990 JFE 
Bosch & Eckard 1991 RES 
Bosch & Lee 1994 MDE 
Bosch, Eckard, & Lee 1998 MDE 
Bosch, Eckward, & Singal 1998 JLE 
Bowen, Castanias, & Daley 1983 JFQA 
Bowen, Rajgopal, & Wenkatachalam 2008 CAR 
Bradford  2005 WP 
Bromiley & Marcus  1989 SMJ 
Brown & Burdekin 2000 JEB 
Burns & Kedia 2010 WP 
Burns, Kedia, & Lipson 2006 WP 
Callen, Livnat, & Segal 2002 WP 
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Cao, Myers, & Omer 2009 WP 
Capelle-Blancard & Laguna 2010 JEEM 
Carcello & Nagy 2004 WP 
Carcello & Nagy 2004 MAJ 
Chang, Wang, & Lin 2009 WP 
Chen, Ganesan, & Liu 2009 AMA 
Chen, Gu, & Tang 2008 WP 
Cheng & Farber 2008 AR 
Chiu, Teoh, & Tian 2009 WP 
Chu, Lin, & Prather 2005 NJEB 
Clinebell & Clinebell 1994 JM 
Cohen & Zarowin 2010 JAE 
Collins, Reitenga, & Sanchez 2008 AA 
Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez 2009 JBE 
Cormier & Magnan 1997 JAPP 
Cornett, McNutt, & Tehranian 2009 JCF 
Cox & Weirich 2002 MAJ 
Cummins, Lewis, & Wei 2006 JBF 
Dag, Eije, & Pennink 1998 WP 
Daniel, Denis, & Naveen 2008 JAE 
Dasgupta, Laplante, & Mamingi 1998 WP 
Davidson & Worrell 1988 AMJ 
Davidson & Worrell 1990 ABER 
Davidson & Worrell 1992 SMJ 
Davidson, Worrell, & Cheng 1994 IR 
Davis, Payne, & McMahan 2007 JBE 
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney 1996 CAR 
Demirkan & Platt 2009 WP 
Desai & Dharmapala 2009 RES 
Desia, Hogan, & Wilkins 2004 WP 
Detre & Gollub 2004 WP 
Donoher, Reed, & Storrud-Barnes 2007 JM 
Dowdell, Govindaraj, & Jain 1992 JFQA 
Dranove & Olsen 1994 JLE 
DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik 2004 JFE 
Dunn 2004 JM 
Durnev & Mangen 2006 WP 
Eckbo 1983 JFE 
Effendi, Srivastava, & Swanson 2007 JFE 
Elayan, Li, & Meyer 2002 WP 
Elayan, Meyer, & Sun 2003 WP 
Ellert 1975 JF 
Ellingson  1988 WP 
Engelen 2009 WP 
Erickson, Hanlon, & Maydew 2004 WP 
Fan, Rui, & Zhao 2008 JCE 
Fanning & Cigger 240 WP 
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Farber 2005 AR 
Feroz, Park, & Pastena 1991 JAR 
Ferris & Pritchard 2009 WP 
Fich & Shivdasani  2007 JFE 
Freedman & Patten 2004 AF 
Freedman & Stagliano 1991 AAAJ 
Frieder & Shanthikumar 2007 WP 
Frieder & Shanthikumar 2008 WP 
Fry & Lee 1989 FR 
Gande & Lewis 2007 WP 
Garber, Adams, Peltzman, & Rubinfeld 1998 BPEA 
Gatzlaff & McCullough 2008 WP 
Gillet, Hubner, & Plunus 2007 WP 
Glied en Kroszner 1994 WP 
Goh  2007 WP 
Goldman, Preyer, & Stefanescu 2008 WP 
Gonen 2003 WP 
Gordon, Henry, Peytcheva, & Sun 2008 WP 
Govindaraj, Jaggi, & Lin 2004 RQFA 
Graddy & Strickland  2007 AE 
Graham, Maher, & Northcut 2001 JAAF 
Gratto, Thatcher, & Thatcher 1990 ABER 
Griffin, Grundfest, & Perino 2004 A 
Gunthorpe 1997 JBE 
Gupta & Goldar 2005 EE 
Hamilton 1995 JEEM 
Hanlon & Slemrod 2009 JPEc 
Harper & Adams 1996 CEP 
Harris 2007 WP 
Harris & Bromiley  2006 WP 
Haslem 2005 JF 
Hedge, Malone, & Finnerty 2010 WP 
Hersch 1991 JHR 
Hertzel & Smith 1993 JLEO 
Hill & Schneeweis 1983 JF 
Hoffer, Pruitt, & Reilly 1988 JPE 
Hoffer, Pruitt, & Reilly 1987 FR 
Hovav & D'arcy 2005 CS 
Hranaiova & Byers 2007 WP 
Hribar & Jenkins 2004 RAS 
Hribar, Jenkins, & Wang 2004 WP 
Huth & MacDonald 1989 JIE 
Jaggi & Freedman 1992 JBFA 
Jarrell & Peltzman 1985 JPE 
Jia, Ding, Li, & Wu 2009 JBE 
Jo & Kim 2007 JFE 
Johnson, Nelson, & Pritchard 2004 WP 
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Johnson, Ryan, & Tian 2005 WP 
Johnson, Ryan, & Tian 2009 RF 
Jones & Rubin  2001 AFE 
Joshi, Khanna, & Sidique 2005 WP 
Kang 2008 AMJ 
Karpoff & Lott 1999 JLE 
Karpoff & Lott 1993 JLE 
Karpoff & Lou 2008 WP 
Karpoff, Lee, & Martin 2008 JFQA 
Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk 1999 JPE 
Karpoff, Lott, & Rankine 1998 WP 
Karpoff, Lott, & Wehrly 2005 JLE 
Kassinis & Vafeas 2002 SMJ 
Kedia & Philippon 2009 RFS 
Kellogg 1984 JAE 
Khanna & Damon 1999 JEEM 
Khanna, Quimio, & Bojilova 1998 JEEM 
Kinney & McDaniel 1989 JAE 
Klassen & McLaughlin  1996 MS 
Koku  2006 JBR 
Koku, Qureshi, & Akhigbe 2001 JBR 
Konar & Cohen  2001 RES 
Lang & Stulz 1992 JFE 
Langus & Motta 2007 WP 
Langus  2008 WP 
Langus, Motta, & Aguzzoni 2010 WP 
Lanoie, Laplante, & Roy 1997 WP 
Laplante & Lanoie 1994 SEJ 
Lee & Masulis 2009 WP 
Li 2004 WP 
Long & Rao 1995 JE&F 
Lowry & Shu 2002 JFE 
Lusk & Schroeder 2002 ARER 
Marciukaityte & Varma 2008 EL 
Marciukaityte, Szewczuk, Uzun, & Varma 2006 FAJ 
McDowell 2005 WP 
McKendall, DeMarr, & Jones-Rikkers 2002 JBE 
McKenzie & Thomsen 2001 JARE 
Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock 2009 WP 
Moore, Stuart, & Pozner 2010 WP 
Muller & Kraussl 2010 WP 
Muoghalu, Robison, & Glascock 1990 SEJ 
Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs 2004 WP 
Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs 2009 JFQA 
Nabar, Kim, & Heninger 2006 WP 
O'Connor, Shapiro, & Downe 2003 WP 
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Owers, Lin, & Rogers 2002 IBERJ 
Palmon, Sun, & Tang 1997 FM 
Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz 2004 JAE 
Pantzalis, Park, & Sutton, NOT PART OF SAMPLE 2008 JEF 
Peltzman 1981 JLE 
Peng & Roell 2008 RF 
Perry & Fontnouvelle 2005 WP 
Persons 2006 JBE 
Prince & Rubin 2000 WP 
Pruitt & Nethercutt 2002 JLR 
Pruitt & Peterson  1986 JFR 
Pruitt, Wei, & White 1988 JLR 
Rao 1997 JFSD 
Rao 1996 JFSD 
Rao & Hamilton  1996 JBE 
Rathinasamy & Loh  2001 JBER 
Reichert, Lockett, & Rao 1993 FM 
Reichert, Lockett, & Rao 1996 FR 
Richardson, Tuna, & Wu 2002 WP 
Rock 2003 CC 
Rupp 2001 EL 
Rupp 2004 RIO 
Saksena 2001 IJCM 
Salavei, Golec, & Harding 2010 WP 
Salavei, Golec, & Harding 2009 WP 
Salavei, Moore, & Golec 2005 WP 
Schmidt, Kappel, & Ziegler 2009 WP 
Schnatterly  2003 SMJ 
Schneider 2010 WP 
Schrand & Zechman 2010 WP 
Skantz, Cloninger, & Strickland 1990 FR 
Srinivasan 2005 JAR 
Staw & Szwajkowski 1975 ASQ 
Strachan, Smith, & Beedles 2005 FR 
Sullivan, Haunschild, & Page 2005 WP 
Summers & Sweeney 1998 AR 
Sun & Zhang 2006 WP 
Swanson, Tse, & Wynalda 2007 WP 
Takaoka  2004 EL 
Thirumalai & Sinha 2007 WP 
Thomsen & McKenzie 2001 AJAE 
Tibbs, Murphy, & Shrieves 2008 WP 
Torabzadeh, Davidson, & Assar 1989 JBE 
Ursel & Armstrong-Stassen 2006 JLR 
Viscusi & Hersch 1990 JRE 
Voon, Puah, & Entebang DIGITAL ONLY 2008 JEC 
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Wang 2008 WP 
Wang & Chou 2009 WP 
Wang & Yu 2008 WP 
Wang, Senbet, & Prabhala 2005 WP 
Wang, Winton, & Yu 2010 WP 
Wei, Xie, & Posthuma 2006 WP 
Wiersema & Zhang 2010 WP 
Williams & Barrett 2000 JBE 
Wokutch & Spencer 1987 CMR 
Wong  2002 WP 
Worrell, Davidson, & Sharma 1991 AMJ 
Wright, Ferris, Hiller & Kroll 1995 AMJ 
Wynne & Hoffer 1976 AE 
Xu, Najand, & Ziegenfuss 2006 JBFA 
Zhao, Lee, Ng, & Flynn 2009 WP 
Zyglidopoulos 2001 BS 
 
a Publication: A: Abacus; AA: Advances in Accounting; AAAJ: Accounting, Auditing, & 
Accountability Journal; ABER: Akron Business & Economic Review; AE: Applied Economics; AER: 
American Economic Review; AF: Accounting Forum; AFE: Advances in Financial Economics; AJAE: 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics; AMA: American Marketing Association; AMJ: 
Academy of Management Journal; AR: Accounting Review; ARER: Agricultural & Resource 
Economics Review; ASQ: Administrative Science Quarterly; BPEA: Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity; BS: Business & Society; CAR: Contemporary Accounting Research; CC: Competition & 
Change; CEP: Contemporary Economic Policy; CMR: California Management Review; CS: 
Computers & Security; EE: Ecological Economics; EL: Economic Letters; FAJ: Financial Analysts 
Journal; FM: Financial Management; FR: Financial Review; IBERJ: International Business & 
Economics Research Journal; IJCM: International Journal of Commerce & Management; ILRR: 
Industrial Labor Relations Review; IR: Industrial Relations; IRBRP: International Review of Business 
Research Papers; JAAF: Journal of Accounting, Auditing, & Finance; JAE: Journal of Accounting & 
Economics; JAPP: Journal of Accounting & Public Policy; JAR: Journal of Accounting Research; 
JARE: Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics; JBE: Journal of Business Ethics; JBER: 
Journal of Business & Economics Research; JBF: Journal of Banking & Finance; JBFA: Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting; JBR: Journal of Business Research; JCE: Journal of Comparative 
Economics; JCF: Journal of Corporate Finance; JE&F: Journal of Economics & Finance; JEB: 
Journal of Economics & Business; JEC: Journal of Economic Cooperation; JEEM: Journal of 
Environmental Economics & Management; JEF: Journal of Empirical Finance; JF: Journal of 
Finance; JFE: Journal of Financial Economics; JFQA: Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis; 
JFR: Journal of Financial Research; JFSD: Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions; JHR: 
Journal of Human Resources; JIE: Journal of Industrial Economics; JLE: Journal of Law & 
Economics; JLEO: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization; JLR: Journal of Labor Research; JM: 
Journal of Management; JPE: Journal of Political Economy; JPEc: Journal of Public Economics; JRE: 
Journal of Regulatory Economics; MAJ: Managerial Auditing Journal; MDE: Managerial & Decision 
Economics; MS: Management Science; NJEB: Nebraska Journal of Economics & Business; RAS: 
Review of Accounting Studies; RES: Review of Economics & Statistics; RF: Review of Finance; RFS: 
Review of Financial Studies; RIO: Review of Industrial Organization; RQFA: Review of Quantitative 
Finance & Accounting; SEJ: Southern Economic Journal; SMJ: Strategic Management Journal; WP: 
Working Paper. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Governance Without Ownership: A Qualitative Study of the Corporate 
Governance of Philanthropic Organizations 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Although Philanthropic Organizations (POs) face the gravest corporate governance challenges 
imaginable, they have hardly been systematically studied by corporate governance researchers to date. 
The few studies available either uncritically extend the agency theoretical analysis of the separation of 
ownership and control in public firms to the PO context, or research individual corporate governance 
practices without attempting to contribute to a general understanding of PO governance. In order to 
break away from this agency theoretical path dependency, this study uses qualitative research methods 
on an analytical sample of 34 Dutch philanthropies to develop a currently lacking general theory of 
PO governance. We provide a definition of POs, describe their economic function and their core 
governance challenge, and develop a typology of POs based on the differential ability of POs to 
involve their two primary stakeholder groups—i.e. donors and beneficiaries—in organizational 
governance. We articulate our nascent theory by means of six propositions, and conclude with 
exploring its implications for research on corporate governance, the use of stakeholder theory in 
corporate governance research, and the governance of social enterprises and hybrids.  
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Introduction 
POs are formal organizations without owners that produce goods or services for one stakeholder 
group (i.e. the beneficiaries), that are predominantly paid for by another stakeholder group (i.e. the 
donors). POs are a particularly interesting research object because they are subject to a number of 
unusual conditions that make their governance challenges exceptionally daunting.  First, the non-
overlap between the stakeholder group that pays for the goods or services and the stakeholder group 
that consumes them implies that there is no functioning market for POs’ goods and services, and 
hence no price mechanism to guide organizational decision-making on what to produce and for whom. 
Second, POs do not have a single primary stakeholder group, such as owners, whose interests as a 
residual risk bearer provide incentives to monitor managerial decisions (Jensen, 2002). Instead, POs 
face multiple primary stakeholder groups, such as donors, volunteers, and beneficiaries, of which none 
can claim priority (Anheier, 2005; Brody, 1996). In spite of these challenging conditions, the survival 
rate of POs is exceptionally high. While only 52.4 percent of businesses established in the US in 2001 
survived five years or more (Bureau of Labor Statistics), the survival rate of public charities was 84 
percent over the same period (National Center for Charitable Statistics). As POs are hardly subject to 
market forces that would weed out inefficient producers, this finding is more disturbing than 
comforting, as existing POs may not be delivering the value that would economically justify their 
existence. As such, POs represent a unique organizational form, facing particularly daunting corporate 
governance challenges, the resolution of which are potentially greatly welfare enhancing (Hansmann, 
1996). 
The available literature on the governance of POs strongly reflects a path dependency on the 
agency theoretical analysis of the separation of ownership and control in public firms (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Most theoretical work on PO governance attempts to extend or adapt this analysis to 
the context of POs (e.g. Brody, 1996; Manne, 1999; Steinberg, 2010; Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & 
Jegers, 2012), while empirical work has primarily investigated agency theory-inspired governance 
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practices known from the context of public firms, such as board monitoring (Ostrower & Stone, 2006; 
Miller, 2002), performance-based remuneration schemes (Baber, Daniel & Roberts, 2002; Hallock, 
2002), and the role of accounting information (Hyndman, 1990; Keating & Frumkin, 2003).  
The extension of the agency theoretical analysis of the separation of ownership and control in 
public firms to PO governance has narrowed our perspective and led us to insufficiently account for 
the idiosyncratic governance challenges that POs face. Drawing parallels between owners in public 
firms and donors in POs, the literature has focused primarily on possible agency problems between 
the external donors and internal decision agents in POs. As a result, research on PO governance 
focuses almost exclusively on accountability practices as governance remedies for these agency 
problems (Cornforth, 2012). That this somewhat uncritical extension of the agency theoretical 
framework to the PO context has not been very fruitful is aptly illustrated by the existing literature on 
PO board composition. A review of nearly three decades of research concluded that fundamental 
questions of how, when, and why board composition matters, have yet to be answered (Ostrower & 
Stone, 2006). More generally, “a coherent economic theory on nonprofit governance has not yet 
emerged from the research” to date (Jegers, 2009: 158).  
The purpose of our study is to fill this gap. In order to break away from the field’s theoretical 
path dependency which “favors building new theory based on old” (Bansal, 2013: 127), we adopt two 
strategies. First, we revert back to Kenneth Arrow’s (1974) foundational insight that governance is the 
backbone of formal organizations and involves both organizational decision-making and 
accountability practices. He argued that the key design challenge of any organization is to optimally 
balance decision-making authority with accountability mechanisms and therefore both merit equal 
consideration in the study of organizational governance. Using this broadened perspective, second, 
we use an inductive, qualitative research approach to develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
the unique governance challenges of POs. The questions that we set out to answer include: What are 
the specific decision-making and accountability challenges that POs face? Who are a PO’s 
64B_BW_Vishwanathan_standV3.job
 

 
118 
 
stakeholders? What does a well-governed PO look like and how can this be achieved? Qualitative 
research methods are particularly suitable to answer these broad questions because they allow us to 
collect open-ended data and develop a new, and potentially path-breaking theory of PO governance 
(Bansal, 2013; Graebner, Martin & Roundy, 2012). 
 We used qualitative comparative case study methods (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994) on a 
sample of 34 POs that we selected through a most different systems sampling design (Przeworski & 
Teune, 1970). This analytical sampling design maximizes the variety of potentially relevant PO 
attributes in order to facilitate maximal generalizability of our theory building efforts. By 
comparatively analyzing data from various sources, we develop a typology of POs that not only 
enlightens our understanding of the specific governance challenges that POs share as an 
organizational form, but that also helps to understand the subtly different governance challenges that 
different types of POs may face. Based on our analysis, we develop a theory of the governance of 
POs, which we articulate by means of six propositions. These propositions do not just involve 
empirically testable propositions, but should rather be interpreted as the foundational tenets and 
conceptual building blocks of our emerging theory of PO governance. Next to contributing to the 
corporate governance literature, this theory may also fruitfully inform the literatures on stakeholder 
management (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997) and social enterprises 
(Pache & Santos, 2010; 2013; Battilana & Dorado, 2010).  
In order to define and demarcate the phenomenon of interest, we first discuss some available 
theoretical insights concerning POs and introduce the first two theoretical propositions of our theory. 
In the subsequent section we describe our sampling design, data collection efforts, and qualitative 
analyses. We present our findings in the next three sections and gradually build our theory by 
articulating four additional propositions. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical implications 
and intended contributions of our study.  
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Theoretical Background 
What is a PO? 
We define POs as organizations that meet three basic requirements: 1) POs have a legal personality, 2) 
POs are subject to the non-distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980; 1996), and 3) PO’s service 
purchasers and service recipients are two largely non-overlapping groups. The first requirement 
represents a trivial but necessary condition that applies to any formal organization, because only legal 
personality allows organizations to function as an entity separate from its constituents that can engage 
in business and own assets on its own behalf (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). The second 
characteristic of POs is that they are subject to the non-distribution constraint, which is a defining 
feature of the broader class of non-profit organizations (NPOs) more generally (Hansmann, 1980). 
This constraint does not bar NPOs from making profits, but prohibits that any profits made are 
distributed to any of the organization’s constituencies. Because ownership entails the formal right to 
control an organization and the right to appropriate its profits, NPOs are organizations without 
owners. The final characteristic of a PO is that it receives the bulk of its income from parties other 
than the recipients of the delivered service. This feature distinguishes POs within the class of NPOs. 
Hansmann refers to such organizations as ‘donative nonprofits’ as opposed to ‘commercial nonprofits’ 
such as universities, labor unions, and museums. In commercial nonprofits the service recipients are 
typically involved in an exchange relationship with the organization; paying a tuition or membership 
fee, or an entry ticket in return for goods or services. When unsatisfied with quality of the delivered 
goods or services, these recipients can withhold their business. This is something that the recipients of 
a PO’s goods or services are hardly able to do due to the significant non-overlap between service 
purchasers and service recipients. Since how an organization is defined influences an empirical 
analysis of its governance challenges, the first theoretical proposition of our theory involves a 
definition and empirical demarcation of POs as an organizational form:  
Proposition 1: POs are formal organizations without owners that produce goods or services for 
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one stakeholder group (i.e. the beneficiaries) that are predominately paid for by another 
stakeholder group (i.e. the donors).   
 
What Do We Know? The Existence and Governance of POs  
According to the literature, POs, and NPOs more generally, are organizations that emerge in 
conditions where markets fail to govern transactions. This happens when either; 1) the goods or 
services produced are public goods (Weisbrod, 1977), 2) severe information asymmetries stand in the 
way of efficient exchange, 3) or the product or service is delivered to a party other than the one paying 
for it. In such circumstances regular contractual arrangements cannot provide purchasers with 
sufficient means for contract enforcement, resulting in contract failure (Hansmann, 1987). A for-profit 
organization operating under such conditions would have both the incentive and the opportunity to act 
opportunistically and provide less service or quality than was paid for. Although NPOs may also have 
the opportunity to deliver inferior services, they lack the incentive to do so because the non-
distribution constraint prohibits any distribution of profits to parties involved in the organization 
(Fama and Jensen 1983a). The NPO, therefore, has been conceived as an organizational response to 
the contract failures that NPOs face in exchange (Hansmann 1980). Within the class of NPOs, POs 
arguably represent the worst cases of contract failure. While NPOs may face a substantial overlap 
between service purchasers and service recipients, POs face limited or no overlap at all. An illustrative 
example is a development aid organization where donors and beneficiaries represent two completely 
physically separated groups.  
Building on this functional explanation for their existence, the dominant view of PO 
governance in the literature is that an agency relationship exists between (external) donors on the one 
hand, and the (internal) organizational decision agents on the other, because donors are vulnerable to 
expropriation and opportunism by those administering the service (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Although 
the non-distribution constraint represents an important remedy for this problem, it is hardly a perfect 
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solution because decision agents still have the opportunity to indirectly distribute some PO resources 
to themselves by means of inflated salaries or perquisites, for example. The literature conceives this 
agency problem as the core governance challenge of POs, and since for-profit, publicly listed 
organizations are subject to similar challenges, Fama and Jensen (1983a; 1983b) claim that the 
governance challenges of POs do not differ much from those of their for-profit counterparts. 
Accordingly, the bulk of research on NPO governance has focused either on internal monitoring 
through accounting practices (e.g. Hyndman, 1990; Keating & Frumkin, 2003) board supervision 
(Ostrower & Stone, 2006; Miller, 2002), or on external monitoring through taxation policies and 
regulation (Bolton & Mehran, 2006; Fremont-Smith & Kosaras, 2003; Manne, 1999).  
Donors, however, are not equivalent to shareholders because donors do not own POs. In fact, 
as POs do not have any owners, they may be better understood as organizations without principals 
(Brody, 1996). This does not imply that monitoring practices are irrelevant to POs, but it does reveal a 
deeper question that lies at the core of PO governance; to whom are POs accountable? Most of the 
available literature assumes that POs are accountable to donors. Yet this stream of research, which has 
focused primarily on board monitoring, is highly fragmented and has failed to produce any 
foundational insights or generalizable recommendations regarding the governance of POs (Jegers, 
2009). The goal of this study is to move away from the field’s unbalanced focus on the relationship 
between POs and their donors, and hence a foundational assumption of our theory is that due to the 
absence of ownership, POs do not have a single primary stakeholder group:  
Proposition 2: Because POs have no owners, they do not have a single, ultimate stakeholder group 
whose interests are leading the governance of the organization. 
Data and Methods 
Given the variety of extant POs and the likely heterogeneity in existing governance challenges, the 
qualitative comparative case study method is most suitable because the continuous comparison of 
multiple cases allows us to verify whether an emergent finding is “idiosyncratic to a single case or 
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consistently replicated by several cases” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 27). This replication logic is a 
key feature of comparative case studies and enables the development of robust and generalizable 
theories (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004).  
 
Case Selection  
We selected all our cases from the Dutch philanthropic sector. Accounting for nearly five percent of 
the Dutch GDP, it is one of the largest philanthropic sectors in the world (Salamon & Sokolowski, 
2004)20. The most popular area of philanthropic activity is development aid, which received nearly 40 
percent of all financial contributions collected in 2010, followed by community services, 
environmental protection, and healthcare (CBF, 2010). The Dutch philanthropic sector is 
institutionally well organized. The government provides tax deductions to stimulate giving and a 
government-supported Fundraising Office (CBF) exists that collects data on Dutch POs and offers 
certification for good governance (Ploeg, 2010).  
 As is recommended in case study research, we purposefully sampled our individual cases 
using a most different systems sampling design where cases are selected such that the variation of 
potentially relevant attributes is maximized (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). We selected the cases in 
three rounds. In the first round we identified ten cases that were most different in a number of key 
descriptive features; type (grant-making POs vs fundraising POs), size (in total income and number of 
employees), age, and sector. In the second round we selected cases that were most different with 
respect to contract failures, which in most cases involves the extent of information asymmetry that the 
PO’s donors are subject to (Hansmann, 1980). This is high for organizations that rely on a large 
number of small dispersed donors, and low for organizations where the most important donor 
manages the PO. During the final round of case selection, we had already developed a preliminary 
understanding of the governance challenges of POs and selected cases that were most different with 
                                                          
20 Note that the size of the philanthropic sector in this study is measured as the sum of private volunteering and giving as a 
share of GDP for the period 1995-2002. 
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respect to the attributes that we expected to be relevant to our emerging theory (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). Finally, we consulted a field expert and asked him to reflect on the 
comprehensiveness of our emerging sample and to suggest cases that might bring new insights into 
our research. We reached a point of informational redundancy at a final sample size of 34 cases 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Table 1 summarizes some key characteristics of the cases in our analytical 
sample. We assign each case with a unique ID ranging from C01 to C34 and use this ID to denote a 
specific case throughout the paper.    
 
Data Sources 
We collected data from five sources: (1) interviews with case specific informants, (2) interviews with 
field experts, (3) primary archival data, (4) secondary archival data, and (5) focus groups. Primary 
archival data were first used to assist case selection, and subsequently to further enhance our 
understanding of the case such that more informed and detailed probing was possible during the 
interview. The interviews represent the central source of information in our study. In later stages of 
our research archival data were used again to complement our knowledge of the cases and to 
triangulate emerging findings (Patton, 2002). Focus group meetings with PO leaders were organized 
at several stages of our research, both to validate intermediate theory building and to acquire new data 
in regard to specific questions that came up during the previous round of data collection.  
 Interviews. The interviews were semi-structured and open-ended (cf. Merton & Kendall, 
1946). We interviewed the PO’s director, the COO, or the Chair of the Board. Since for some POs 
corporate governance is a salient and sensitive issue, we started each interview by explaining that our 
goal is to map the general corporate governance challenges of POs, and that we are not interested in 
evaluating the extent to which any particular PO is meeting existing obligations21. Because each 
interview lasted approximately two hours, we believe that we were able to reach some level of  
                                                          
21 Such as those articulated in the Code Wijffels; the Dutch good governance code for POs. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample characteristics 
  # of cases Case ID 
Activity 
Grant-making 9 C01, C02, C05, C09, C12, C17, C19, C26, C31 
Fundraising 23 C03, C04, C06-C08, C10, C11, C13-C16, C18, C20-C23, C25, C28-30, 
C32-C34 
Hybrid 2 C24, C27 
Legal form   
Association 9 C04, C06, C07, C10, C13, C21, C30, C34 
Foundation 25 C01-C03, C05, C08, C09, C11, C12, C14-C20, C22-C29, C31-C33 
Industry   
Public-social benefits 11 C01, C09, C13, C19, C22, C25, C26, C28, C27, C33, C34 
International relief 7 C04, C05, C17, C20, C23, C29, C32 
Culture & arts 3 C06, C24, C30 
Health 5 C03, C12, C15, C16, C18 
Environment/animals 4 C07, C08, C11, C21 
Sports 2 C10, C14 
Mixed 2 C02, C31 
Total income   
≤ €100,000 3 C07, C10, C28 
€100,000 - €1 million 4 C06, C15, C20, C22, C33 
€1 - €10 million 9 C01, C08, C12, C14, C17, C19, C25, C26, C30 
€10 - €25 million 9 C02-C05, C13, C18, C27, C32, C34  
€25 - €50 million 5 C09, C11, C23, C24, C31 
≥ €50 million  3 C16, C21, C29 
Total paid staff   
≤ 5 7 C01, C06, C10, C12, C26, C28, C33 
5 - 15 7 C02, C14, C15, C19, C20, C22, C30 
15 - 50 7 C05, C08, C09, C17, C25, C27, C31 
50 - 100 7 C03, C07, C18, C23, C24, C29, C32 
100 - 250 4 C04, C11, C16, C34 
≥ 250 2 C13, C21 
Age   
≤ 10 years 7 C01, C02, C12, C16, C20, C25, C33 
10 - 50 years 12 C03, C08-C11, C14, C15, C17, C18, C22, C28, C32 
50 - 100 years 8 C04, C05, C13, C23, C24, C27, C29, C34 
100 - 300 years 5 C06, C07, C21, C30, C31 
≥ 300 years 2 C19, C26 
Geographical scope   
Dutch city/region 4 C09, C26, C28, C33 
Nationwide  17 C01, C03, C06, C07, C10, C13-C16, C18, C21, C22, C24, C25, C30, 
C31, C34 
Some foreign countries 5 C05, C12, C19, C20, C27 
Worldwide 8 C02, C04, C08, C11, C17, C23, C29, C32 
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openness and trust between the interviewer and respondent. The interviews covered a broad range of 
topics such as organizational and governance structures, funding acquisition, history, program 
management, and stakeholder relationships. For each topic discussed we asked respondents to identify 
and explain the challenges relating to decision-making and accountability, as well as the practices that 
they employ to address these challenges. An interview was finished when the respondent answered 
‘no’ to the question of whether he/she could think of any other management or governance challenge 
their organization copes with. We also performed five additional interviews with field experts to tap 
into a more detached view of PO governance. Such interviews are valuable because they potentially 
reveal governance issues that organization-specific, image-conscious respondents might not have been 
willing to share (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). All interviews were recorded and transcribed and a 
total of 761 pages of (single-spaced) transcribed text were used for data analyses.  
  Archival data. We used both primary and secondary archival data. The two most important 
sources of archival data were PO’s official websites and their annual reports. All 34 POs had a 
website, and for all POs we had access to a digital annual report. The other primary data that we used 
were brochures and organizational charters that we received from the respondents. We obtained 
secondary archival data from the Dutch Fundraising Office who agreed to share its database with us, 
containing financial and non-financial data on certified Dutch fundraising POs. This involved 
information on income sources, expenditures, board size, board composition, and the number of 
employees and volunteers, for example. For 21 of the 25 fundraising POs in our sample this 
secondary information was available. Unfortunately, no such secondary database for grant-making 
POs exists in The Netherlands.  
 Focus groups. We organized five focus group sessions (cf. Morgan, 1993) of which two were 
conducted at the beginning of our research, and three towards the end. The focus groups consisted of 
15 to 30 representatives of middle or higher management from a wide array of POs. The duration of 
these sessions spanned between 45 to 120 minutes. During the first two sessions we briefly introduced 
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our research topic and asked each participant to identify and describe their organization’s biggest 
governance challenge. Since these initial sessions took place before the interviews, our aim was to 
make an initial assessment of governance challenges facing POs. A discussion among the participants 
often arose naturally, and our role was to make sure that the discussion remained on-topic. The 
sessions organized at a later stage of our research were more focused. We presented the emerging 
theory and asked participants to interpret and apply it to their own organizations. The goal of these 
sessions was both to evaluate the validity of our theory and to further develop it22.  
 
Qualitative Analyses 
Our research is based on 34 cases, which is larger than the number of cases conventionally used in 
comparative case study analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). As a result, it was not feasible for us to “become 
intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540), but given our 
research objective of developing a general theory of PO governance, this was not our aim to begin 
with. In fact, the relatively large sample size allowed us to reach a higher level of abstraction when 
analyzing our data, which is a necessary step in building a generalizable theory. We now describe the 
three stages of our analytic procedures.  
Stage 1: Surveying common governance challenges. The first step in our data-analysis was to 
make sense of the large amount of transcribed interview text describing numerous governance and 
organizational challenges. The goal was to identify common governance challenges mentioned by 
respondents across cases. We denoted a fragment of text as describing a governance challenge when 
the respondent mentions some kind of problem, dilemma, or hardship related to either strategic or 
operational decision-making, or to some sort of organizational accountability practice. To make an 
initial assessment of governance challenges, both authors read a subset of interview transcripts and 
individually prepared an overview of reoccurring governance challenges. We subsequently compared 
                                                          
22 Due to privacy considerations, we were unable to record and transcribe our focus group sessions, but one of the co-
authors took detailed notes during each session. 
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and synthesized our findings. Several meetings followed in which we read and discussed new 
interview transcripts and attempted to complement our inventory of governance challenges and further 
refine their conceptualizations. After identifying 12 distinct governance challenges we concluded that 
our overview of governance challenges was exhaustive.  
We next sought to derive a conceptual ordering from our overview of governance challenges 
by reviewing them and experimenting with different groupings. Our goal was to ‘distill’ a smaller 
number of governance challenges that would theoretically be able to capture the inductively derived 
12 challenges. We eventually arrived at a three-level hierarchical ordering. At the lowest level we 
positioned the 12 descriptive governance challenges. Proceeding from our foundational assumption 
that governance involves both organizational decision-making and accountability practices (Arrow, 
1974), we grouped each governance challenge at the second order as relating to either a decision-
making challenge or an accountability challenge. At the highest level of conceptual ordering, we 
identified two core organizational challenges; “acquiring and managing resources” and “mission 
achievement”. To facilitate further analysis, we uploaded all the interview transcripts to Nvivo, a 
qualitative data analysis software package. We then coded all transcripts using the 12 governance 
challenges as coding labels so that we could easily retrieve all interview fragments dealing with a 
certain challenge. All coding was done by one coder. Table 2 shows the hierarchical structure in our 
data, and describes the 12 governance challenges.    
 Stage 2: Identifying explanatory relationships. After identifying common patterns across 
cases, the second stage of data analysis served to explain differences between cases. Although we 
identified 12 frequently occurring governance challenges, not all POs experienced these challenges to 
the same degree. In fact, different respondents emphasized different governance challenges. The key 
question that drove our analysis was therefore: why are certain governance challenges more pressing 
for some POs than for others? To answer this question, we performed both within and cross-case 
analyses.  
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To improve our understanding of each individual case, we first produced a data matrix. We 
listed both quantitative features, including total income, total number of paid staff, and age, as well as 
qualitative features, such as legal form, sector, mission statement, core activity, geographical scope, 
and who the donors and beneficiaries are. We subsequently went back to the interview transcripts to 
carefully re-read fragments of text coded as governance challenges. For each challenge we attempted 
to uncover what the contingencies or organizational characteristics were that gave rise to, or 
intensified, this challenge. Following this process we achieved a better understanding of each case and 
developed preliminary thoughts on possible explanatory relationships between organizational 
characteristics and manifested governance challenges (Yin, 1981).  
The within-case analysis also revealed that sometimes the analysis was too centered on one 
specific issue. For example, at the time of the interview C07 was in the middle of a large scale 
reorganization process and as a consequence, the interview was centered on the challenges related to 
closing down offices and firing or relocating volunteers. So the respondents’ assessments of their 
organization’s governance challenge were prone to being biased by a decision that was made or an 
incident that had occurred recently. In order to discriminate among case specific idiosyncrasies and 
distill analytically generalizable relationships, we performed a cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin 1994). We sought to identify factors that may explain or intensify governance challenges that 
were inherent to the organization, or, at least, very difficult to alter, as opposed to factors that were the 
result of discretionary organizational decisions or practices. Through this approach we were able to 
reach a higher level of abstraction. We went back and forth between interview data and archival data 
to triangulate our emerging insights (Jick, 1979).  
 Stage 3: building and validating emerging theory. To build our theory we relied on an 
approach that resembles analytic induction (Znaniecki, 1934; Robinson, 1951), which is “a non-
experimental qualitative sociological method that employs an exhaustive examination of cases in 
order to prove universal, causal generalizations” (Manning, 1982: 280). In many ways this method is 
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similar to the replication logic in case study analysis, as cases are treated as a series of experiments 
each serving to confirm or reject a ‘hypothesis’ (Yin, 1984). The most important distinguishing 
feature of analytic induction, however, is that it avoids producing probabilistic statements. Instead, it 
seeks to develop insights involving the essential features of a phenomenon, and generate theories that 
are universal, precise, and limited (Robinson, 1951). Since our goal is to produce a general theory of 
the corporate governance challenges of POs, analytic induction is an appropriate method.      
 We followed the general structure of analytic induction by studying whether our insights in 
regard to explanatory relationships identified in the previous stage, were confirmed or disconfirmed 
by the data of each case. In case of confirmation we enhanced our confidence in the insight and 
proceeded to the next case. Disconfirming cases were particularly valuable because they helped us to 
revise and refine our emerging theory. While other approaches typically account for deviant cases by 
the inclusion of a new variable, in analytic induction deviant cases have the potential to change the 
full analytic scheme of the emerging theory to ensure maximal generalizability (Mehan, 1979). We 
continued this procedure of developing, testing, and refining (or sometimes, completely revising) our 
emerging propositions until they could account for all 34 cases in our analytic sampling design.      
 The final step was to validate our emerging theory (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 2008). Once 
we had a foundational outline of our theory, we presented it to different focus groups of executives 
who either worked for a specific PO or in the philanthropic sector more broadly. During these sessions 
we asked the participants to apply our emergent theory to their own organization, and assess whether 
its predictions resonate with their experience. These sessions helped us to enhance our theory’s 
internal validity since the group discussions highlighted areas of our theory that were unclear and 
needed more refinement. We were also able to probe the external validity of our theory as these focus 
groups contained various individuals currently working, or having worked for a large variety of 
organizations.  
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POs as Dual Objective Organizations 
We concluded from the analyses described above that POs simultaneously seek to achieve two core 
objectives; realizing their mission, and acquiring philanthropic resources. While the prior can be seen 
to represent a PO’s raison d’être, the latter is needed for their survival. We therefore conceptualize 
POs as dual-objective organizations. In the process of trying to meet these organizational objectives, 
POs are faced with challenges related to both decision-making and accountability. We now elaborate 
on some of the challenges listed in Table 2. 
 
Mission Achievement 
Decision-making challenges. A PO’s mission defines who its beneficiaries are and what the purpose 
of the organization is (Brown & Slivinski, 2006). While mission achievement is challenging for any 
organization, it is particularly daunting for POs due to the absence of competitive market forces. 
Successful organizations are typically those that show sustained growth, but in the philanthropic 
sector successful organizations may be precisely those that cease their activities because they have 
achieved their mission. However, in the absence of competitive pricing in a market for the PO’s goods 
and services it is all but straightforward for the PO how it should achieve its mission, and when it is 
actually ‘completed’.  
An important decision-making challenge faced by POs involves defining their mission. The 
respondent of C06 describes this challenge: “.. a lot of things were going on in this association, a lot 
of things were fun, many things were happening but… should we stop or should we continue? This 
was actually literally the question. […] What do we actually do, what do we stand for, and are we still 
needed?”. The director of this PO eventually wrote a new mission statement, which was elaborately 
discussed by the board and approved. We coded such decision-making challenges under the ‘defining 
mission’ label in Table 2.  
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TABLE 2 
Data structure 
Organizational 
objectives Governance challenges 
Description Cover-
age 
 
 
 
D
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
Defining mission Challenges resulting from the fact that there is no 
competitive market for the PO's products/services: 
What is the PO going to produce? And for whom? 
When is the PO 'finished'?  
9,4% 
  Mapping needs Challenges related to how the PO identifies the 
specific needs it wishes to address. Given the PO's 
mission, which specific needs or beneficiaries 
should it prioritize?  
10,7% 
Mission 
achievement 
 Managing 
organizational 
scope 
The difficulty of staying focused and close to the 
core activity on the one hand, and being flexible and 
responsive to beneficiary needs on the other.  
7,9% 
 Need for expertise Deals with complexities resulting from the need and 
importance of expert knowledge to make strategic 
decisions.  
4,7% 
  
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
Performance 
evaluation 
Challenges related to both the importance and 
difficulty of performance measurement and 
evaluation. 
6,8% 
  Board’s ability to 
monitor 
Challenges related to the difficulty of effectively 
monitoring PO performance due to board members' 
lack of time or understanding of the PO's activities.  
12,1% 
       
 
 
D
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
Acquiring financial 
donations 
Deals with complexities resulting from the PO's 
dependence on financial donations and the difficulty 
of acquiring them. 
10,5% 
  Managing 
relationship with 
financial donors 
Challenges related to managing the demands of 
donors. How does the PO try to please its donors? 
How should the PO balance donor needs with 
beneficiary needs? 
10,5% 
Acquiring  
resources 
 Managing 
relationship with 
association 
members 
Only applicable to associations: Challenges related 
to managing the demands of members. How does 
the PO try to please its members? How should the 
PO balance member needs with beneficiary needs? 
3,3% 
 Managing 
relationship with 
volunteers 
Challenges related to managing the demands of 
volunteers. How does the PO try to please its 
volunteers? How should the PO balance the 
demands of volunteers with beneficiary needs? 
5,4% 
  
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
Meeting legitimacy 
demands 
Deals with the challenge of meeting the 
accountability expectations of external institutions 
such as certifiers and regulators.  
11,0% 
  Reputation 
management  
External stakeholders use reputation to evaluate a 
PO's performance and therefore managing it is very 
important: how does the PO avoid reputation 
damage?    
7,7% 
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Within the scope of a given organizational mission, POs also face strategic decision-making 
challenges. One of these challenges includes determining the scope of the PO’s activities. C22 is a PO 
lending music instruments to professionals and provides an illustrative example: “… on the one hand 
we have to keep an eye on the changing conditions within our own organization, and the changing 
conditions within society. So […] you give four instruments to a quartet, yes but what does that mean 
for us? And aren't there other things that we should do to help these people? But on the other hand, 
this is a private foundation that was founded by a number of people, who are still here, and who had a 
specific goal in mind. So then you get a kind of dilemma”. The question essentially is whether to 
expand operations to better cater to the needs of beneficiaries, or to stick to the PO’s original mission 
and core business. This was found to be a common decision-making challenge for many POs, and we 
categorized it under the ‘managing organizational scope’ label in Table 2.   
 Accountability challenges. Organizing accountability after decisions have been made and 
actions have been taken also create challenges for POs. Without ‘natural’ market signals that help 
evaluate past decisions, POs are forced to develop ‘artificial’ ways to create feedback loops to the 
organization. The director of an endowment fund (C31) aptly expressed his struggle in this regard: “I 
am looking for opportunities to see myself in a mirror, or to obtain a compass of the world that we 
donate to. We give 30 million euros to applicants, and they all say ‘thank you’, but there are also 
many that don’t receive, in fact, to half of the applicants we say ‘no’! And besides them, the world is 
even bigger! I would like to know how… well we think we are doing good things here, but then 
actually we should ask them. When is it good and when is it not good?” The respondent then goes on 
to stress the importance of performance measurement, which is one way in which POs can 
purposefully seek feedback on their decisions and operations. Yet, given the complexity of the societal 
problems that POs routinely deal with, measuring performance or impact is difficult. We refer to these 
accountability challenges as ‘performance measurement’ challenges in Table 2.  
To improve monitoring quality, monitoring is predominantly done by a separate supervisory 
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board in many POs. Yet, developing an effective supervisory board also creates challenges. Whether 
the board can effectively perform its monitoring function depends largely on the individual board 
members’ familiarity with the sector in which the PO operates, and the amount of time he or she is 
willing to dedicate to the PO. In addition, different POs, depending on their life cycle phase, need 
different forms of monitoring. A pioneering PO, for example, is best served by a highly committed 
board that not only monitors its decisions, but also functions as a source of advice (e.g. C08), while a 
mature and established PO is better served by a more formal and distant monitoring board (e.g. C32). 
We classified such challenges under ‘board’s ability to monitor’ in Table 2.  
 
Acquiring Resources 
Decision-making challenges. Resource acquisition is as important for POs as attempting to achieve 
their mission. POs rely on three different forms of resources; financial donations, voluntary labor, and 
membership fees (if the PO is an association). While managing relationships with resource providers 
is essential for a PO’s survival, it may also create grave decision-making challenges because the 
interests of resource providers may not cohere with the mission of the PO or the needs of its main 
beneficiaries. Exemplary for such challenges is the predicament of C29: “We do get requests though, 
also from major donors, those are private individuals that want to give a large amount of money and 
want that money to be spent on a school, in that country, and that looks like this and that… We also 
don’t know what to do with that. On the other hand this is very tempting, because you can attract 
funds, but then… it also doesn’t quite fit with our organization” (C29). We coded such challenges 
under the ‘managing relationship with financial donors’ label in Table 2.  
Managing volunteers is something different altogether. Whereas donations with unattractive 
conditions can be rejected, after volunteers are recruited they can develop strong views and demands 
on what should be done by the PO. Although volunteers are generally well intentioned, managing 
them is difficult because of their tendency to overcommit. According to one of our respondents “It 
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could happen that they [the volunteers] say ‘look, there’s a refugee camp […] where many rejected 
asylum seekers are being kept and these people are treated even worse than regular prisoners are in 
Holland’. There are volunteers that just won’t accept this. ‘[Name of the PO] or not, ‘we are doing 
something now!’ (C13)”. This is a clear manifestation of psychological ownership where volunteers 
feel a strong sense of being psychologically tied to the PO’s mission (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 
2001). The challenges that POs are confronted with is whether or not to cater to the needs of 
volunteers, and if not, how to re-align them with the PO’s objectives. We code such challenges under 
the ‘managing relationship with volunteers’ label in Table 2.  
Finally, the relationship between association members and the PO must be managed. 
Members, as opposed to financial donors or volunteers, have formal decision-making powers in a PO 
and are therefore better able to enforce their demands. C04 provides an example of a decision-making 
challenge that may result from such structure. C04 is a national subsidiary of a multinational PO, and 
a majority of the decision-making regarding the PO’s activities is done by specialists at the 
international headquarters. When members realized how limited their ability was to actually influence 
PO decision-making, many of them stopped showing up at General Meetings, leaving the PO with the 
question of whether their associational structure was still viable. We grouped these kinds of decision-
making challenges under the label ‘managing relationship with members’ in Table 2. The General 
Meeting was eventually replaced by a ‘Membership Council’, for which 40 candidates were regionally 
elected by the members.  
 Accountability challenges. As with most organizations, monitoring of decisions and 
performance does not just take place internally, but also externally by institutions and stakeholders. 
To provoke positive evaluations from external parties, POs must manage their legitimacy and 
reputation. External institutions impose legitimacy demands on POs, by introducing good governance 
codes, for example, but meeting these demands is often costly and time consuming. A respondent 
even said: “[…] I think that whole discussion [about the need for more transparency] is just going 
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berserk. […] I think it is idiotic the kind of things you have to put in your annual report, I’m pulling 
my hair out of my head! I did it just because I think they want it” (C22). We code such challenges as 
‘meeting legitimacy demands’ challenges in Table 2. POs also rely on their reputation as a bonding 
device to secure resources and legitimacy. While it takes years to build a reputation, it can collapse 
overnight and this is often detrimental for POs as it may result in a failure to attract resources to 
continue operations. Hence many POs are involved in risk management practices and since many POs 
operate overseas, rely on volunteers, or deal with very vulnerable people, this is an important 
challenge for them. We code such challenges as ‘managing reputation’ challenges.     
 
The Economic Function of POs 
In sum, as dual-objective organizations POs face two primary stakeholder groups; donors and 
beneficiaries. We define donors as all stakeholders that provide resources to the PO, while 
beneficiaries are understood to be the ‘consumers’ of the PO’s goods or services. Since POs are 
critically dependent on resources, they must attract or retain donors, which requires meeting their 
expectations and satisfying their demands. At the same time, POs need to make decisions and 
undertake activities that cohere with their mission and serve beneficiary needs. Because there is no 
spontaneous market alignment between donor means and beneficiary needs, we conceive of POs as a 
mediating structure between donors and beneficiaries:   
Proposition 3: In the absence of a market for a POs goods or services, the main economic function 
of POs is to mediate between the interests of their two primary stakeholder groups; beneficiaries 
and donors.  
The Core governance Challenge of POs 
An important observation that arose from our cross-case analyses is that POs differ considerably in the 
relationship they have with their donors and beneficiaries. While in certain POs face-to-face contact 
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with beneficiaries is common practice, in other POs managers have no idea about the identity of their 
beneficiaries. In order to be able to effectively mediate between donors and beneficiaries, POs must 
know what their needs and interests are. We found that this is a core challenge for all POs. The extent 
to which the resources, preferences and needs of donors and beneficiaries can be incorporated in PO 
organizational processes depends, as we explain next, on the extent of ‘stakeholder involvability’.   
The Notion of Stakeholder Involvability 
Stakeholder involvability can be understood as the extent to which it is possible for a PO to involve its 
two primary stakeholder groups in its organizational practices. Stakeholder involvability is therefore 
not about a stakeholder group’s actual involvement in the PO but rather about its possible 
involvement. The more involvable a stakeholder group is, the easier it is for a PO to incorporate their 
resources, preferences and needs in organizational processes. 
After surveying our cases, we found that the extent of stakeholder involvability depends on 
three attributes of the relationship between the stakeholder group and the PO (see. Table 3). First, in 
order to be involvable in organizational processes, stakeholders must be identifiable for a PO. This is 
typically only the case if the PO has an individual and formalized relationship with them. The 
beneficiaries of both C14 and C22, for example, individually apply for a ‘service’ from the PO, and 
once their application is approved, the PO stays in contact with them throughout the duration of the 
service. As a result, C14 and C22 are able to maintain a close relationship with their beneficiaries. 
When, on the other hand, the targeted beneficiaries of a PO are a broad and dispersed group, which is 
the case for C04 whose mission is to promote and protect human rights across the world, it is nearly 
impossible for the PO to individually identify its beneficiaries. The same logic applies to donors. If 
the PO relies largely on lotteries and street fundraising to acquire financial donations, it is nearly 
impossible for the PO to trace the identity of its donors, while POs that obtain the bulk of their income 
from a single family (C02 & C05) or a company (C01 & C12) are well able to identify their donors. 
Similarly, when a substantial share of a PO’s donor portfolio consists of volunteers or association  
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of stakeholder involvability 
Beneficiaries: Donors: 
Are they identifiable?  Are they identifiable?  
Beneficiaries are easily individually 
identifiable when they have a one-on-one, 
formalized relationship with the PO. 
Donors are easily individually identifiable 
when they have a direct and formalized 
relationship with the PO. 
 High: C14, C22  High: C02, C05 
 These POs have a contractual relationship with 
each of their beneficiaries, which typically lasts for 
a long time.  
 These POs were founded by family philanthropists, 
and rely exclusively on the returns of the family 
endowment to finance their operations.   
 Low: C04, C08  Low: C16, C29 
  The mission of these POs is so broad and affects so 
many people that it is impossible to identify the 
individual beneficiaries.  
  These POs are highly dependent on lottery and 
street fundraising which makes it impossible to 
trace the identity of the individual donors. 
Are they approachable?  Are they approachable?  
Beneficiaries are easily physically 
approachable when the geographic distance 
between them and the PO is small. 
Donors are easily physically approachable 
when the geographic distance between them 
and the PO is small.  
 High: C09, C26  High: C28, C34 
 The statutes of these POs dictate that they can only 
serve beneficiaries that are located within their own 
city or region.  
 These POs are fully dependent on volunteers to 
execute their mission and these volunteers work in 
close proximity to the PO.  
 Low: C12, C20  Low: C19, C31 
  While C12 exclusively serves beneficiaries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, C20's beneficiaries are all located 
in Bangladesh. 
  These POs do not have volunteers or association 
members, but only financial donors that are not 
located in close proximity to the PO.  
Are they able to communicate 
meaningfully?  
Are they able to communicate effectively?  
Beneficiaries are capable of meaningful 
communication with the PO if they are 
knowledgeable about their own needs as well 
as the broader mission of the PO.  
Donors are able to communicate with the PO 
and effectively influence its actions when 
they have formal decision-making power 
within the organization.  
 High: C13, C33, C34  High: C01, C02, C12  
 The beneficiaries of these POs are adults that are 
fully knowledgeable about their needs. Since 
satisfying these needs is the PO's mission, 
beneficiaries' feedback is useful and meaningful. 
 C02 is a family foundation in which the founding 
family members are still involved with the PO's 
management. C01 and C12 are associations whose 
members have formal decision-making power. 
 Low: C07, C11, C16  Low: C05, C26, C29 
  C07 and C11 are environmental organizations 
whose beneficiaries are the natural environment. 
C16 is a PO that finances cancer research and its 
ultimate beneficiaries, i.e. cancer patients, often 
cannot provide meaningful feedback to the PO.  
  The original donors of C05 and C26 have passed 
away and their voice is only represented by their 
will or articles of incorporation. C29 is a large 
multinational PO that relies on many small and 
large donors who only have withholding power. 
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members, donors are more easily identifiable, as volunteers and association members are typically 
more closely involved in a PO than financial donors.   
  A second attribute that determines stakeholder involvability is the extent to which stakeholders 
are physically approachable for the organization. An important condition involves the geographic 
proximity between the PO and its stakeholder groups. The closer stakeholders are located to the PO, 
the easier it is for the PO to learn about their needs and interests and incorporate it in organizational 
processes. For example, the beneficiaries of a PO that has a historical mandate to only serve 
beneficiaries in its own specific city or region (C09 & C26) are more easily physically approachable 
than the beneficiaries of a PO that are located abroad (e.g. C12 & C20). With respect to donors, 
specifically, the extent to which a PO relies on volunteers determines their approachability. In contrast 
with financial donors or association members, volunteers are often actively involved in the PO and 
have face-to-face contact with PO management, which significantly increases their approachability. 
The final attribute that affects stakeholder involvability is the extent to which stakeholders are 
able to communicate meaningfully with the PO. The better stakeholders are able to articulate their 
needs and interests, the easier it is for the PO to involve them in organizational processes. However, 
direct communication is not always possible between stakeholders and the PO. Specifically, 
beneficiaries that are animals (e.g. C07) or the natural environment (e.g. C11), are not capable of 
meaningful communication with the PO and a mediating structure is needed to ‘speak’ on their behalf. 
Even feedback provided by identifiable human beneficiaries may not be meaningful or useful for a 
PO. C29 is case in point, as its mission is to protect the rights of children in poverty. These children 
generally do not understand the broader social and economic causes of their predicament, which limits 
the ability of POs to involve them in organizational processes. The same is true for a PO that finances 
cancer research (C16). Although its ultimate beneficiaries are cancer patients who are able to 
communicate meaningfully, they typically do not have the expertise to provide useful feedback as to 
which cancer research projects to finance.  
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Under certain conditions donors are also unable to communicate their needs to the PO. Some 
POs received their income from an endowment that was established by a financial donor ages ago 
(e.g. C05, C26). Although such donors are able to communicate their interests through a will, its 
influence on day-to-day decision-making is often limited. Even if donors are still alive, their ability to 
influence the PO is oftentimes very low. For example, many POs rely on a large number of small 
financial donors to acquire the necessary resources, and although these donors can withhold their 
donations when unsatisfied with the PO’s performance, they typically cannot effectively influence its 
activities. Donors are clearly best able to effectively influence the PO when it is run by the major 
donor, as is the case for family foundations (C02) or corporate foundations (C01 & C12), or when the 
PO is an association, in which case the members have ultimate decision-making power (C01 & C12).  
In sum, stakeholder involvability involves the extent to which a stakeholder group is 
involvable in a PO’s organizational processes. Stakeholder involvability is high when stakeholders are 
individually identifiable, physically approachable and capable of effective and meaningful 
communication with the PO. Under such circumstances it is relatively easy for the PO to learn about 
the needs and interests of its stakeholders and incorporate them in organizational decision-making and 
accountability practices. We hence predict:    
Proposition 4: The higher the involvability of a given stakeholder group, the more likely it is that 
this stakeholder group’s needs and interests will be represented in the PO’s organizational 
processes. 
 
Managing Stakeholder Involvability  
Based on this understanding of stakeholder involvability, we developed a scoring protocol to 
graphically map the involvability of the donors and beneficiaries in all of our 34 cases23. Figure 1 
presents a scatterplot illustrating the combination of beneficiary and donor involvability for each case. 
                                                          
23 The scoring protocol can be found in appendix C. 
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As can be observed, the degree of involvability of a PO’s stakeholders differs considerably. When the 
stakeholder involvability of donors is higher than of beneficiaries, the PO is likely to have a bias in 
favor of serving donor needs. Conversely, when beneficiary involvability is higher than donor 
involvability, a PO may be more inclined to favor beneficiary needs. Hence differential degrees of 
stakeholder involvability in POs create a dispositional tendency for imbalance.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Scatterplot of donor and beneficiary involvability 
 
 
 
 
We also found that POs feature a variety of organizational practices that augment or restrict the 
involvement of stakeholders and thereby either aggravate or correct a given PO’s dispositional 
imbalance. Table 4 provides a number of examples of practices that either aggravate or remedy such 
imbalances. The first part of the table lists examples of aggravating and correcting organizational 
practices in POs where beneficiary involvability is higher than donor involvability. In the second part 
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of the table we provide examples of aggravating and correcting organizational practices in POs where 
donor involvability is higher than beneficiary involvability. Because POs are dual-objective 
organizations whose economic function is to mediate the needs and interests of beneficiaries and 
donors, correcting possible imbalances is a core corporate governance challenge for POs. Hence:  
Proposition 5: The core corporate governance challenge of POs is to balance the interests of 
donors and beneficiaries in organizational decision-making and accountability practices. 
 
A Typology of POs 
Based on our analyses, we have conceived POs as dual-objective organizations whose economic 
function is to mediate between its donors and beneficiaries, whose core governance challenge is to 
balance the needs and interests of these two primary stakeholder groups. Because donors and 
beneficiaries often differ with respect to their involvability in organizational processes, we have 
predicted that this balance tends to be tipped in favor of one of the two as a matter of fact. We now 
zoom in on the subtly different governance challenges that different types of PO are confronted with. 
Using the notion of stakeholder involvability as the underlying theoretical dimension we develop a 
typology that articulates how different types of POs face different governance challenges (see Figure 
2). We denote each type of PO with a name that is intended to capture its distinctive governance 
challenges. 
 
Caregivers 
The POs located in the top-left cell are organizations with high beneficiary involvability and low 
donor involvability, making their organizational processes prone to being beneficiary-centered. We 
therefore denote these types of POs as ‘Caregivers’. The most important governance challenge of 
Caregivers is to avoid the over-representation of beneficiary needs such that the PO delivers 
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FIGURE 2 
A typology of POs 
 
 
 
 
services that beneficiaries are keen on receiving but donors are not willing to fund. C22 is exemplary 
in this respect. This PO lends music instruments to talented musicians who do not have the resources 
to buy these instruments themselves. Its employees are in close contact with its beneficiaries and are 
highly knowledgeable about both the music instruments and the classical music industry. The 
respondent of C22 explained that for the first time they see their waiting list shortening as the demand 
for instruments decreases. They are also noticing, however, that musicians are in increasing need of 
advice on how to manage their careers, and that oftentimes they seek this advice from the PO’s 
employees because of their unique expertise. C22 is now faced with a dilemma of whether to satisfy 
the remaining demand for instruments and then continue to operate as a simple collection conservator, 
or to act upon this emerging need and start delivering advisory services to beneficiaries to help them 
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further their musical careers. To avoid that the decision will only reflect beneficiary needs, the PO’s 
director intensively discusses this dilemma with the board of directors. He acknowledges that he is 
“just a director on a payroll”, and that the board, the founder, and the donors will have an important 
say. Well-governed Caregivers, hence, are POs that guard against the over-representation of 
beneficiary needs in organizational processes by adopting governance practices that reduce 
beneficiary involvement or enhance donor involvement.    
 
Gold Minders 
The POs located in the bottom-right cell have the exact opposite features. These POs are predisposed 
to be more donor-centered in their organizational processes as their donor involvability is higher than 
their beneficiary involvability. Since these POs tend to be concerned mostly with securing their 
resources, we call them ‘Gold Minders’. The most important risk that these POs face is that the 
interests of donors may dominate organizational processes such that such POs find themselves 
delivering services that donors are keen on supporting, but beneficiaries are not served by receiving, a 
phenomenon known as philanthropic particularism (Salamon, 1987). A respondent from a Gold 
Minder in the development aid sector (C32) coined the term ‘money-driven behavior’, and said that: 
“Personally, I think that programs and content should always be leading. [However] a very big 
stumbling block for many organizations in The Netherlands is that we have become money-driven. 
[…] [For example;] the EU says that there is money available for the Great Lake area, and there we 
go! All of them [i.e. POs] start developing programs for the Great Lake area. And this is not because 
they first made an assessment of where the needs are most pressing, or where their added value lies, 
cause that might very well be in another area.” The main governance challenge of Gold Minders is 
therefore to avoid the excessive donor involvement. C32 attempts to accomplish this by broadening its 
financial donor portfolio and decreasing its dependence on any single or small group of donors. Large 
multinational POs (e.g. C23 & C29) are able to reduce donor involvement by locating the program 
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division in the international headquarters, while country offices are charged with fundraising, which is 
an effective way to remedy excessive donor involvement.   
 
Peacekeepers 
The stakeholders of POs located in the top-right cell tend to be highly involved in organizational 
processes. As a consequence, these POs always find themselves involved in complex negotiations and 
compromises. We therefore denote these POs as ‘Peacekeepers’. Theoretically, these POs might be 
considered to be subject to the most favorable governance conditions as both beneficiaries and donors 
can be relatively easily involvable in organizational processes. In practice, however, Peacekeepers 
perceive their challenges to be particularly pressing, not only because beneficiaries and donors often 
place conflicting claims on the PO, but also because of the difficulty related to managing the decision-
making process. C13 is an association that coaches people going through a difficult time. It relies on 
13.000 volunteers to provide these coaching services, who are managed by 84 local offices, which are 
supervised by 5 district offices. When we asked the respondent about their main governance 
challenge, she said: “Decision-making… that it takes so much time. Especially if you want to be 
decisive, or sometimes, you have to be responsive, you have to go through all those layers. And also, 
with such a democratic form, you always end up making compromises and this not always the best 
thing for the organization because it makes us lose focus and strength.” Since key stakeholders are 
easily involvable in the organization, Peacekeepers do not need governance practices compensating 
for the lack of involvement. Rather, they must adopt practices that remedy possible over-involvement 
of both stakeholder groups so as to enable more efficient and swift decision-making. C34 is similar to 
C13 in terms of structure, and is seen by many respondents as a best practice organization. C34 
reduced the involvement of donors and beneficiaries by changing its structure; while initially it was an 
association of small local associations and foundations, it is now one large association that oversees 
local offices. Because the local offices are no longer autonomous legal entities, the association has 
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more control over their activities.  
 
Free Spirits 
The beneficiaries and donors of POs located in the bottom-left of the matrix are only limitedly 
involvable in the organization. As a result, these types of POs tend to act as ‘Free Spirits’. Although 
theoretically Free Spirits are subject to the worse corporate governance conditions, respondents from 
these types of POs did not perceive their corporate governance challenges to be all that pressing. We 
explain this finding by the fact that, in stark contrast to Peacekeepers, whose decisions are constantly 
challenged by different stakeholders, the decisions of Free Spirits are in fact under-challenged. Hence, 
the most important risk of Free Spirits is that they become unresponsive to the needs and interest of 
their primary stakeholders. To avoid this, Free Spirits must self-discipline and proactively search for 
ways to remedy for the lack of donor and beneficiary involvement. C05 is an endowment fund and an 
exemplary Free Spirit. Its beneficiaries are young children in developing countries, and the PO goes 
out of its way to collect knowledge on beneficiary needs and incorporate it in strategic decisions; “We 
consult with the operational organizations that we fund, we also consult with researchers, with 
international organizations like the WHO or the Worldbank and other experts in the field who are not 
home to us in any kind of way, so they don’t have grants from us. We go through all the strategic 
planning work like this. Then we go to the countries, do the same thing all over again, country-level 
data, baseline research, talking with people from the countries who may or may not have grants from 
us, but are engaged in early childhood.” C05’s donor is a Dutch philanthropist who passed away many 
years ago. Although the donor cannot be involved in the PO anymore, the CEO feels a strong moral 
responsibility to be transparent and accountable to the general public. Among the Dutch grant-making 
organizations, C05 is considered to be a pioneer in transparency, performance evaluation, and impact 
measurement, and the CEO proactively advocates more transparency in the sector. Collectively, these 
governance practices attempt to remedy the PO’s tendency to under-represent both donor and 
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beneficiary needs.   
Having distinguished four types of POs based on their different degrees of donor and 
beneficiary involvability and the resulting dispositional imbalance in their primary stakeholder 
relationships, we articulate our final proposition about PO governance practices:   
Proposition 6: The corporate governance of POs consists of involvement enhancing and 
involvement restricting practices that correct for the potential over- or under-representation of 
donors and beneficiaries in the PO’s organizational processes.  
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study has theoretically defined POs as formal organizations without owners that produce goods 
or services for one stakeholder group that are predominately paid for by another stakeholder group, 
and that hence do not have a single, stakeholder group whose interests are leading in organizational 
governance. Using a comparative case study research design on an analytic sample of 34 Dutch POs, 
it has then empirically developed the foundational tenets of a general theory of PO governance on this 
theoretical foundation.  
This theory understands POs as organizational intermediaries between donor and beneficiary 
interests, which in the absence of a market for philanthropic goods or services are not spontaneously 
aligned by the market. The core prediction of the theory is that due to the differential degree in which 
the donors and beneficiaries are involvable in organizational practices, different types of POs will 
feature different dispositional tendencies to incorporate donor and beneficiary interests in 
organizational processes. After developing a typology showing how different types of POs face subtly 
different governance challenges, we have shown how involvement enhancing or restricting 
governance practices may functionally contribute to meeting the core PO governance challenge of 
mediating and balancing the interests of a POs primary stakeholder groups. We now outline how our 
nascent theory of PO governance may contribute to research on corporate governance, the role 
stakeholder theory in corporate governance, and on the governance of social enterprises. 
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Broadening the Scope of Corporate Governance Research  
Our theory contributes first and foremost to the corporate governance literature in which agency 
theory has long functioned as a field-defining theoretical framework (Dalton et al., 2007). The 
dominance of agency theory in corporate governance research can to a large part be attributed to the 
fact that the separation of ownership and control in public firms came to serve as an “exemplar” 
(Kuhn, 1970: postscript) for the theory’s application (Shleiffer & Vishny, 1997), but the unique fit 
between agency theory and the empirical context of public firms also explains why agency theory is 
less suitable for guiding research on other forms of ownership and enterprise organization (Hansmann, 
1996). Although modified forms of agency theory have been applied to other organizational forms, 
such as family firms (Schulz, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001), research has shown that family 
firm governance may also be fruitfully guided by a more context specific theory, such as the socio-
emotional wealth maximization approach (Gomez-Mejia, et al. 2011), for example.  
 Aiming to develop a context specific theory of PO governance, our study shows, first, that 
even organizations that have no owners face daunting corporate governance challenges, and that these 
challenges are more comprehensive than those faced by public firms. This is, second, because in the 
absence of a market for philanthropic goods or services, the governance challenges of POs 
simultaneously involve decision-making and accountability practices, which broadens the focus of 
most governance research on accountability practices. Third, by showing that the core governance 
challenge of POs is to mediate and balance the interests of its two primary stakeholder groups, this 
study demonstrates how governance research may fruitfully broaden the explanatory focus away from 
any particular stakeholder group, such as shareholders for example, or from any specific objective 
function, such as shareholder value maximization (Jensen, 2002), to a broader array of corporate 
constituencies, organizational objectives and organizational forms. As such, our study heeds to recent 
calls to expand the explanatory focus of corporate governance research to include the variety of 
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existing organizational forms and the complex stakeholder environments in which contemporary 
organizations operate (Starbuck, 2014; Tihanyi, Graffin & George, 2014). 
Although our nascent theory was developed specifically to guide and refocus empirical 
research on PO governance, it may also contribute to governance research on other organizational 
forms, such as social enterprises, or to the development of other theories guiding corporate 
governance research, such as stakeholder theory, for example. We now explore possible contributions 
of our theory to these academic fields of interest.  
 
An Exemplar for the Use of Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Governance Research 
Because we found that the economic function and core governance challenge of POs is to mediate and 
balance the interests of its two primary stakeholder groups, our theory seems uniquely suited to 
contribute to the development of stakeholder theory (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008). POs are an 
exemplar for the further development of stakeholder theory in corporate governance research, because 
they involve a paradigmatic application of stakeholder theory (Kuhn, 1970), similar to how the 
separation of ownership and control in public firms came to serve as an exemplar for the application 
of agency theory in corporate governance research. We see two contributions to stakeholder theory 
that demonstrate the fruitfulness of POs as a research context.   
 Although the notion that firms must balance the interests of its stakeholders to optimally create 
value is central to stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), surprisingly little is known about how this 
balancing takes place. An important reason for this is that existing research has mostly studied the 
outcomes of stakeholder management rather than stakeholder management as a governance process. 
Specifically, the bulk of empirical work on stakeholder theory has either investigated the 
organizational consequences (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; and Jones, Willness & Madey, 2014) or 
antecedents (e.g Darnall, Henriques & Sadorsky, 2010; Murillo-Luna, Garces-Ayerbe & Rivera-
Torres, 2008) of different levels of stakeholder management activities, while only few studies (e.g. 
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Reynolds, Schultz, & Hekman, 2006; Delmas & Toffel, 2008) have researched the process of 
managing and balancing the often conflicting interests of multiple stakeholder groups.  
This study sheds some light into the black box of stakeholder management as a governance 
practice by showing that stakeholder management is to an important degree about managing the 
involvability of different stakeholder groups in organizational decision-making and accountability 
processes. Like the POs in this study, organizations can balance the interests of their stakeholders by 
adopting governance practices that either restrict, or remedy for the lack of stakeholder involvement in 
organizational processes, in order to secure an optimal balance between stakeholder interests. We urge 
future research to zoom in on the governance practices through which firms manage the involvability 
of their stakeholders.  
 More specifically, our findings speak to the stakeholder theory literature on stakeholder 
identification and salience. A prominent view is that a stakeholder group is salient to managers when 
it possesses three attributes; power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 2001). The two 
main stakeholders of POs tend to possess only two of these attributes. Beneficiaries are legitimate 
stakeholders that often have urgent claims but typically do not have the power to impose these claims 
on the PO. Donors, on the other hand, are both powerful and legitimate stakeholders but their 
demands are typically not urgent. Mitchell and colleagues’ predict that stakeholders that possess two 
attributes are more salient to managers than stakeholders who possess only one attribute, but less 
salient than stakeholders who possess all three. Their theory, however, does not answer the question 
which stakeholder is more salient when two or more stakeholders possess the same number of 
attributes, as is characteristically the case for POs.  
By introducing the notion of stakeholder involvability, our study may contribute to resolving 
this issue. Stakeholder involvability captures the extent to which it would be possible for an 
organization to involve a given stakeholder group in its governance processes. When stakeholders are 
individually identifiable, physically approachable and capable of effective and meaningful 
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communication with mangers, it is easier for managers to learn about the stakeholders’ interests and 
involve these in organizational processes. Thus, based on our research we predict that when two or 
more stakeholders possess the same number of stakeholder attributes, decision-makers tend to 
prioritize the interests of that stakeholder group whose voice is most easily heard. This finding implies 
that aside from the specific attributes of a particular stakeholder group, stakeholder salience also 
depends on the attributes of the relationship between the stakeholder and the organization, and 
specifically on how easy it is to engage with a given stakeholder group.  
 
Natural Extensions of our Theory: The Governance of Social Enterprises and Hybrids 
Although the theory outlined in this study was developed specifically for POs, it can be extended to 
the governance of all organizations having a non-paying stakeholder group that is critical for 
performing its economic function. Social enterprises are an obvious case in point, as they typically 
serve both clients who pay for the goods or services delivered, as well as beneficiaries who are non-
paying third party stakeholders who consume the goods or services produced by the social enterprise. 
Seen from the perspective of our theory, the core governance challenge of social enterprises is to 
ensure that the interests of their clients and beneficiaries are mediated and well-balanced through 
organizational governance practices.  
Recent findings in the emerging literature on hybrid organizations can be seen to provide 
empirical support for the core predictions of our theory (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 
2010; Pache & Santos, 2013). Social enterprises are hybrid organizations because they combine 
organizational practices resulting from both the commercial and social institutional logics that shape 
their mission. Battilana and Dorado (2010), for example, studied microfinance organizations and 
concluded that to be sustainable, these organizations must “strike a balance between the logics they 
combine” (p. 1419). They also document that microfinance organizations face the risk of mission drift 
because they have a tendency to prioritize “the banking logic over the development one” (p. 1423). 
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This is finding echoes a similar tendency we found to characterize the Gold Minder type of POs we 
describe.  
Likewise, Pache and Santos (2013) studied work integration social enterprises and present 
empirical evidence consistent with the imbalance correcting governance practices we describe in this 
study. They found that in order to gain legitimacy in the work integration field, for profit social 
enterprises adopt the majority of the practices enacting the social welfare logic rather than the 
commercial logic. Seen from the governance theory developed in this study, such practices may also 
serve to enhance beneficiary involvement while restricting client involvement, and thereby contribute 
to correcting the dispositional tendency for imbalance between client and beneficiary interests that 
burden social enterprises.  
Our nascent theory can even be extended to audit firms, who in advanced market economies 
provide third party assurance in respect to the financial disclosures of public firms (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Similar to the POs and social enterprises, audit firms create value for one stakeholder group 
that is critical for performing its economic function, i.e. investors, but are paid for by another primary 
stakeholder group, i.e. the public firms whose disclosures audit firms serve to verify. Like POs and 
social enterprises, audit firms have been found to prioritize the needs and interests of their paying 
clients over those of its other primary stakeholders, and even over the interests of society at large, as is 
evidenced by the recurrent gatekeeper failures and the severe economic crises that these failures have 
contributed to (Coffee, 2002; Partnoi, 2006; Sikka, 2009). Our nascent theory may not only help us to 
further understand the governance challenges and practices of gatekeeper firms in general, but may 
ultimately also contribute to shaping the governance practices of such firms in order to reduce the 
chance of gatekeeper failures in the future. 
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This PhD thesis lies at the intersection of stakeholder theory and corporate governance research. 
Stakeholder theory proposes that firms are best understood as a set of relationships among groups that 
have a stake in the activities of the firm. Corporate governance research, on the other hand, has almost 
exclusively focused on the owners of firms as it deals with the question of how decision-making 
structures and accountability practices should be designed within organizations, such that owners can 
ensure themselves of getting a return on their investment. By adopting a stakeholder theory lens to 
corporate governance, I seek to broaden the theoretical and empirical scope of corporate governance 
such that various stakeholder groups can be included in the analysis of the corporate governance of 
organizations.  
 A good example that illustrates the necessity of a broader stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance is the recent emission-scandal by Volkswagen. A majority of Volkswagen’s shareholders 
as well as its supervisory board consisted of insiders; members of the Porsche family, and 
representatives of both Volkswagen’s workforce and the state of Lower Saxony (the home state of 
Volkswagen). The latter two groups obviously shared a common goal: protecting jobs at Lower 
Saxony’s biggest employer. With a lack of independent and external scrutiny by other shareholders, 
regulators or consumers, growth, employment and profits became the dominant metrics that governed 
Volkswagen. When Volkswagen discovered that its diesel engines were not able to pass US emission 
tests, it decided to attach cheat devices to its vehicles and prioritize production gains over 
environmental sustainability and public health. The Volkswagen debacle illustrates that the primacy of 
shareholder interests in corporate governance certainly does not always lead to an optimal outcome 
for other stakeholders, as is typically assumed in the economic literature. In fact, excessively pursuing 
the interests of one stakeholder group might strongly damage the interests of another stakeholder 
group. This PhD thesis focuses on exactly this problem: How can organizations balance, the often 
conflicting, interests of multiple stakeholders in corporate governance? I attempt to answer this 
question by conducting three empirical studies that each focus on a specific stakeholder-balancing 
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problem.  
The first empirical study is about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Firms that invest in 
CSR are firms that allocate more resources to satisfy the needs and demands of their stakeholders than 
would be necessary by law. Conventional economic theory tells us that the sole purpose of firms is to 
maximize profits for shareholders, and that such extralegal activities are damaging to shareholders. I 
challenge this proposition and study how CSR investments affect the financial performance of firms. I 
conducted a meta-analysis, which is a method that aggregates empirical findings of other research 
papers to draw overall conclusions about a given relationship. I found that CSR has a positive effect 
on firm performance, and I identified four specific strategic advantages of CSR to firms. That is, CSR 
may boost a firm’s reputation, enhance its endorsement by stakeholders, reduce its risk exposure, and 
improve its innovative capacity. Thus, this study illustrates that if firms succeed to reap strategic 
benefits from stakeholder management, it is certainly possible to create value for both stakeholders as 
well as shareholders.  
Study 2 focuses on what I refer to as Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSI) or, in others 
words, corporate acts of misconduct. The goal of this study is to research how much firms are 
financially punished for their CSI, and how corporate governance plays a role in reducing the 
prevalence of CSI. Most corporate governance practices are designed to ensure shareholders that 
managers will take decisions that improve the share value of the firm. These practices can be grouped 
into practices that enhance the monitoring of managers and practices that financially incentivize 
managers. I investigated whether these practices, which are designed to protect shareholder interests, 
also serve to protect the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders. I conducted another meta-
analysis. Overall, the findings show that CSI has a negative but modest effect on firm financial 
performance. In addition, I found that corporate governance practices that enhance monitoring also 
reduce CSI, while corporate governance practices that offer financial incentives, actually enhance 
CSI. This implies that certain practices commonly adopted to protect shareholder interests may result 
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in managerial actions that damage the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders.  
 While Study 1 and 2 are based on publicly listed, for profit organizations, Study 3 looks at a 
completely different type of organization: the Philanthropic Organization (PO). POs are an ideal type 
organization to study stakeholder management because they are organizations with no formal 
ownership. Unlike for-profit firms, POs do not have an ultimate stakeholder group such as 
shareholders whose interests are leading in decision-making and accountability. Instead, POs have 
multiple primary stakeholder groups who each have a legitimate claim on the organization. Through a 
qualitative study, I sought to understand how POs govern for stakeholders. By means of a typology I 
theorize that the balancing of donor and beneficiary interests in corporate governance represents the 
key governance challenge of POs. I illustrate that different types of POs face a subtly different 
governance challenge. While one might be inclined to over-involve donors at the expense of 
beneficiaries in corporate governance, others have a tendency to under-involve donors and over-
involve beneficiaries. Different types of POs must therefore adopt different governance practices to 
strike a balance between the extent of involvement of the two stakeholders in corporate governance.  
The three empirical studies in this thesis examine three specific stakeholder-balancing 
problems. Study 1 and 2 focused on the tension between shareholders and non-shareholding 
stakeholders of firms. While Study 1 showed that it is possible to pursue a stakeholder strategy 
without compromising shareholder profits, Study 2 revealed that it is unlikely that firms that pursue 
shareholder profits are able to do so without compromising stakeholders’ interests. This interesting 
asymmetry is a novel insight to the stakeholder management literature. Study 3 brings POs as an 
organizational form on the radar of stakeholder management scholars and reveals the dynamics that 
determine which stakeholder interests are prioritized in corporate governance when there are no 
shareholders.  
Even though there is a growing consensus among scholars that the currently dominant 
shareholder-centered understanding of corporate governance needs rethinking, very few researchers 
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have actually attempted to empirically explore the intricacies of a stakeholder-centered approach to 
corporate governance. This PhD Thesis puts ‘the finger on the sore spot’ and empirically investigates 
how organizations balance the interests of stakeholders in corporate governance by studying three 
distinct stakeholder-balancing problems in organizations. Theoretically, this thesis offers novel 
insights that contribute to a closer integration of stakeholder theory and corporate governance 
research, and practically, it inform managers about the potential consequences of their stakeholder 
management decisions and policymakers in the development of corporate governance reforms.     
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
Dit proefschrift ligt op het snijpunt van stakeholder theorie en corporate governance research. Volgens 
stakeholder theorie kunnen organisaties het beste gezien worden als een reeks relaties tussen groepen 
die allen een belang hebben in de activiteiten van de organisatie. Corporate governance daarentegen, 
richt zich bijna uitzonderlijk op de eigenaren van organisaties. De kernvraag in deze literatuur is dan 
ook hoe besluitvorming en de verantwoording daarover in organisaties het beste vormgegeven dienen 
te worden zodat eigenaren een redelijk rendement op hun investering kunnen bewerkstelligen. Door 
een stakeholder perspectief toe te passen op corporate governance, probeer ik zowel de theoretische 
als empirische scope van corporate governance te verbreden zodat meerdere stakeholders in acht 
genomen kunnen worden in de analyse van de corporate governance van organisaties.  
 Het belang van een stakeholder perspectief op corporate governance wordt duidelijk 
geïllustreerd door het recente emissieschandaal van Volkswagen. De meerderheid van zowel de 
aandeelhouders als van de raad van commissarissen van Volkswagen bestond uit insiders: de familie 
Porsche, en vertegenwoordigers van Volkswagen werknemers en van de Duitse deelstaat Nedersaksen 
(de thuisbasis van Volkswagen). De laatste twee groepen hadden een duidelijk gemeenschappelijk 
doel: de banen beschermen van de grootste werkgever van Nedersaksen. Door een gebrek aan 
onafhankelijk of extern toezicht door andere aandeelhouders, klanten of de overheid, werden groei, 
werkgelegenheid en winst de dominante maatstaven waarmee Volkswagen werd gegoverned. Toen 
Volkswagen erachter kwam dat hun dieselmotoren de Amerikaanse emissietesten niet konden 
behalen, besloot het sjoemelsoftware te installeren aan de motoren. Hiermee verkoos Volkswagen 
productie voordelen boven het milieu en volksgezondheid. Het Volkswagen debacle laat zien dat 
voorrang geven aan de belangen van aandeelhouders in corporate governance zeker niet altijd leid tot 
een optimaal resultaat voor andere stakeholders, zoals vaak veronderstelt wordt in de economische 
theorie. Sterker nog, het overmatig nastreven van de belangen van een bepaalde stakeholder groep kan 
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sterke negatieve gevolgen hebben voor de belangen van een andere stakeholder groep. Dit proefschrift 
focust zich precies op dit soort probleemstukken: Hoe kunnen organisaties de belangen van 
verschillende stakeholders balanceren in corporate governance? Ik probeer deze vraag te 
beantwoorden met behulp van drie empirische studies die zich richten op een specifiek stakeholder 
management probleem.  
De eerste empirische studie gaat over Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen (MVO). 
Organisaties die investeren in MVO zijn organisatie die meer middelen toewijzen aan het nakomen 
van stakeholder belangen dan wettelijk is voorgeschreven. Veel klassieke economische literatuur 
beweert dat de enige doelstelling van organisaties is om winsten te creëren voor aandeelhouders. 
Hieruit volgt dat MVO schadelijk zou kunnen zijn. Studie 1 is een meta-analyse naar de relatie tussen 
MVO en de winstgevendheid van bedrijven bedoeld om deze propositie te testen. Een meta-analyse is 
een methode waarbij de bevindingen van andere onderzoeken worden geaggregeerd om een algehele 
conclusie te trekken over een relatie.  Mijn resultaten wijzen op een positieve relatie tussen 
investeringen in MVO en bedrijfsresultaat.  Ook onderscheid ik vier specifieke manieren waarbij 
organisaties MVO op een strategische wijze kunnen inzetten; om hun reputatie te verbeteren, om 
instemming van stakeholders te verkrijgen, om blootstelling aan risico’s te verminderen, en om de 
innovatiecapaciteit te vergroten. Deze resultaten laten zien dat wanneer organisaties hun stakeholders 
strategisch managen, het wel degelijk mogelijk is om waarde te creëren voor zowel stakeholders als 
aandeelhouders.  
 Studie 2 is een onderzoek naar wat ik noem Maatschappelijk Onverantwoord Ondernemen 
(MOO), of met andere woorden, misdragingen door organisaties. Het doel van dit onderzoek is 
bestuderen hoe streng bedrijven financieel worden gestraft voor MOO en hoe corporate governance 
een rol speelt in het verminderen van MOO. De meeste bestaande corporate governance praktijken 
zijn bedoeld om aandeelhouders ervan te verzekeren dat managers hun belangen in acht nemen bij het 
runnen van de organisatie. Deze praktijken kunnen onderverdeeld worden in praktijken die leiden tot 
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meer toezicht op managers, en praktijken die financiële prikkels bieden aan managers. Ik onderzoek 
of deze praktijken, naast het beschermen van de belangen van aandeelhouders, ook de belangen van 
niet-aandeelhoudende stakeholders kunnen beschermen. Op basis van een andere meta-analyse vind ik 
dat MOO een negatief, maar bescheiden effect heeft op de winstgevendheid van organisaties. 
Bovendien laten de resultaten zien dat praktijken die leiden tot meer toezicht op managers, ook MOO 
verminderd, terwijl praktijken die managers financieel prikkelen, MOO juist versterkt. Hieruit blijkt 
dus dat sommige corporate governance praktijken die de belangen van eigenaren beschermen, de 
belangen van andere stakeholders juist kunnen schaden.    
 Terwijl Studie 1 en 2 gebaseerd zijn op de beursgenoteerde, commerciële onderneming, gaat 
Studie 3 over een compleet andere organisatievorm: de Filantropische Organisatie (FO). FOs zijn een 
ideale type organisatie om stakeholder management te onderzoeken omdat het een organisatievorm is 
die formeel geen eigenaarschap kent. In tegenstelling tot bedrijven hebben FOs zonder eigenaren geen 
ultieme stakeholder groep wiens belangen een leidraad vormen in besluitvorming en verantwoording. 
FOs hebben juist meerdere primaire stakeholders waarvan ieder een legitieme claim (kan) hebben op 
de organisatie. Door middel van een kwalitatieve studie probeer ik een beter begrip te krijgen van hoe 
FOs de belangen van deze verschillende stakeholdergroepen tegen elkaar afwegen. Op basis van de 
bevindingen ontwikkel ik een typologie waarin ik theoretiseer dat de voornaamste governance 
uitdaging van FOs is om de belangen van donoren en begunstigden evenwichtig te balanceren in 
besluitvorming en verantwoording. Terwijl de ene type FO de neiging heeft om donoren veel meer te 
betrekken in corporate governance dan begunstigden, kan de andere type juist geneigd zijn 
begunstigden veel meer te betrekken. Verschillende typen FOs moeten dus verschillende soorten 
praktijken toepassen om de belangen van stakeholders op een evenwichtige manier te behartigen.  
 De drie empirische studies in dit proefschrift bestuderen een specifiek stakeholder 
management probleem. Study 1 en 2 focussen zich op het spanningsveld tussen aandeelhouders en 
niet-aandeelhoudende stakeholders. Terwijl Studie 1 laat zien dat het mogelijk is om een stakeholder 
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strategie te volgen zonder daarbij aandeelhouders te benadelen, laat Studie 2 juist zien dat bedrijven 
die voornamelijk winsten voor aandeelhouders nastreven, dit in veel gevallen niet kunnen doen zonder 
stakeholders te benadelen. Deze asymmetrie brengt een nieuwe en interessante dynamiek in 
stakeholder management voor het voetlicht. Studie 3 zet FOs als organisatievorm op de radar van 
managementwetenschappers en identificeert de variabelen die verklaren welke stakeholder groep 
geprioriteerd worden in de corproate governance.  
Hoewel de consensus onder wetenschappers groeit dat het dominante corporate governance 
model waarin aandeelhouders centraal staan toe is aan vernieuwing, hebben nog maar weinig 
wetenschappers geprobeerd empirisch te onderzoeken hoe dan precies een corporate governance 
model waarin stakeholders centraal staan eruit ziet. Dit proefschrift legt de vinger op de zere plek en 
onderzoekt empirisch hoe organisaties de belangen van verschillende stakeholders met elkaar afwegen 
in corporate governance in drie specifieke stakeholder management settings. Bij elkaar genomen 
levert dit proefschrift nieuwe theoretische aanknopingspunten om stakeholder theorie en corporate 
governance beter met elkaar te integreren. In meer praktische zin helpt dit proefschrift managers beter 
begrijpen wat de consequenties zijn van bepaalde stakeholder management praktijken en beslissingen, 
en informeert het beleidsmakers in de ontwikkeling van corporate governance hervormingen.    

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